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Chapter 1 
General introduction 
   
1.1.  Healthcare cost containment Western economies have experienced high healthcare cost growth over sustained periods of time. Healthcare spending almost doubled since 1970 in countries of the European Union (EU-15), from an average of 5.5% of the economy in 1970 to 10.2% in 2014, outpacing economic growth by 1.4% per year (WHO, 2018). Several factors account for high spending growth, such as technology growth, increases in income, demographic trends and socio-economic trends (De la Maisonneuve et al., 2016; Di Matteo, 2005; Hartwig, 2008; Martín et al., 2011; Reich et al., 2012b). Largely, additional healthcare spending has produced benefits to society, increasing health and longevity (Cutler and McClellan, 2001). However, additional health and longevity gains may become increasingly costly (Cutler et al., 2006) Furthermore, some individual cost drivers may add little value, such as cost-ineffective medications, increases in overuse or lagging productivity (Brownlee et al., 2017; Erixon and Van der Marel, 2011; Pearson, 2017; Sage, 2017).   Healthcare in European countries is financed predominantly collectively. Therefore, increases in healthcare costs require governments to raise funds by increasing taxes or premiums, taking on extra government debt or liberating alternative government expenditures. However, the ability of governments to increase taxes may be limited for political and economic reasons (Trabandt and Uhlig, 2009; van den Berg et al., 2011). Furthermore, the European debt crisis proved increases in government debt to be an irresponsible option. Healthcare growth risks crowding out other government spending, like education or infrastructure (Baicker and Skinner, 2011). If the benefits of these alternative government expenditures outweigh the benefits of increased health spending, healthcare cost containment will improve welfare. In addition, healthcare spending requires a substantial redistribution of resources from healthy individuals to the ill. The willingness of healthy individuals to pay for health costs of the ill may not be unbounded, especially if these costs result from unhealthy lifestyles (Buchanan, 2011; Jeurissen, 2005; Kloosterman, 2011). Cost containment may help to sustain solidarity principles in health (Cutler, 2002; Helderman and Jeurissen, 2010; Hinrichs, 1995).   Furthermore, not all funds in healthcare are spent efficiently (OECD, 2017b). Market failures, such as adverse selection, moral hazard and information asymmetry are more abundant in healthcare than in other sectors (Arrow, 1963; Helderman and Jeurissen, 2010). This is reflected in large variations in clinical practice (Skinner and Staiger, 2015; van 
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den Berg et al., 2011), waste or fraud (Couffinhal and Frankowski, 2017; Kelley, 2009; Morris, 2009) and differences in quality (Skinner and Staiger, 2015). Resolving these issues may reduce costs while increasing quality. Cost containment policies that do not specifically target these inefficiencies risk displacement of valuable care. When properly designed, healthcare cost containment may thus provide benefits for society, by reducing excess spending that adds little benefits, reducing crowding out of other valuable government expenditures, retaining solidarity principles in healthcare and increasing efficiency of spending. To achieve these goals, countries have implemented an array of cost containment policies over the years. Cost containment policies are estimated to explain between one third and two thirds of excess healthcare growth differences between countries (De la Maisonneuve et al., 2016). Well designed cost containment policies could thus substantially add to general welfare.  In this thesis, particular attention is given to cost containment policy in the Netherlands. In 2006, the Netherlands reformed the health sector by introducing managed competition to contain costs and improve efficiency (Enthoven and van de Ven, 2007). However, cost containment proved difficult throughout the first years after reform, placing the Netherlands amongst the highest-spending countries in Europe. Then, around 2013, healthcare growth stabilised. Did managed competition reform live up to its promise of cost containment and efficiency improvement? What lessons can countries draw that have implemented or contemplate health care reforms predicated upon the principles of managed competition? What additional cost containment policies may be effective? This is particularly relevant with respect to hospital cost containment, the biggest sector in healthcare (White, 1999). The aim of this thesis is to research how governments could contain hospital costs effectively and efficiently. For this purpose experiences with managed competition in the hospital sector in the Netherlands are researched in detail. This thesis contributes to our understanding of cost containment policy in the Netherlands, which hold lessons for other OECD countries. In the next section, the managed competition system in the Netherlands is introduced, after which the aims and outline of this thesis are presented in detail.   
1.2. Managed competition and cost containment in the Netherlands The Netherlands underwent major healthcare reform in 2006, when the new Health Insurance Act introduced principles of managed competition in large parts of the healthcare sector (hospital care, primary care, pharmaceuticals). The reform had no direct consequences for long-term care. Not earlier than in 2015 long-term care underwent a major reform; one of its most conspicuous elements was the large-scale decentralization of 
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home care to municipalities (Maarse and Jeurissen, 2016). In 2006, the Netherlands spent €53 billion on healthcare (including long-term care) or 9.2 percent of GDP. Healthcare spending rose to €72.5 billion in 2015 (11% of GDP), a nominal growth percentage of 3.9% per year (CBS, 2016). Hospital care comprised a third of total spending and hospital costs increased on average by 4.9% nominally per year between 2006 and 2014 (Figure 1.1). From 2013, hospital expenditures have remained stable at slightly less than 4% of total spending.  
 Figure 1.1: trends in spending on healthcare and hospital care in the Netherlands (source: CBS Statline)  Hospital care is part of the Health Insurance Act, which is designed based on principles of managed competition (Enthoven and van de Ven, 2007). A schematic overview of the system is given in figure 1.2 (van Ginneken et al., 2011). Insurance is mandatory and individuals choose between competing insurers. Currently, ten health insurers compete in the health insurance market on the price of their premiums and quality of contracted care within the network. Insurers are incentivised to selectively contract providers in the healthcare purchasing market based on costs and quality (van Ginneken et al., 2011). Active purchasing may reduce premiums, improve network quality and thereby attract new customers. Patients choose the most appropriate provider within the network, considering for example quality, waiting times and price.   The government sets a comprehensive mandatory benefit package and determines the height of the mandatory deductible (€385 in 2018). Furthermore, the Dutch government monitors and regulates the managed competition system, while keeping direct interventions at a minimum (Rekenkamer, 2016; van Ginneken et al., 2011). However, due to rapid cost growth in the years after the reform, from 2010 the government intervened by negotiating an agreement with the representative associations of hospitals, physicians and insurers on 
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the growth of total hospital expenditures, starting with a 2.5% real growth cap in 2012, which was gradually reduced to 1% real growth (Rekenkamer, 2016). Under the expenditure cap, insurers were still supposed to selectively contract care, as long as total expenditures did not exceed the cap. Government efforts to contain costs therefore in practice mainly comprised safeguarding the managed competition system and enforcing expenditure caps. Other government tools to contain costs include increasing the mandatory deductible and restricting the mandatory benefit package (Rekenkamer, 2013).  
   Figure 1.2: The Dutch managed competition system (adopted from Van Ginneken et al., 2011)  
1.3. Evidence on cost containment in the Netherlands In the Dutch hospital setting, the government uses four main tools for cost containment: managed competition, cost sharing, benefit restrictions and budgeting (Rekenkamer, 2013). Government aims of cost containment and efficiency improvement are closely interlinked. Managed competition can be conceptualized as an alternative institutional setting to contain costs by improving efficiency. Cost sharing and benefit restrictions are additional tools to contain costs and improve efficiency. The introduction of a macro budget (expenditure cap) negotiated with the national associations of hospitals and insurers can be conceptualized as co-production. It expresses a sense of co-responsibility for cost containment. Co-production perfectly fits in the governance style of public policymaking in the Netherlands which is based less on hierarchical direction than on collaboration with main and state-recognized functional organisations representing the interests of their constituency (here hospitals, doctors, and insurers).  
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 The managed competition reform has met with mixed reviews. A number of authors are mildly positive, citing efficiency gains, premium competition and quality improvements as main accomplishments, although improvements were suggested in the area of risk equalization, merger control and quality transparency (Plexus, 2014; van de Ven et al., 2009; van Kleef et al., 2014). Other authors have been more sceptical, arguing the system does not –yet– function as envisioned (Maarse et al., 2016; Okma et al., 2011; Van Ginneken, 2015). Research mainly focused on the health insurance market and health care provision market, while quantitative research on the healthcare purchasing market has been limited (Maarse et al., 2016; Ruwaard, 2018). Competition on the health insurance market is deemed sufficient, but the healthcare purchasing market is believed to function suboptimal (Van de Ven et al., 2013; van Ginneken et al., 2011). For example, early evaluations of managed competition in the hospital sector concluded that active purchasing was limited (van de Ven et al., 2009). Main barriers are unpopularity of selective contracting by patients, fear of loss of reputation by insurers, hospital concentration, incomplete ex-ante risk equalization and lack of valid quality indicators (van de Ven et al., 2009). Over time, however, preconditions for managed competition improved (van Kleef et al., 2014). Selective contracting remained an exception directly after the reform, but has slowly increased (van Ginneken et al., 2011). Although selective contracting has always remained unpopular, restricted choice health plans gained in popularity, from 3.3% in 2013 to 13.1% in 2017 (NZa, 2017a). A gradual increase of active purchasing has been linked to improvements in cost containment (Plexus, 2014). Contracting with hospitals is based primarily on global budgets and mainly include volume agreements (van Ginneken et al., 2011). Up to date, there is little evidence that insurers use quality information in contracting (van den Berg et al., 2011; Van der Wees et al., 2014). Lack of quality transparency remains an important barrier to the functioning of managed competition (Plexus, 2014; Van Ginneken, 2015). However, the Dutch managed competition system tends to score high in international quality comparisons (Osborn et al., 2016; van den Berg et al., 2011).  Other critical points on managed competition included the absence of consequent cost containment policy (Helderman and Jeurissen, 2010). The Dutch government has insufficient means to control health costs, and insufficiently utilizes available options (Rekenkamer, 2013). Internationally, a relatively low number of cost containment policies has been described in literature for the Netherlands (Tenbensel et al., 2012). Sector agreements on expenditure caps have been effective in containing costs, but not in increasing efficiency (Rekenkamer, 2016). Use of the mandatory deductible as a means of cost sharing has been little effective in reducing utilization in the Netherlands, and is mainly used as a co-financing mechanism rather than a cost containment policy (Plexus, 2014; 
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Rekenkamer, 2013; van de Ven et al., 2009). The government sought to contain costs between 2006 and 2009 by transferring specific care (physical therapy, dental care) from the basic benefit package to supplementary insurance (Helderman and Jeurissen, 2010). However, measures to reduce the basic package have proven to be ineffective cost containment measures (Rekenkamer, 2016). To prevent cost-ineffective new technologies from entering the benefit package, the National Healthcare Institute advises the ministry based on criteria of necessity, effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and feasibility (Angelis et al., 2018). In order to prevent low-value for money technologies from replacing existing high-value care, cost effectiveness is one of the criteria used. However, the actual value loss when hospital spending is reduced remains unknown, and no formal threshold for cost-effectiveness has been implemented as yet (Angelis et al., 2018).  
1.4. Defining effective cost containment policies Cost containment is considered a government objective, strongly interlinked with efficiency improvement (Docteur and Oxley, 2013; Liu, 2003). Different interpretations of cost containment have been used; for example, “bending the cost curve”: lowering the growth of healthcare spending compared to historical growth rates (Cutler et al., 2009). Others interpret cost containment in the context of sustainability: equal or lower growth than the economy (Auerbach and Kellermann, 2011; Smith et al., 2009). Yet others equate cost containment to austerity measures: absolute reductions in spending, i.e. negative growth (Legido-Quigley et al., 2013; Reeves et al., 2015). More generally, cost containment is referred to a normative benchmark, being zero growth, the economy growth rate or historical growth rates. Measuring the effectiveness of cost containment requires a comparison between healthcare spending in a given country or region over a certain period of time with healthcare spending in another but comparable country or region (control group) over the same period of time. Another method is to compare health care spending of different but comparable payers (White, 1999).   Cost containment has been referred to in the setting of providers, e.g. within-hospital cost containment, or referring to patient journeys, where a certain new treatment may result in lower per-patient costs. For the government, two types of costs are of interest: total spending and public payer spending. The former encompasses all healthcare costs, the latter only the public part of total costs. Successful public cost containment may not necessarily reduce total spending, if public costs are shifted to private agents (White, 1999). Hospital cost savings may be of interest for the government in relation to efficiency and access, but not cost containment per se, as hospital cost savings may not translate to public or total cost containment. For example, patients may visit other hospitals or care settings in 
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response to hospital cost containment, increasing costs there. Similarly, patient treatment costs may signal increased efficiency, but if hospitals respond to patient cost savings by increasing treatment intensity in other patient groups, it does not translate into effective public or total cost containment. Therefore, in this thesis effective cost containment is defined as containment of public or total healthcare costs.    Cost containment and efficiency are related but separate government goals. In this thesis, efficiency refers to the relation between cost and quality. A reduction in costs at the same or higher level of quality is considered to increase health system efficiency, as is an improvement in quality at the same or lower level of costs (Weinstein and Stason, 1977). If an intervention greatly improves quality but slightly increases costs, efficiency is improved, but cost containment is not obtained (Moreno-Serra, 2014). Similarly, cost containment may reduce efficiency if quality sharply declines. Effective and efficient cost containment therefore is defined as containing costs while retaining or increasing efficiency, i.e. quality. The next section discusses the relation between cost containment, quality improvements and efficiency in more detail.   
1.5. Cost containment and quality improvement: a conceptual model Containment of total spending affects processes at different levels, from the government to purchasers, to providers, to health professionals and patients. Efficient and effective cost containment results in lower cost at all levels while retaining or improving quality, as illustrated by a stylized model in figure 1.3. In the model, cost containment is considered primarily a top-down process. The government sets spending limits, while purchasers impose spending limits onto providers, who steer health professionals to remain within their budgets. Conversely, quality improvement is considered predominantly a bottom-up process: starting with the wishes and needs of the patient (person), health professionals are expected to improve quality of care. In turn, high-quality providers should be stimulated through purchasing, which provides additional incentives for providers to improve quality. Evidently, governments should be involved with quality improvement, while recognising the limited effectiveness of top-down quality regulation. To improve health on a population level while containing costs, governments employ policies to safeguard and incentivise these processes, targeting all layers and agents.    Governments have a primary responsibility for cost containment on a macro level, in deciding what the optimal level of health costs should be from a societal point of view and setting spending limits accordingly. In the Netherlands, healthcare is prospectively budgeted at the start of the cabinet, and since 2012, additional spending limits are enforced through sector agreements. Concurrently, the government transfers responsibility for 
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attaining the spending limit to health insurers as purchasers. Purchasers are responsible for reducing costs while maximising health outcomes, i.e. increasing efficiency. In the Netherlands, managed competition incentivises insurers to selectively contract high-quality, low-cost providers, thereby improving quality while containing costs. Strategic purchasing incentivises providers to maximise performance and minimise costs. Providers can attain these aims by prioritizing high-value care and stimulating innovations that improve quality. These quality improvements spawn from innovative health professionals responding to wishes and needs of patients. One movement to further improve quality is person-centred care (PCC), which stipulates the importance of personal values and shared decision making. On the other hand, health professionals could use rationing to reduce ineffective care, e.g. waste and inefficiencies, when faced with budget constraints. These interactions show that in a well-functioning system, efficiency gains are stimulated at all levels, ensuring cost containment while improving health outcomes.    
1.6.  Aims of this thesis This thesis focuses on macro-level mechanisms of effective and efficient cost containment in the Dutch healthcare system. The focus on the macro level excludes cost containment policies and quality improvement strategies at the level of the provider and caregiver, e.g. hospital cost-saving strategies, quality improvement programs, prioritization, etcetera. Instead, focus is on the role of governments and purchasers in containing costs while stimulating quality improvements. This thesis contains four macro-level themes, displayed in figure 1.3:  1) Effective cost containment policies at the government level;  2) The relation between cost containment and health outcomes at the macro level;  3) The role of purchasing in improving quality and containing costs;  4) Structural hospital characteristics associated with performance.  
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These four themes aim to address knowledge gaps in the literature and to improve understanding of the macro-level mechanisms of cost containment and quality improvement. These themes also cover cost containment policy tools used in the Netherlands, relating to the performance of managed competition in efficiency improvements (theme 3), budgeting and new technology assessment (theme 2), while theme 1 and 4 examine additional policy options to contain costs. The use of mandatory deductibles as means of cost sharing is not explicitly covered in this thesis, although evidence on effectiveness in other countries is collected under theme 1.  
1.6.1. Effective cost containment policies Healthcare cost containment has been a constant policy issue: since conception of collectively financed healthcare, cost containment has been on the policy agenda. OECD countries have taken up different approaches to tackle this issue. Presently, a lot of evidence has been collected on how to contain costs (Tenbensel et al., 2012). However, as yet this information has not been collected systematically. No complete overview is available on which policy options the government can use to contain costs. Furthermore, a systematic overview of which policy options may be effective strategies is missing. This thesis aims to address this knowledge gap by collecting evidence on which options a government has to contain costs effectively. This aim is split into two research questions: 
-  What policy options do governments have to contain costs? (Chapter 2)  
-  Which policies have been effective in containing costs at the payer level? (Chapter 3) Chapter 2 contributes to the literature by providing a comprehensive overview of the literature on policy options to contain costs. To this aim, a quantitative scoping review methodology was developed. This novel review methodology identifies articles mentioning one or more policies that may contain costs. These policies are registered and categorized, providing an exhaustive overview of which policies are mentioned in literature, and how often these are mentioned. This enables identification of trends in published literature on this topic.   Although a limited number of reviews collects evidence for effectiveness of cost containment policies, this has not been done systematically from a payer perspective. Chapter 2 is used as input for a systematic review on the effectiveness of cost containment policies. Due to the heterogeneity of the methodologies used, a new quality assessment tool was developed to assess diverse approaches to policy evaluations. Furthermore, the combination of both reviews provides a novel way to detect and quantify knowledge gaps. This could support researchers in their quest for strengthening the evidence base. 
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1.6.2. The relation between cost containment and health outcomes One option to contain costs is to reduce the total hospital budget. However, this policy option does not address any inefficiencies, risking displacement of valuable care. It has been proposed that hospital budget reductions have negative effects on health outcomes, but not much empirical evidence is available. Some evidence suggests that quality declined as a consequence of cost reductions in hospital care, suggesting a trade-off between spending and quality at the macro level (Wray, 2013). Another strand of literature estimates marginal benefits of spending, defined as the value gained upon a marginal increase in the health budget. This could also be interpreted as the amount of health lost when the budget is reduced (Claxton et al., 2015a). Conveniently, these estimates can also be used in assessment of new technologies, in order to prevent new cost-ineffective technologies from entering the benefit package (Claxton et al., 2015a). In order to set effective spending limits and properly assess new technologies, governments require information on the relation between reductions in spending and health outcomes at the macro level (Helderman and Jeurissen, 2010). This leads to the following research question:  
-  What is the marginal value lost due to reductions in hospital spending in the Netherlands? (Chapter 4) For this purpose a methodology tailored to the Netherlands is constructed. This includes novel methods to construct health gains, to model the production of health gains and to correct for reverse causality. Application to the Dutch hospital sector provides estimates on the value lost when hospital funds is reduced. This information can be used to guide cost containment, specifically prioritization, new technology assessment, and setting global budgets. The Netherlands informally uses reference values in approving new technologies of between €20.000 and €80.000. Estimation of the marginal value of hospital spending allows comparison to assess if this range is appropriate. For some countries, e.g. England, the US, Canada, Spain, Australia, it is estimated that one QALY is lost for each €18.000 to €200.000 of budget reduction (Claxton et al., 2015b; Thokala et al., 2018; Vallejo-Torres et al., 2016; Vallejo‐Torres et al., 2017). Addition of the Netherlands to this list allows comparison of methodologies and outcomes.   
1.6.3. The role of purchasers in improving quality and containing costs  Active purchasing allows purchasers to simultaneously contain costs and stimulate quality improvements. Many systems have upgraded the role of purchasers over time. With the Health Insurance Act reform in 2006, the Netherlands became a forerunner in using managed competition principles to improve purchasing (Enthoven and van de Ven, 2007). 
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Despite its importance, most evaluations are mostly qualitative in nature (Klasa et al., 2018; Reinhard Busse and Elke, 2007). Up to date little empirical research has been done on purchaser performance. Theme 3 contributes to the literature by providing quantitative evidence on one aspect of strategic purchasing: the reallocation of budgets over providers. Ideally, purchasers steer patients to hospitals that provide high-quality care at acceptable costs, and away from expensive and low-quality providers. This would imply that in a well-functioning system, budgets of high-performing providers grow at the cost of low-performing providers. To research whether this is promoted by the managed competition system in the Netherlands, the following research questions were formulated:  
-  To what extent does managed competition in the hospital sector lead to reallocations of provider market share? (Chapter 5) 
-  Do quality improvements of providers lead to increased shares of new patients in a managed competition setting? (Chapter 6) Chapter 5 assesses to what extent budget reallocations take place in a managed competition system. To this aim, a new, broadly applicable indicator for budget reallocations was developed and applied to four different health systems within the Netherlands. Policy-makers could use this indicator to compare and adjust payer systems. Furthermore, the results provide empirical insights in the effects of managed competition in the Netherlands with respect to active purchasing. Chapter 6 employs a case study on purchasing to stimulate quality improvements. Conditions for selective purchasing could be considered relatively optimal for assisted reproduction (van der Geest and Varkevisser, 2008). In assisted reproduction, higher pregnancy rates result in lower costs per patient due to fewer attempts necessary. Purchasers therefore should be stimulated to purchase selectively, as this will both increase quality and reduce costs. Chapter 6 investigates to what extent quality improvements are rewarded by an increase in the number of new patients. This could inform scholars and policy makers on the combined effects of patient choice and active purchasing under managed competition.   
1.6.4. Structural hospital characteristics associated with performance Structural hospital characteristics may influence hospital performance and, consequently, costs and efficiency. Two factors often associated with performance are profit status and ownership, distinguishing between non-profit public hospitals, non-profit private hospitals and for-profit private hospitals (Pita Barros and Siciliani, 2011). Hospitals in the Netherlands are structured as non-profit private hospitals (Jeurissen, 2010). Profit status of Dutch hospitals has been much debated (Jeurissen, 2010; Plomp, 2009). A body of research has been performed on profit status, predominantly in the US, finding mixed evidence 
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(Hollingsworth, 2003; Schlesinger and Gray, 2006; Sibbel and Nagarajah, 2012). Evidence suggests profit status may not be decisive in determining hospital performance. On the other hand, new public management predicts that privatization would improve quality and efficiency compared to public provision (Boyne, 2002; Walsh, 1995). Especially in European countries, controversy on privatisation of public hospitals demands for a review on performance differences between public and private hospitals (Jeurissen et al., 2016). To this aim, the following research question is formulated:  
- Do private hospitals outperform public hospitals regarding efficiency, accessibility, and quality of care? (Chapter 7)  Chapter 7 uses a realist review methodology to collect evidence on empirical differences in hospital efficiency, quality and access from European countries since 2000. This could inform policy makers in the Netherlands and other European countries on whether private (non-profit) hospitals are indeed associated with improved outcomes in terms of quality, efficiency and equal access to care.  
1.7. Conclusions Cost containment in health care is a major policy issue. Healthcare is growing faster than the economy and ever more private and public resources are devoted to healthcare, threatening the fiscal sustainability of public budgets. Furthermore, not all spending is valuable; there is significant room for efficiency improvements. Part of resources currently spent on healthcare might be more productive elsewhere. Therefore, government intervention may be both necessary and beneficial. Over the years, Western countries have implemented many different policies to address the issue of rising costs, and many more policies have been suggested. Chapter 2 collects these policy options from the literature. However, in complex and adaptive systems such as healthcare, policies may not have their intended effect. Chapter 3 reviews effectiveness of cost containment policies. In order to make an informed decision regarding expenditure caps and new technology assessment, information is needed on the value that is lost when hospital spending is reduced. Chapter 4 estimates the marginal value for hospital care in the Netherlands. To contain costs and improve quality, the Netherlands has opted for a system of managed competition. In this system, insurers compete for patients by actively purchasing high quality care at low costs. Competitive markets are dynamic: stimulated by active purchasing, efficient providers gain market share, while inefficient providers lose market share. Chapter 5 measures these budget reallocations in Dutch healthcare markets. Steering patients to the most efficient providers could improve outcomes directly and indirectly: a larger part of the patient population is receiving high-quality care, while purchasing and competition on quality 
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incentivises providers to improve quality. Chapter 6 uses assisted reproduction in the Netherlands as a case study to test if hospitals can increase patient numbers by improving quality in a managed competition setting. Lastly, hospital costs and quality may be related to structural characteristics. New public management theory suggests that private hospitals might be more efficient than public hospitals. Chapter 7 researches this premise. Chapter 8 ends with a general discussion.   
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2 Policy options to contain healthcare costs: a 
review and classification 
Stadhouders, N., Koolman, X., Tanke, M., Maarse, H., & Jeurissen, P.  Published in Health Policy, 120(5), 486-494. (2016) 
 
 
 
 
Abstract Containing health care costs has been a challenge for most OECD member states. We classify 2250 cost containment policies in forty-one groups of policy options. This conceptual framework might act as a toolkit for policymakers that seek to develop strategies for cost control; and for researchers that seek to evaluate them. We found that certain important cost drivers such as wages and capital are being sparsely covered. We distinguish four primary targets to contain costs: volume controls, price controls, budgeting and market oriented policies. Price controls and budgeting, both seen as relatively effective, appear substantially less often in literature than volume controls and market oriented policies. The relative use of each option hardly changed over time, although the health system type did matter. Market oriented policies were more likely to be suggested for countries with public provision of health care, as well as for the US system. In contrast, budgeting policy proposals were more likely to be suggested for countries with market provision systems, such as Canada, Germany and France. Implementation of cost containment policies could lead to convergence of health care systems, except for the US system, if policies are implemented based on the literature.   
Acknowledgments The authors thank W. van den Hout and two anonymous reviewers for constructive feedback and helpful comments. This research was funded by the Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport.  
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Chapter 2 
Policy options to contain healthcare costs: a review and 
classification 
 
2.1 Introduction Health costs tend to grow faster than the economy, leading to concerns about the sustainability of health care expenditures (Pammolli et al., 2012). High growth is not necessarily a cause for concern, since good health is highly valued (OECD, 2015b). Also, new health technologies may prove to be value for money (Cutler and McClellan, 2001; Cutler et al., 2006). However, the level of health care spending might be inefficiently high in most countries (Aaron and Ginsburg, 2009; Blumenthal et al., 2013; Joumard et al., 2010; Newhouse, 1992). The US, for example, has the highest level of health expenditures of all countries, but on average performs rather poorly on health outcomes (Murray and Frenk, 2010; Reinhardt, 2012). Some studies suggest that the level of health spending does not fully account for differences in health outcomes among OECD countries, suggesting substantial room to improve value for money (Blazquez-Fernandez et al., 2014; Xingzhu, 2003).   More importantly, the rise in health care costs might increasingly threaten the sustainability of government expenditures (Mongan et al., 2008). OECD governments spend between 19% and 45% of total public spending on health care in 2011 (OECD, 2015a). As health care is a substantial spending post for governments, increases in total health care expenditures could risk for government budget excesses. These can be resolved by containing health costs, increasing taxation (or social contributions) or cutting spending on other government items such as education or infrastructure (Di Matteo, 2010; Glied, 2008; Kane and Orszag, 2003; Kiewiet and McCubbins, 2014; Monaco and Phelps, 1995). Increasing debt levels could provide short term relief, but are not sustainable as a permanent solution to health cost growth (Chernew et al., 2010).   As a result of the global financial crisis, governments increasingly took austerity measures to lower public spending on health care (Moreno-Serra, 2014; Pisu, 2014; Ryu et al., 2013). Although health growth has slowed down since the crisis, in part because of cost containment policies, health costs growth can pick up again as the economy improves (Cuckler et al., 2013; Robson, 2001). Also, new and expensive technologies entering the market might increase expenditures (Jago, 2015; Keehan et al., 2015). As health costs are projected to continue to outpace economic growth, cost containment likely remains a pressing issue (Cuckler et al., 2013; Fuchs, 2013). Thus, targeted cost containment strategies 
Chapter 2 
 
20 
 
that could lower spending without adversely affecting health outcomes are increasingly sought for. On the other hand, many cost containment strategies hold the risk to turn into policies of cost-shifting, sometimes with adverse health outcomes.   Studies about cost containment policies are accumulating, providing opportunities to learn from other countries’ experiences (Cuckler et al., 2013; White, 1999). To categorize the existing knowledge a comprehensive cost containment model is required (Marmor et al., 2005). Some proposals for categorization were based on the distinction between supply and demand (Chernew et al., 2010; Murray and Frenk, 2010), sometimes added by additional layers that seek to catch the institutional dimension of healthcare, such as ‘public management, coordination and financing’ (Moreno-Serra, 2014). Jourmard et al. distinguish market based policies from command and control policies in an effort to assess health system efficiencies (Joumard et al., 2010). In an important article that evaluates the interplay between health systems characteristics and common cost containment policies, White introduced a distinction between ‘targets’ and ‘systems’ of cost control, whereby ‘targets’ mainly refer to policies affecting either prices or volumes; and ‘systems’ to the dimensions of the health system necessary for effective cost containment (White, 1999). However, such categorizations do not intend to be comprehensive, and moreover only evaluate a subset of cost containment policies.   The aim of this article is to construct a conceptual model to study cost containment policies and interventions, grounded in the relevant literature and including less common as well as more standard policies. We think that such a model can inform policymakers about possible cost containment directions. Moreover, it may serve to structure research on the effectiveness of specific groups of containment policies. We focus on the government goal of containment of the public part of health expenditure, implicitly aligning with most papers about cost containment. We use a broad scoping review and a perspective that aligns with the aim of containing costs on a system-wide level and include policies described for governments in all 34 OECD member states. Section 2 presents our conceptual framework. Section 3 describes our methodology to collect and categorize cost containment policies from the literature to complete our model. Section 4 describes our results. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of our results and policy implications.  
 
2.2 The framework We start by using the accounting identity expressing total costs as a combination of volumes and prices. Policies to contain total health care costs can directly target price or volume or alternatively, their interplay (Chandra et al., 2012). Next to direct price and volume controls we distinguish two types of policies that target both volumes and prices: budgets and 
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market oriented policies. A budget forces containment of prices and/or volumes. Governments can use a market oriented approach to increase efficiency and ultimately lower total costs. Market oriented policies refer to policies influencing market processes and market players rather than policies that stimulate ‘free markets’ or competition. Market oriented policies could very well add restrictions to ‘free’ markets. These policies are therefore not exclusive to market-based systems (Brown, 2003).   The effects of different types of cost containment policies in terms of volumes and prices depend on a number of factors, such as the reimbursement model, the cost-structure (e.g. level of marginal costs), or the services mix. For example, lower reimbursement prices could induce higher volumes as physicians try to compensate income losses (Barer et al., 1996). A decrease in the price of inpatient care might lead to increases of both prices and volumes for outpatient care (Davis and Russell, 1972). Restricting the number of physicians might lower the number of treatments, but also can lead to scarcity with upward pressures on treatment prices (Barer et al., 1996). Services with high marginal costs might be more responsive to cost containment policies than those with high fixed costs (Moreno-Serra, 2014). Also, cost containment of public expenditures could lead to increased private expenditures, i.e. cost shifting. However, assessing the effects of cost containment policies is beyond the scope of this paper. We base our framework on policy targets rather than outcomes in terms of prices and volumes, as targets may be more invariant.  In this framework we therefore identify four primary targets for cost containment: 1) direct price controls, 2) direct volume controls, 3) budgeting and 4) market oriented policies. We hypothesize that all cost containment policies can be classified to one of these four categories. These four main categories can be further specified using second-level concepts.   Governments can control prices by targeting reimbursement prices or production 
costs. Reimbursement prices can be contained by rate-setting on health services. Production costs include costs of inputs as well as the costs of capital and labor (Mankiw, 2014). As total health care costs are the product of capital and labor inputs at a fixed level of technology, input factor prices are considered important targets for cost containment. Reimbursement prices can differ from production costs, the difference being provider profits. Therefore, the effect of policies targeting containment of production costs is likely to be larger in public provision systems and highly competitive systems, as lower production costs are more likely to translate into lower reimbursements. Conversely, in market oriented system with weak competition lower production costs may merely result in higher provider profits.  Policies aimed to control volumes target the number of services providers might be able to provide (supplier side volume controls); or control the number of treatments patients are willing or able to consume (demand side volume controls). Further, budgets can be 
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determined for a specific part of the healthcare system (sectoral budget) or a bundle of different sectors (macro budgets). We use the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP-) framework to categorize market oriented policies (Martin, 2010). Market structure influences the market conduct in terms of competition or collaboration, which then channels actual market performance. Policies can target each stage of the framework to obtain a lower-cost outcome.  
 
2.3 Materials and methods Appendix figure 2.5 graphically summarizes our methodology and our research strategy. Since the aim is to provide a broad overview of the field of cost containment policies, we performed a scoping review (Arksey and O'Malley, 2005; Armstrong et al., 2011). We restricted our methodology to articles in the English language. Our review focused on policies enacted at the regional or country level (Liu, 2003; White, 1999). To retain a broad scope, a policy was included if the article states that it may contain costs. This may be sector costs, public costs or total health costs. Possibly our review includes policies which a paper claims to be able to contain costs, but which turn out to be ineffective. For example, policies may simply shift cost to patients without affecting the total cost level (Swartz, 2010). However, evaluating effectiveness of cost containment policies is beyond the scope of this paper. Policies may have other aims besides cost containment, such as increasing quality or equity. We include policies if the article states that the aim of a policy is, amongst other aims, cost containment.   We identified the following keywords, in various combinations using Boolean operators and glossary terms when appropriate: Sector: healthcare, health care, long 
term care; action: lower, control, contain, decrease; object: expenditures, cost; Actor: 
government, policy. The following online literature databases were used: Pubmed, Embase, CINAHL, Econlit, Web of science, Business Source Complete, Sage Research Methods, IDEAS. Using these keywords, we found 8134 articles. We imported these articles in Endnote X7 and scanned each on title and abstract. Duplicates were removed using Endnote’s ‘Remove Duplicates’ function. If the possibility of inclusion could not be determined by title and abstract, the full text was examined. Finally, 710 articles met all of our inclusion criteria of which the following information was extracted: year of publication, authors, journal, title, the country or countries the article refers to, region, state or province the article refers to (if relevant), specific health sector, as well as all cost containment policies mentioned.  Two reviewers categorized the cost containment policies from the literature into one main category and one secondary category. For each policy, first we determined whether it 
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targeted total costs (budgeting) or not. If the policy could not be considered a budget, we assessed whether a policy directly targets prices, by setting the reimbursement price or by targeting production costs. For example, introducing DRG’s (payment reform) does not set prices of DRG, but introduces a mechanism that could lead to more efficient provision. Therefore, it was categorized as a policy targeting efficiency improvements via market processes. However, a policy setting DRG prices was considered as rate-setting, and was categorized as a price targeting policy. Similarly, we assessed whether a policy directly targets volume, by reducing patient demand or by provider restrictions. For example, cost sharing targets patient overuse of care rather than a lower reimbursement price, and is therefore considered a policy primarily targeting lower volumes (Swartz, 2010). Policies stimulating moving from an inpatient setting to an outpatient setting do not mainly aim to restrict treatment volumes, but rather promote a more efficient setting for treatments, and were therefore categorized as a policy changing market structure to obtain cost containment. Finally, policies can promote a more efficient, lower cost outcome by influencing market processes. These include policies targeting market structure, like merger controls or changing types of third party payers, but also policies targeting to reduce inefficiencies in the overall performance of the health system, such as administrative excesses or tort reform.   Cost containment policies could be part of policy bundles, such as the Choosing Wisely campaign (Levinson et al., 2014). The cost containment aspects of these policy bundles were evaluated separately. For example, the notion of patient-centered care can include a number of policies which may lower costs, e.g. shared decision making, enhance patient choice in providers, increase possibilities to choose insurance and reduce practice variation to reduce overtreatment (Cassel and Guest, 2012). Separate policies within a bundle having different targets may be categorized at different places in our framework. Next, we created a third layer of categories to further specify our findings. This categorization was based on similarity between policies (inductive approach) (Elo and Kyngäs, 2008). Groups were given a term that covers the underlying policies. If any intervention did not fit into any existing group, a new group was created until all cost containment options were assigned to one single group. The second reviewer repeats this procedure to test the robustness of the categorization. 
 We validated the saturation of the model using two external sources. Berenson et al. present a complete overview of 36 cost containment policies that were implemented in US Medicare between 1970 and 2008 (Berenson et al., 2008). The Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) evaluates electoral plans of Dutch political parties on their budgetary effects. In 2015, CPB evaluated 104 policy propositions from ten different parties 
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(CPB, 2015), providing an overview of cost containment policies that covers the entire spectrum of political ideologies. Two researchers independently categorized the cost containment options from these two sources (Given, 2008).   
2.4 Results We were able to extract a total of 2250 studied cost containment policies from our database of 710 articles. The majority of articles was published in 1994 (figure 2.1). The US is the largest contributor with 52% of all policy options, followed by Canada (9%) and Germany (7%). We found articles for 28 of 34 OECD countries. The majority of articles was published in Health Affairs (76), Health Policy (38) and the New England Journal of Medicine (18). 153 articles explicitly covered a health subsector, specifically pharmacy (37%), long-term care and mental care (28%), hospital care (25%) and primary care/prevention (10%).   All 2250 cost containment policy options were placed into one of the four target categories of the conceptual framework with an inter-rater reliability of 83%. Disagreements were discussed and re-categorized. Figure 2.2 shows that most policies found in the literature are market oriented policies (44%), followed by volume controls (34%), price controls (15%) and budgeting (7%). Following our inductive approach, 39 third-level categories are defined (inter-rater reliability 76%). The remaining 24% is re-categorized based on common consent, which required minor changes in category definitions (see Appendix table 2.1). Some cost containment policies were found to be used in different settings and for different targets. For example, technology assessment is stated as a tool to define the benefit package, to prevent overtreatment, to establish a reference price and to improve transparency. These tools for cost containment were categorized based on their specific target as stated in the article.  
 Figure 2.1: Number of cost containment policy publications over the years 1970-2015 (For 2015 the total number of articles is estimated based on the 2015 articles up to september) (left axis) related to weighted OECD-average health costs as percentage of GDP (right axis). 
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 Confrontation of our model with real world cost containment policies did not result in alteration of the model. Of the 36 implemented policies in Medicare, 32 were literally present in our database, and for 4 policies similar terms were found. Of 104 real life propositions made by Dutch political parties, 37 were featured literally in the review database; while similar terms could be found for another 52 policies. Sixteen policies did not have a counterpart in the literature, but could be categorized using the existing categories from the framework. The validation did not lead to revision of the framework.   Figure 2.2 suggests that the toolkit of policymakers to limit spending growth healthcare contains up to forty-one explicit strategies. This figure also illustrates that some of the primary strategies that are considered comparatively more effective, such as budgeting and price controls (Stabile et al., 2013), are covered less intensively in the literature. The structure of the third party payer market has been proposed and studied the most among our database (185), followed by payment reforms (174) altering the method of reimbursement (e.g. DRG’s, capitation, pay-for-performance), cost sharing mechanisms (160), and policies aiming to increase appropriateness through utilization review, guidelines and reduction of regional variation (148).  Some categories such as patient choice of providers (3), cost reducing innovations (6), and the reduction of fraud (8) and waste (9) have been hardly mentioned or studied. We conclude the same for important underlying cost drivers such as wages (21) and capital (11). Demand policies make up 17% of all cost containment policy proposals (387 of 2250). Demand policies initially comprised 10% of all policies during the 1980’s, increased to 20% in the early nineties and stabilized afterwards (data not shown). Strategies with more inconclusive outcomes on cost containment seem to have been covered the most, perhaps suggesting that searching for efficiency dominates pure cost control. 
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  After relative stability we see an increase around 2008 in the literature that tracks market oriented cost containment (figure 2.3a). As over half the articles are US-oriented and the US may be considered an outlier healthcare system (Böhm et al., 2013), we also show the relative quote of cost containment targets for OECD countries excluding the US (figure 2.3b). When excluding the US, market oriented policies decrease to about 25-30% of all policies. In OECD countries other than the US, studies on volume controls are predominant at about 40 percent. Budgeting peaked in popularity in the early 90’s with 20% of all policies, but then levelled off to about 10%. Budgeting and price controls also plateau at somewhat higher levels than the articles that cover these issues for the US.  
a
 
b
 Figure 2.3: The moving 5-year average trends of relative coverage in literature of primary cost containment targets in (a) all OECD countries and (b) OECD countries excluding the US.  Figure 2.4 plot some trends in individual cost containment policies that have been studied most. Across market oriented policies third party payer structure tops during the late 
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
market
volume
price
budget
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
market
volume
price
budget
Chapter 2 
28 
nineteen nineties, before entering into a steep decline. This seems to correspond with the rise and fall of managed care practices in the US. Recently, many studies cover payment reform illustrating the search towards new reimbursement mechanisms that include elements of quality and outcome schemes (figure 2.4a). We witness a declining number of studies into capacity regulations and benefits (figure 2.4b).  
a
 
b
 Figure 2.4: The moving 5-year average trends of highly covered containment strategies in the literature: a) market oriented policies and b) volume control strategies. 
 We categorized health systems as public provision or market-based provision systems based on the classification of Joumard (OECD, 2011), as the study classifies most OECD member countries into two equal-sized groups. The US was considered as a third type of system characterized by a high level of private insurance (Böhm et al., 2013). Using this classification, we found that countries relying on market based provision attract more policy suggestions for cost containment than public provision countries (see Appendix table 2.2). 
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Excluding the US, policy options in market based provision countries were covered three times as often in absolute terms compared to public provision countries. Interestingly, budgeting and pricing options are covered somewhat more for market provision systems in comparison with public types; while, in relative terms, market oriented policies and volume controls are covered more often for public provision systems. This might indicate that the literature holds a tendency to cover options that might fit better into alternative healthcare systems. The US tops all other countries with a very strong interest in the literature towards market oriented cost containment policies.  To check the robustness of the classification, two other classifications are used (Böhm et al., 2013; Docteur and Oxley, 2013). Docteur and Oxley differ from Joumard primarily in the classification of Australia, the UK and New Zealand. Appendix table 2.3 shows that countries such as Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Japan and Australia have fewer market oriented policies (25-30% of total) compared to the UK, Sweden and New Zealand (39-50% of total). Thus, our results are somewhat sensitive to the grouping of the UK and New-Zealand with regard to market oriented policies. For most countries too few articles were found for each policy classification to be robust.   
2.5 Discussion A full overview of cost containment policies holds the promise to form a powerful checklist, which helps policymakers to better structure their policies as well as discovering alternative options. This contributes to the art and craft of both policy learning and policy analysis. Since fiscal stress often induces reactive policymaking based on countries’ institutional legacies, a structural assessment of policy options might add to the policymakers’ toolkit.   In this article, we set out to construct a conceptual cost containment framework. To this aim, we constructed a theoretical framework distinguishing four primary targets for controlling health costs: (1) price controls, (2) volume controls, (3) budgets, and (4) market oriented policies. By collecting 710 articles that describe a total of 2250 cost containment options, we were able to further specify our model into 41 separate categories of cost containment policies. Our review allows identification of trends in cost containment policy literature. In his 2002 paper, David Cutler discerns three universal waves of health reform in OECD-countries (Cutler, 2002). The first wave of reform provided equal access and universal coverage (about 1940-1970). This spurred large cost increases, leading to a wave of cost containment reforms (1970-2000). In order to increase efficiency, a third wave of market based reforms was initiated in the 2000’s. Therefore, we expected to find that literature about cost containment would increase up to 2000, after which attention would shift toward market oriented policies. Our data partly supports this theory. First of all, the 
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number of cost containment articles shows two peaks. The first peak could reflect increased concerns about cost containment in the early and mid-1990s, consistent with the second wave of health reform, while the second peak might relate to the global recession of 2008 (Houÿez et al., 2014). However, given that over half of the articles consider the US, major political events such as the 1994 Health Care Act and the 2009 Affordable Care Act might also be reflected in the peaks in publications. Secondly, the literature shows a shift towards market oriented policies around 2008, consistent with the third wave of health reform. However, a different pattern emerges when the US is excluded from analysis: although market oriented policies slightly increased after 2000, volume controls remain predominant in literature. There, we do not find conclusive evidence that after 2000 the study of cost containment through market oriented policies increased in importance.   Our findings that some main targets are used more often than others might be explained by the fact that some policy effects are controversial, leading to more academic discussions. In contract, some policy directions might be already implemented and not under consideration for change. However, the relation between academic literature and policy-making is uncertain. Part of the literature included in our research describes policies already implemented, while other literature is suggesting policies for future policy-making. Also, academic literature might be lagging on policy making due to the time taken up by writing and publishing. For some OECD countries no articles were found. Adding gray and non-English literature possibly might align our analysis better to the interests of policy makers. English peer-reviewed literature might form an incomplete proxy of what policymakers and researchers actually consider to be possible options. Our validity controls show that although policies considered by policy-makers do not substantially differ from those found in the literature, some differences in relative use are visible. For example, the two external sources of policies showed relative high use of demand policies, like cost sharing and benefit package reductions.   The relative attention on cost containment policies seems to differ between types of health system. Higher numbers of cost containment policies in market provision systems like Canada and Germany might reflect that these have more difficulties in containing costs (Or et al., 2010), although a publication bias towards market based provision systems could also be present. Furthermore, we expected that market based provision systems would attract relatively more attention on market oriented cost containment policies (Lameire et al., 1999; Saltman et al., 2004). Similarly, public provision systems might be expected to attract more attention for budgeting and price and volume controls. However, market oriented policies are comparatively more often suggested for public provision systems like the United Kingdom and Sweden, while budgeting and pricing strategies are more often 
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suggested for market based provision systems (other than the US). This might indicate that researchers look into alternative solutions to enhance the cost containment possibilities of their healthcare system. If policy makers use the existing literature in designing and implementing cost containment policies, this could induce to the emergence of more hybrid health systems (Joumard et al., 2010; Schmid et al., 2010; Wendt et al., 2005). However, for the US the literature about cost containment is more biased towards market oriented policies. This might suggest that in the US, strategies such as budgeting and price controls are not considered to be very realistic policy options (Stabile et al., 2013). Alternatively, the US might be more market oriented for cost containment presently as historically the US system might have lagged behind in market constraints compared to other OECD countries (White, 2007).   When designing cost containment measures, governments and policymakers can benefit from an encompassing overview of cost containment policies that is grounded in the peer-reviewed literature. Our model might aid policymakers by showing possible directions of cost containment not previously considered. Combinations of different cost containment strategies such as price and volume controls might lower cost growth; while budgeting might prevent cost shifting and market oriented policies might increase efficiency. Inquiring into combinations of policies could provide new insights into effective cost containment. A follow-up systematic review holds the promise to inform scholars and policymakers with strong evidence of the real world effectiveness of (combinations of) different cost containment policies.  
2.6 Concluding remarks This article categorizes policy options from the literature directed at health care cost control. The resulting taxonomy will aid policy makers in considering strategies to control health costs. We identified forty-one options, which were placed into four main groups: price controls, volume controls, budgeting and ‘market oriented’ policies. Overall, market oriented policies received most attention in literature. This was mainly driven by the overrepresentation of US studies. For other countries, volume controls were the predominant target. We found that budgeting and price controls were sparsely represented in literature, especially in studies about the US. Market oriented policies were mentioned and studied more in public provision systems like the UK, Sweden and New Zealand. Budgeting was more studied in market provision systems like Canada, Germany and France. Cost containment policies could increase convergence in these systems, if policymakers do follow such trends in academic cost containment interest in their real world implementation strategies.   
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Appendix to Chapter 2 
 Figure 2.5 Four-step methodology for a scoping review on cost containment policies, including search strategy and inclusion criteria. 
  
Table 2.1: Overview of cost containment policy group definitions 
nr Policy group Definition  
1 Macro budget A budget covering all health spending 
2 Sector budget A budget covering sector health spending 
3 Price limits Policies aiming to directly limit, control or cut the existing prices or fee schedules.  
4 Fee schedule A policy of implementing fixed across-the-board-prices for providers/treatments.  
5 Reference pricing Reference pricing is a specific type of fee schedule, where prices are set according to a reference. This can be the price a comparable product, or a reference price based on international prices for the same product.  
6 Price negotiations Policies aimed to lower prices by implementing price negotiation systems.  
7 Lower-cost substitutes Policies enforcing or promoting the use of lower cost inputs, such as medicines and medical devices, in treatment. Lower-cost substitutes can be subdivided into bulk billing, use of generics and trade. 
8 Wage controls Policies controlling salaries in health care 
9 Profit controls Policies controlling profits of health providers 
10 Capital controls Policies controlling the capital/investments in health care  
11 Reduce overtreatment Policies aimed to reduce unwanted variation in volumes 
Policy options to contain healthcare costs: a review and classification 
 
33 
12 Capacity controls Capacity controls limit the capacity to perform treatments or to limit take-in of new patients. This includes restrictions on the number of providers or the size and capacity of providers.  
13 Access control Policies designed to control or restrict patients’ physical (non-monetary) access to care.  
14 Labor restrictions Reduce or restrict the health care labor force (e.g. nurses or medical specialists) 
15 Cost sharing Cost sharing does not directly influence the full price, but increases the share of the price patients pay. Patients respond by demanding lower volumes, which makes this policy a patient side volume control policy. 
16 Benefit package Policies aiming to restrict or reduce the specific care covered by insurance. This is a special case of increasing copayments for specific procedures to 100% private payment.  
17 Prevention Policies encouraging prevention programs in order to prevent people from becoming ill and making use of health care 
18 New technology control All policies designed to prevent the emergence and adaptation of novel treatments, medicines or medical devices.  
19 Patient empowerment Policies designed to increase the role of the patient within the care system when it comes to selecting treatment options.  
20 Third party payer structure Policies aimed to alter the type of insurers/carriers/purchasers active in the market.  
21 Provider structure Policies altering the provider setting in a market, changing the setting in which a treatment takes place or promoting a different mix of providers.  
22 Government level Policies that alter the level of decision making of the government in health care. The level of government decision making varies from local community autonomy to centralized government decision making.  
23 Responsibility redefinition Policies that alter market structure by redefining tasks and responsibilities between health providers. 
24 Antitrust policy Policies that prevent cartels, control mergers and safeguard competition  
25 Ownership Policies promoting to change the legal ownership of health providers or insurers are placed in this category.  
26 Risk redistribution Policies that change distribution of risks between providers and payers in the health market. 
27 Payment reform Policies that alter the provider payment system or promote certain payment structures are placed within this category.  
28 Competition Policies that promote provider and insurer competition are placed in this category 
29 Prospective payments Policies promoting predetermined payments as opposed to retrospective payments fall under this category 
30 Coordination  Policies that promote more coordination between providers  
31 Contracting Policies aimed to alter market conduct by altering insurer contracts or provider contracts 
32 Consumer choice Policies promoting consumer choice of insurance  
33 Patient choice Policies promoting patient choice of providers 
34 Health IT Policies aimed to promote the use of IT in health care  
35 Tort reform Policies that aim to reduce health costs by altering the medical liability legislation 
36 Administration Policies aimed to reduce the administrative burden, for example by reducing or simplifying administrative requirements 
37 Management  Policies that aim to improve the performance of provider management through manager incentivation or management process control 
38 Information  Policies that provide information to patients and providers  
39 Reduce waste Policies aimed to reduce excess waste and inefficiency in health care given the volume of treatments. The policies aim to lower costs by cutting those things that do not contribute to the value of treatments 
40 Reduce fraud Policies aimed to reduce fraud and abuse 
41 Innovation Policies that promote cost-saving (process) innovations and reduce the cost of innovations through patent policy. 
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Table 2.2: Use of four primary targets for cost containment policies in literature per type of health 
system according to the OECD health system classification of Joumard (2010).   Budget Price Market Volume Market provision systems1 99 (13%) 161 (21%) 219 (29%) 282(37%) Public provision systems2 24 (8%) 46 (16%) 96 (34%) 119 (42%) The US 88 (6%) 154 (11%) 782 (54%) 427 (29%) Policy options suggested for more than one type of provision system are counted for each. Countries not included in the classification are excluded from the analysis.  1. Germany, Netherlands, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Austria, Czech Republic, Greece, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg; 2. Iceland, Sweden, Turkey, Denmark, Finland, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, United Kingdom 
 
Table 2.3: Use of four primary targets for cost containment policies in literature per type of health 
system according to the classification of Docteur and Oxley (2013).   Budget Price Market Volume Public contract model1 107 (12%) 171 (20%) 254 (30%) 313 (37%) Public integrated model2 13 (8%) 28 (18%) 43 (28%) 70(46%) private insurance/provider model3 88 (6%) 154 (10%) 793 (54%) 435 (30%) Policy options suggested for more than one type of provision system are counted for each. Countries not included in the classification are excluded from the analysis.  1. Japan, France, Netherlands, UK, Germany, Canada, New Zealand, Spain, Hungary, Austria, Ireland, Czech, Belgium; 2. Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Australia, Italy, Greece, Portugal; 3. US, Switzerland 
 
Table 2.4: Use of four primary targets for cost containment policies in literature per type of health 
system according to the classification of Böhm et al. (2013).    Budget Price Market Volume NHS1 18 (8%) 29 (13%) 71 (32%) 101 (46%) NHI2 39 (12%) 76 (23%) 103 (31%) 115 (35%) SHI3 29 (14%) 42 (20%) 69 (32%) 75 (35%) PHS4 88 (6%) 154 (11%) 782 (54%) 427 (29%) ESHI5 35 (13%) 51 (19%) 74 (27%) 112 (41%) Policy options suggested for more than one type of provision system are counted for each. Countries not included in the OECD classification are excluded from the analysis.  1. (NHS=National Health Service ) Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Portugal, Spain, UK; 2. (NHI=National Health insurance) Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, Italy; 3. (SHI=Social Health Insurance) Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, Switzerland; 4. (PHS=Private Health Systems) USA; 5. (ESHI=Etatist Social Health Insurance) Belgium, Estonia, France, Czech Republic, Hungary, Netherlands, Japan, Poland, Slovakia, Israel, Korea 
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Table 2.5: Countries, cost containment policies and relative quotes 
Country Total number of policies budget price volume market 
US 1451 6% 11% 29% 54% 
Canada 236 12% 23% 35% 29% 
Germany 192 15% 22% 35% 29% 
UK 120 7% 12% 43% 39% 
Netherlands 99 14% 18% 38% 30% 
France 68 19% 13% 44% 25% 
Japan 47 4% 21% 45% 30% 
Australia 38 11% 21% 42% 26% 
Sweden 31 3% 3% 52% 42% 
New Zealand 30 3% 33% 13% 50% 
Italy 23 13% 9% 48% 35% 
Norway 22 9% 18% 59% 14% 
Denmark 22 9% 9% 59% 23% 
Spain 21 24% 33% 33% 10% 
Switzerland 18 0% 0% 39% 61% 
Korea 16 13% 19% 38% 31% 
Greece 15 7% 67% 7% 20% 
Israel 13 0% 15% 31% 54% 
Belgium 9 44% 11% 33% 11% 
Czech republic 6 0% 33% 67% 0% 
Ireland 5 40% 20% 20% 20% 
Hungary 4 0% 50% 50% 0% 
Poland 4 0% 50% 50% 0% 
Slovakia 4 0% 50% 50% 0% 
Slovenia 4 0% 50% 50% 0% 
Austria 4 0% 0% 25% 75% 
Portugal 2 0% 50% 0% 50% 
Turkey 1 0% 0% 0% 100%    
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3 Effective healthcare cost-containment policies: a 
systematic review 
Stadhouders, N.,* Kruse, F.,* Tanke, M., Koolman, X., & Jeurissen, P.  * Shared first authorship  Published in Health Policy, 123(1), 71-79 (2019)    
Abstract Unsustainable growth in healthcare expenditure demands effective cost-containment policies. We review policy effectiveness using total payer expenditure as primary outcome measure. We included all OECD member states from 1970 onward. After a rigorous quality appraisal, we included 43 original studies and 18 systematic reviews that cover 341 studies. Policies most often evaluated were payment reforms (10 studies), managed care (8 studies) and cost sharing (6 studies). Despite the importance of this topic, for many widely-used policies very limited evidence is available on their effectiveness in containing healthcare costs. We found no evidence for 21 of 41 major groups of cost-containment policies. Furthermore, many evaluations displayed a high risk of bias. Therefore, policies should be more routinely and rigorously evaluated after implementation. The available high-quality evidence suggests that the cost curve may best be bent using a combination of cost sharing, managed care competition, reference pricing, generic substitution and tort reform.    
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Chapter 3 
Effective healthcare cost-containment policies: a systematic review 
 
3.1 Introduction The share of GDP spend on healthcare is increasing in all member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), from 4.6% of GDP in 1970 to 9.0% of GDP in 2016 (Keehan et al., 2015). Despite a temporary slowdown in the growth of healthcare spending during the fiscal crisis, the pace of healthcare growth is again accelerating in many OECD countries (Keehan et al., 2015). Growth is driven by a combination of factors: ageing populations and work-force, technological advances, changing preferences due to higher incomes, higher wage growth due to lagging productivity growth, and increased coverage (Murthy and Okunade, 2016). Healthcare expenditure is financed primarily collectively (OECD, 2017a). The capacity to fund further health spending growth through increases in taxes and premiums seems limited (Trabandt and Uhlig, 2011). Hence, expanding healthcare budgets may increasingly pressure public spending in other areas, such as education or infrastructure (De La Maisonneuve and Martins, 2013). Furthermore, the healthcare sector is prone to inefficiencies such as unnecessary care, waste in healthcare, unwarranted clinical practice variation, administrative burdens, fraud and abuse (Berwick and Hackbarth, 2012). The combination of the limited capability of both the government and the economy to keep financing high healthcare growth, plus the awareness about the existing inefficiencies in healthcare, provides policymakers with a compelling argument to contain healthcare costs.  Various countries have sought to address high healthcare cost growth through myriad policies (Chen et al., 2017; Craig and Howard, 2014; Gusmano and Allin, 2014). Many EU countries, for example, have been experimenting with strict cost containment policies during the fiscal crisis (Reeves et al., 2014). Salaries were reduced in France and Ireland (Mladovsky et al., 2012), and Greece likewise implemented policies to cut physician’s wages and fees by 25% (Karanikolos et al., 2013). Health budgets were reduced in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland, amongst other countries (Mladovsky et al., 2012). Latvia and Bulgaria reduced the health budget by over 20% (Mladovsky et al., 2012). Although health systems differ, cost-containment policies have been remarkably similar across countries (Stadhouders et al., 2016). And while the effects may be context-dependent, still countries could learn from each other’s experiences, especially regarding effectiveness (Anderson et al., 2013; Stabile et al., 2013; Stanton and Rutherford, 2002). 
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A large number of cost containment policies have been identified, targeting all aspects of the health system, such as prices, volumes, supply, demand and market processes (Stadhouders et al., 2016). However, the adaptive capability of the health system may complicate attaining the goal of containing total costs. For example, price reductions may invoke volume increases (Evans et al., 1989; Lomas et al., 1989; Tai‐Seale et al., 1998), or compensation in other areas (Dobson et al., 2006; Yip, 1998). In general, intervening in market processes may invoke adverse behavioural responses (Burns and Pauly, 2018; Simoens and Giuffrida, 2004). Therefore, whether policies are effective in containing total spending remains an empirical query.  To our knowledge, a robust overview of the available evidence is lacking. The few reviews undertaken focus on areas such as pharmaceuticals (Han et al., 2015) or hospitals (Schwierz, 2016), Medicare and Medicaid (Berenson et al., 2008), payment reform (Hsiao et al., 1993; NCSL, 2011), and efficiency (Liu, 2003). None of these reviews has systematically appraised the reliability and risk of bias of the included articles. Moreover, most reviews do not assess the evidence from a payer perspective, whether governments (in National Health Service systems), healthcare insurers (in Social Health Insurance systems) or governmental organisations like Medicare and Medicaid. Instead, most studies in this field take either a patient or provider perspective. Patient level policies may reduce patient treatment cost, but may forego the provider response to use the access capacity for additional care for other patient groups. Similarly, provider level policies (e.g. hospitals implementing policies to reduce their operating costs) may fail to incorporate additional burdens that may fall on primary care providers or other hospitals (Sharfstein et al., 2018). From a provider or patient perspective, costs may decrease, but due to possible spillovers to other sectors, providers and/or patients render the effect on total payer expenditure ambiguous.  This review addresses this issue by focusing on the effect of policies from a societal/payer perspective (Garattini and Ghislandi, 2006). From a societal perspective, costs are contained when total healthcare expenditures are reduced (combining all payers and patients); while from a payer perspective cost containment implies a reduction in payer expenditures. This allows cost shifting to patients and cost shifting between payers, but not between patient groups or hospitals. The aim of this review is threefold: (1) to summarise existing literature on the effectiveness of healthcare cost-containment policies; (2) to identify knowledge gaps; and (3) to inform policymakers on promising cost-containment policies.   
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3.2 Materials and methods We performed a systematic review to identify evidence on the effectiveness of known policy options to control payer expenditure. Our approach follows the Centre for Reviews and Dissemination guidance protocol for undertaking reviews in healthcare (Khan et al., 2001). Standard rapid review procedures were followed with respect to handsearching journals, expert consultations and article translations (Tricco et al., 2016). Inclusion criteria are defined according to the Patient, Intervention, Comparator, Outcome, Study design (PICOS) framework (Table 3.1) (Liberati et al., 2009). Effective cost containment is defined as lower total expenditure or payer expenditure compared to a control group, including before-after comparisons within the same population and comparison to a similar population (e.g. insured population of insurers, regions or countries) (OECD/WHO/Eurostat, 2011). Our study population is defined as the insured population (enrolees) of one or more payers, either private or public. This excludes studies using per patient expenditure, per provider expenditure, volumes or prices as sole outcome measure. Containing the cost per unit of service, i.e. increasing efficiency, is excluded, except when this is shown to lead to reductions in total expenditures. Other outcomes – in particular quality, equity and efficiency – are policy relevant as well, but beyond the scope of this review. This review only includes OECD countries. 
Table 3.1: PICOS inclusion criteria Population  Health sectors of OECD countries  Intervention  Implementation of a cost containment policy  Comparator  Comparison over time, between regions or between groups of insured  Outcome  Reduction in level or growth of:  
 Total expenditure 
 Sector expenditure 
 Public expenditure 
 Total health insurance premiums  Study design  Empirical policy evaluations   Using inductive pilot searches, relevant keywords were defined for all inclusion criteria. A twofold strategy was employed: a search for cost-containment policies in general and a specific search for individual policies that were identified as cost-containment policies (Stadhouders et al., 2016). The final search string (see Appendix table 3.3), was amended with database specific glossary terms (MeSH terms). The following databases were searched (June 2016): Pubmed, Medline, The Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature (CINAHL), Web of Science and Econlit. After adding relevant articles from a second cost-containment literature database (Stadhouders et al., 2016), 7209 unique articles were collected. After excluding irrelevant articles based on title and abstract, 276 
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articles were screened in full text independently by two researchers. References of the excluded reviews were checked for relevant articles and screened using a similar process as the original articles (see Appendix figure 3.2 for the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) flow diagram).  We extracted relevant information of the included articles and assessed the quality. To this aim, we reviewed ten quality assessment tools (Bero et al.; Evers et al., 2005; Glasgow et al., 1999; Group, 2004; Harbour and Miller, 2001; Olsen, 2002; Peersman et al., 1997; Sterne et al., 2014; Walker et al., 2012; West et al., 2002). Based on these validated frameworks, we designed a quality assessment tool specifically for policy evaluations (Appendix 3.1). We use five quality domains: content validity, selection bias, confounding bias, measurement bias and reliability. Literature reviews were assessed separately using A MeaSurement Tool to Assess systematic Reviews (AMSTAR) (Shea et al., 2007). The results of the included systematic reviews were incorporated directly in the narrative synthesis without a separate assessment of the papers included in that review (Whitlock et al., 2008). Two reviewers independently performed quality assessments and review assessments.  To structure our results, we use an existing framework of mutually exclusive groups, covering both macro-policies and micro-interventions (Stadhouders et al., 2016). Comparing our results with this framework allows detection of knowledge gaps, which may inspire future policy evaluations. Although other categorisations of cost-containment policies exist (Ellis and McGuire, 1993; Mongan et al., 2008; Moreno-Serra, 2014; Pane and Taliaferro, 1994; Vogler et al., 2016; White, 1999), this categorisation was deemed most suitable to detect knowledge gaps.   
3.3 Results In total, 72 policies from 43 empirical papers and 18 systematic reviews were included. The 18 systematic reviews covered a total of 341 studies. Overall, the included papers were of mixed quality. Of the 43 empirical papers, 29 articles scored low on at least one of the five quality domains. Systematic review ratings ranged from 3 out of 12 to 12 out of 12 points on the AMSTAR scale. We were unable to perform a meta-analysis due to the methodological heterogeneity and context dependency of the studies (Schünemann et al., 2008). Therefore, results for each intervention are discussed separately. First, we summarise the literature. Next, we identify knowledge gaps. Last, we synthesise the results.   
3.3.1. Literature overview Appendix table 3.4 summarises our results, structured according to each of the four primary policy groups: budgets, price controls, volume controls and market-oriented policies, where 
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– due to the large number of articles – the last category is further subdivided into market structure policies, market conduct policies and market performance policies. We briefly discuss the findings for each intervention.   
Budgets Budgeting total or sector expenditures is a widespread policy measure (Abel-Smith and Mossialos, 1994; Wolfe and Moran, 1993). Despite their intuitive appeal, budgets are not necessarily effective in containing spending. For example, budget constraints may be considered soft if hospitals expect a government bail-out in case of overspending (Kornai, 2009; Rodden et al., 2003; Tjerbo and Hagen, 2009). Therefore, effectiveness of budgets as a cost containment tool is an empirical question. However, we could only include two studies at the payer level. The introduction of the Balanced Budget Act in the US (1997) limited total spending on Medicare by 112 billion dollar (Bazzoli et al., 2005). In response, the Centre for Medicare and Medicaid Services introduced a series of cost-containment measures, such as price reductions and payment reform. After two years, hospitals with higher exposure to Medicare patients ended up with on average 9% lower revenues than hospitals with low Medicare exposure, without declines in actual volume (Bazzoli et al., 2005). A systematic review (2 studies) evaluated the effectiveness of GP drug budgets; a significant reduction in pharmaceutical expenses of 27%-70% was found in the UK, while a non-significant reduction of 18%-27% was reported in Ireland (Sturm et al., 2007).   
Price controls Price controls include limits on reimbursements (price setting, fee schedules, price negotiations or reference pricing) and controls of production factors (wages, profits, capital or pharmaceutical inputs). The price of pharmaceuticals in turn may be set based on prices in other countries (external reference pricing) or based on prices of comparator drugs (internal reference pricing). We found two studies on price limits, one study on profit controls, one review on reference pricing (16 studies), one study on external reference pricing, one review on generic substitution (8 studies) and one additional study on generic substitution. Hospital price cuts due to the US Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (1989) has been estimated to reduce spending by 6% for every 10% reduction in price (Nguyen, 1996). Reductions in US Medicare homecare prices as a result of the Home Health Interim Payment System (1997) have shown to reduce both use and costs of homecare without any effect on mortality (Huckfeldt et al., 2014). A systematic review found no evidence for pharmaceutical profit controls for Ireland (Lee et al., 2015). 
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One systematic review (16 studies) concluded that internal reference pricing lowered payer spending in most cases, but also increased patient cost sharing, resulting in a marginal reduction in total expenditure (Lee et al., 2015). A Danish reform (2005), replacing external reference pricing with internal reference pricing, reduced pharmaceutical spending by 10% (Kaiser et al., 2014). One review found lower costs in four of its eight included studies on substitution from brand-name drugs to clinically equivalent counterparts (generics), while no difference was found in clinical outcomes (Gothe et al., 2015). The authors commented that although acquisition costs of the target drug declined, increases in inpatient and outpatient utilisation compensated for this. This specific review did not take into account the possibility that pharmaceutical companies may increase prices of other drugs as a result of generic substitution (Mestre-Ferrandiz, 2003). Contrary to these findings, a study on mandatory generic substitution between 1997 and 1999 found drug cost reductions of $36 to $52 (a significant 8% reduction) per health plan member (Joyce et al., 2002).   
Volume controls  We found evidence for 17 interventions that aim to control volumes from seven studies and ten reviews (179 studies). Four interventions target supply, and thirteen interventions target demand for care, specifically cost sharing (6 interventions) and benefit restrictions (5 interventions).  Already in 1974 the RAND Health Insurance Experience (HIE) demonstrated in a large randomised controlled trial that cost sharing can contain expenditure (Manning et al., 1987; Newhouse et al., 1981). We included six papers that confirmed this finding. One review (12 studies) found that high-deductible consumer directed health plans (CDHC) reduced plan expenditure with 5%-15%, corrected for enrolee characteristics (Bundorf, 2016). Plans with high coinsurance also bared lower expenditure (Feldstein and Wickizer, 1995). One review (29 studies) concluded that both user charges and coinsurance lower drug expenditures (Lee et al., 2015). A second review (19 studies) reported drug cost savings even after a small increase in copayments, but also found reduced access to necessary medications (Soumerai et al., 1993). In addition, insurance plans with higher drug copayments were found to have 27% lower pharmaceutical expenditures. Additionally, two-tier plans with higher copayments for branded drugs had lower spending than single tier plans (7-22%). Extra copayments for non-preferred brands had an additional cost-decreasing effect (2-7%) (Joyce et al., 2002). Also for independent practice associations, increasing pharmaceutical copayments from $5.00 to $7.50 resulted in an estimated 12% reduction in pharmaceutical expenditures. For Health Maintenance Organisations, the reduction of pharmaceutical expenditure (3%) was non-significant, suggesting either that copayments were less effective 
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in managed networks or that pharmaceutical adherence was better guarded by these plans (Hillman et al., 1999). Prior authorisation policies and utilisation review policies may contain costs by reducing overtreatment. A review on prior authorisation (6 studies) found drug-related cost savings (MacKinnon and Kumar, 2001). One study demonstrated that drug utilisation review programs reduced total drug expenditures by 7% (Moore et al., 2000). According to a recent review (6 studies), prescription caps contain expenditures. However, access to essential drugs may decrease (Lee et al., 2015).  Mixed results were found for benefit restrictions. One review (9 studies) on prescribing restrictions found either lower costs (6 studies), no significant effect (2 studies), or even higher costs (1 study) (Green et al., 2010). A second review (30 studies) found that reimbursement restrictions predominantly contain costs but could lower patient outcomes (Lee et al., 2015). A third review (12 studies) on benefit restrictions found no effect on total costs, primarily due to substitution towards other therapies (Soumerai et al., 1993). A fourth review (59 studies) on managed care formulary restrictions found policies to be effective in 34%, neutral in 37% and ineffective in 29% of the studies (Happe et al., 2014). One additional study from South Korea found no significant effects after delisting certain drugs (Park et al., 2016).  The effectiveness of patient education to limit demand is also mixed. A review (2 studies) found no cost savings after a patient education program in Spain; in North America direct-to-consumer advertisements to reduce use of certain specific drugs even increased expenditures for these drugs (Lee et al., 2015). However, a randomised health promotion intervention for enrolees of a large Californian health plan, consisting of health assessments, education material and participant motivation, reduced claims by $3.2 to $8.0 million, between 1989 and 1991 (Fries et al., 1994).   
Market structure policies We found 22 interventions from 16 studies and 6 reviews (101 studies) aiming to adjust market structure to contain costs. Most studies target payer structure, e.g. by stimulating use of managed care organizations (MCOs).  Earlier studies showed predominantly cost-containing effects of MCOs. A 10% increase in MCO market penetration reduced premium growth by 7% (Feldstein and Wickizer, 1995). MCOs were estimated to have between 8% and 15% lower costs in competitive regional markets (Bamezai, 1999). Higher MCO market penetration led to annual hospital savings of 7% in California (Robinson, 1991). MCO penetration seems to have spillover effects; a 1% increase in MCO market share is associated with a 0.9% 
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decrease in fee-for-service (FFS) insurance costs (Chernew et al., 2008). Due to the managed care backlash in the US, MCOs lost importance for the private markets (Chernew et al., 2008), although Medicare and Medicaid continued to rely on managed care as alternative service providers. However, studies that evaluated Medicaid-managed care models found no significant effects on total costs (Burns, 2009; Harman et al., 2011). European experiences with managed care are also mixed. A study from Switzerland found large cost reductions due to managed care, up to 16% compared to traditional insurance (Reich et al., 2012a). This could be due to patient selection, as the effect on other insurers has not been taken into account. For German insurers, evidence for patient selection in managed care contracts was found. Managed care contracts increased the costs of pharmaceuticals in neighbouring regions and, as a result, total pharmaceutical expenditure increased by 0.2% to 0.8% following each percent increase in managed care penetration (Ehlert and Oberschachtsiek, 2014). For other forms of payer reforms, limited evidence was found. One study found short-term cost reductions of 30% to 40% due to mental health carve-outs, explained by a combination of financial incentives, reputation effects, patient selection and case management (Ma and McGuire, 1998).  Payers could reduce cost by altering provision structures and types of providers. One study found 4% cost savings after a Swiss insurer offered telecare as substitute of regular care (Reich et al., 2012a). An intervention in Florida to provide hospice care and cancer care to nursing home residents reduced government spending by 8% (Gozalo et al., 2008). No significant cost reductions were found for patient-centered medical homes (PCMHs) (Cole et al., 2015; Werner et al., 2013). Reviews on rehabilitation care (0 studies) (Ward et al., 2008) or mental health community care (42 studies) (Roberts et al., 2005) also found no cost savings. Such results indicate that it may be challenging to launch these provision models that lower costs in the short term whilst also improving quality (Cole et al., 2015). As countries are searching for the optimal level of government involvement, waves of decentralisation and recentralization have been observed across Europe (Costa-Font and Greer, 2012; Saltman, 2008). For example, in the UK , commissioning centralized to district health authorities in 1974 (Allen, 2006), decentralized to NHS thrusts and fundholding in 1991 and to primary care trusts 2001, and recentralized in 2013 with the conception of clinical commissioning groups (Checkland et al., 2018). Even in very decentralized countries, e.g. Finland and Denmark, a trend towards centralization has been discerned (Medin et al., 2013; Vrangbaek and Christiansen, 2005) Decentralisation has been proposed as a measure to contain costs (Stadhouders et al., 2016). However, conflicting evidence was found. A multi-country analysis found between 12% and 25% higher cost growth among more decentralised systems (Mosca, 2007). A study on decentralisation in the Spanish NHS 
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found short-term cost increases of 9%-16%, but thereafter a diminished cost growth of 0.5%-1% on an annual basis (Costa-Font and Moscone, 2008).  Registered nurses, nursing assistants, pharmacists or primary care physicians may perform some tasks and procedures traditionally performed by medical specialists more cheaply. One review (11 studies) found that substitution of tasks towards nursing assistants and pharmacists may lower expenditure, although the quality of the evidence is deemed too low to draw general conclusions (Laurant et al., 2009). A second review (3 studies) report marginally lower costs of delegating tasks to primary care physicians on emergency care departments (Khangura et al., 2012).  Non-profit and public providers seem to operate with lower expenses. One review (8 studies) found that for-profit providers on average charge 19% higher prices than non-profit providers (Devereaux et al., 2004). A second review (37 studies) found 23 economic comparisons that favoured non-profit ownership, 5 that favoured for-profit ownership and 9 that were inconclusive (Rosenau, 2003). A final study found for-profit MCOs to be more costly per member, although their results were not consistent (Schlesinger et al., 1986).   
Market conduct policies Evaluations of policies aiming to reduce cost by influencing market conduct primarily focused on the effects of competition, payment reform and care coordination. In the latter category, a number of case management programs have been evaluated. The Illinois Health Connect and Your Healthcare Plus intervention produced savings of 7% and 9%, respectively (Phillips et al., 2014). A Medicaid primary care case management program showed maximal program savings of 7% in Medicaid expenditure (Muller and Baker, 1996). An evaluation of Medicare case management for high-risk patients found cost savings of $7.7 million over three years, rendering a Return on Investment ratio (ROI) of 1.40. Reductions in readmissions and increases in appropriate medication were found (Hawkins et al., 2015). A health management program of a large California employer saved between $8.4 million and $8.8 million, rendering a ROI ratio of between 4.56 and 4.73 (Ozminkowski et al., 1999). Although one study showed per patient cost decreases of $89 for high risk patients due to case management, these savings were insufficient to cover the total costs of the program (Kranker, 2016). For other forms of care coordination, less evidence was available. One study demonstrated that GP continuity in Belgium lowered expenditure by 11% (De Maeseneer et al., 2003).  Competition has proven to contain costs in California during the 1980s and 1990s. A study on pro-competitive reforms found cost decreases of 12% in high competition regions (Melnick and Zwanziger, 1988). Lower growth of expenses could also be noted in 
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comparison with states that relied on non-competitive strategies (Melnick and Zwanziger, 1995). Cost containment retained over the long-term, even increasing bankruptcy risk for public hospitals (Mobley, 1998b). Contrary to the California experience, another study found that neither competition, nor regulation contained expenditures. Supply-side factors (e.g. per capita supply of hospital beds and prevalence of specialists) were found to be the main determinants of expenditure growth (Merrill and McLaughlin, 1986). One recent study on hospital competition in the UK found no effect on expenditures, although positive effects on quality of care were found (Gaynor et al., 2013).  Payment reforms aim to align incentives of providers and payers. In Switzerland, expenditures of capitated networks were 6% lower than networks paid on a fee-for-service base (Reich et al., 2012a). For Medicaid, capitating GP payments reduced utilisation, but increased expenditures by $75 per patient due to the high payments necessary to include a sufficient number of physicians into the program (Gosden et al., 2000). Experiences from Medicaid mental health capitation in Colorado showed moderate cost reduction for the first two years, ranging from 0.5% for for-profit providers to 0.2% for non-profit providers; however, after two years the effects turned insignificant (Bloom et al., 2011). Interestingly, cost-containment effects were larger for for-profit providers, while for-profit status is associated with higher costs. This stipulates that for-profit providers may react more strongly to financial incentives. A literature review (9 studies) on the fiscal effects of P4P found mixed effects; the three most rigorous evaluations did not find any significant savings (Emmert et al., 2012). However, a more recent study on P4P for GPs found 1% lower expenditures as well as higher quality of care (Lemak et al., 2015). Another review found no cost evaluations of target payments for general physicians (Giuffrida et al., 1999).  Prospective payments and DRG payments fix per-patient prices irrespective of the number of activities per diagnosis. For a comprehensive overview of the implementation of DRGs in Europe, see (Busse et al., 2011). Following the implementation of Medicare PPS in 1984, significant reductions in hospital expenditure were found (Feder et al., 1987; Sloan et al., 1988). However, DRGs replacing per diem payment in New Jersey showed no significant cost reductions, as price reductions were offset by volume increases (Hsiao and Dunn, 1987). While DRGs may increase efficiency (Biørn et al., 2003), evidence on total spending is mixed. Implementation of a Medicare prospective payment system for home care in 2000 comprised a fixed per patient payment and a variable component, depending on treatment intensity. The fixed component was increased by the reform, while the variable component was reduced. In net, the reform slightly increased utilisation and expenditure, suggesting that incentives to increase the number of patients seem to have outweighed the incentives to contain per-patient costs (Huckfeldt et al., 2014).  
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Market performance policies According to theory, structure and conduct of the market determine the market outcome (Martin, 2010). However, health sector performance can be improved irrespective of market structure and conduct by targeting inefficiencies outside the primary health production process, like reducing administrative costs, waste or fraud. Of all policies targeting non-health costs, only evaluations of health IT and tort reform were found. A literature review on health IT adoption, such as electronic health records, computerised physician order entry, and clinical decision supports, found cost-containment effects, specifically administrative costs and pharmaceutical expenses, in 43 out of a total of 57 evaluations (H. Low et al., 2013). Tort reform has been shown to decrease defensive medicine and liability premiums, lowering expenditure in the US by 2%-4% (Avraham et al., 2012; Hellinger and Encinosa, 2006).   
3.3.2. Synthesis Although interventions were very heterogeneous, some general trends are visible. We found evidence that cost sharing contained total health expenditure (Bundorf, 2016; Feldstein and Wickizer, 1995) as well as pharmaceutical expenditure (Hillman et al., 1999; Joyce et al., 2002; Lee et al., 2015; Soumerai et al., 1993). Evaluations of case management interventions predominantly showed cost savings (Hawkins et al., 2015; Muller and Baker, 1996; Ozminkowski et al., 1999; Phillips et al., 2014). However, most of these programs do rely on voluntary participation by patients, thus risking selection bias. Insurer competition has been found to contain costs in California (Melnick and Zwanziger, 1988, 1995; Mobley, 1998b). Furthermore, unnecessary treatments may be reduced by prior authorisation (MacKinnon and Kumar, 2001) and utilisation review (Moore et al., 2000). Controlling access to care, e.g. by caps on the number of prescriptions (Lee et al., 2015), could also help to contain pharmaceutical expenditure. Lastly, price limits and budgets may also be effective in containing total payer expenses (Bazzoli et al., 2005; Huckfeldt et al., 2014; Nguyen, 1996; Sturm et al., 2007). Other policies show more contradicting results. Payer structure policies for example, specifically those promoting managed care organizations, has shown to either lower costs (Bamezai, 1999; Chernew et al., 2008; Feldstein and Wickizer, 1995; Reich et al., 2012a; Robinson, 1991), increase costs (Ehlert and Oberschachtsiek, 2014) or have no effect on costs (Burns, 2009; Harman et al., 2011). Payment reform and prospective payments in some cases seem to lower costs (Bloom et al., 2011; Lemak et al., 2015; Reich et al., 2012a) but in other instances they increase costs (Gosden et al., 2000; Huckfeldt et al., 2014) or 
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have no effect on costs (Emmert et al., 2012; Giuffrida et al., 1999; Hsiao and Dunn, 1987). For-profit provision seems to increase expenses, although not consistently (Devereaux et al., 2004; Rosenau, 2003; Schlesinger et al., 1986). Despite the fact that many countries rely on benefit package restrictions to contain pharmaceutical expenditure, evidence did not consistently indicate cost savings (Green et al., 2010; Happe et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2015; Park et al., 2016; Soumerai et al., 1993).   
3.3.3. Identification of knowledge gaps To identify gaps in the literature, the results are plotted in the overview of cost-containment policies by Stadhouders et al. (2016). Figure 3.1 shows that no evaluations were found in 21 of 41 categories. For price controls, evidence on fee schedules and price negotiations is lacking. Regarding supply side volume controls, we found no evidence for capacity controls, such as limits on the number of beds or the number of providers through certificate-of-needs policies, or for labour restrictions, such as limiting the number of practitioners. For demand controls, no evidence evaluating the effects of prevention on a payer level has been included. Additionally, no evaluations of policies limiting the pace of costly innovations were found. In the category of market structure policies, we were unable to include evaluations of antitrust policy, such as merger controls, or risk redistribution, such as risk equalisation programs. No evaluations were found on the effects of consumer choice, contracting policies or patient choice in the category of market conduct policies. Lastly, no papers were included on administrative reductions, fraud control, waste reduction programs, managerial improvement policies, transparency increases or cost-reducing innovations.  
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3.3.4. High-quality evidence to guide policymaking General effects of cost-containment policies are difficult to distil due to the non-random nature of the interventions and the dependency on context. Therefore, we base our policy recommendations on the most robust evidence. Of 43 studies, 13 had low to medium risk of bias and high to medium content validity and reliability. High-quality studies were more likely to find no effect. No effect was found for delisting of benefits, decentralisation, case management, managed care and hospital competition (Costa-Font and Moscone, 2008; Gaynor et al., 2013; Kranker, 2016; Park et al., 2016).  However, some high-quality papers do find significant cost-saving effects. Firstly, cost sharing could reduce costs. One study found that deductibles and coinsurance are associated with lower premium growth rates (Feldstein and Wickizer, 1995). Another study found (tiered) copayments to be effective (Joyce et al., 2002). Secondly, both managed care and competition have the potential to reduce costs. A 10% increase in HMO market share reduced premium growth with 6.5% between 1985 and 1992 (Feldstein and Wickizer, 1995). In addition, long-term effects of cost containment through competitive reforms were found (Mobley, 1998b). Cost sharing and competitive reform may go hand-in-hand; managed care might increase competition, and competition on premiums may benefit plans with high cost sharing (Newhouse, 2004). Also for reductions of pharmaceutical spending, high-quality evidence is available. Internal reference pricing reduced pharmaceutical spending in Denmark by over 10% (Kaiser et al., 2014). Closely related, generic substitution was shown to reduce pharmaceutical spending by 8% (Joyce et al., 2002). Lastly, two high-quality studies point to the potential of cost reductions in specific areas such as end-of-life care and tort reform (Gozalo et al., 2008; Hellinger and Encinosa, 2006).  
3.4 Discussion Cost containment in healthcare is a leading policy challenge. Hence, identifying effective policies is vital, but articles evaluating policies on a macro-level are limited and often lack sufficient rigor. Low numbers of evaluations per policy make it challenging to infer effect sizes as well as time- country-, and health system dependency (Dixon and Poteliakhoff, 2012). Many policy options seem understudied and this includes routine strategies such as budgeting and price setting. All OECD countries would benefit from collective efforts to experiment with, and rigorously evaluate promising policies. As policies are often similar, country heterogeneity may be viewed as a strength. Many different approaches have been taken to tackle rising expenditure. Policymakers should harvest from the wide range of experiences, in order to identify the opportunities and challenges of various policy tools. Countries could then fine-tune cost-containment policies to their own setting, identifying 
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and accounting for divergent and paramount contextual factors. Considering the above, the lack of evaluations of effectiveness is disappointing.  Despite a broad search strategy and not overly limiting exclusion criteria, only 61 papers were included. Several factors might account for this. First, it may be challenging to isolate the effect of many policy interventions. For example, most containment policies are part of a broader reform package (Emanuel  et al., 2012). Also, some policies exert effects in the long run which may be difficult to isolate. Even for policies that prove effective in the short run, it is questionable whether any significant effect endures in the long run. Second, policies may have been rigorously evaluated but not included in our search strategy, for example because these evaluations were not published in the peer-reviewed literature or have been written in another language. Of the 61 papers included in this review, 44 are from the US. This could result from the US being more suited for policy evaluations, but more likely is the result of language and publication bias. US bias could be alleviated by inclusion of evaluations published outside the peer-reviewed literature or in other languages. Last, and probably most important, a large number of studies evaluated costs from the patient or provider perspective and not from the perspective of the payers. Including such studies would greatly increase the number of papers, although the evidence would be much less robust because cost substitution may be mistaken for cost containment.  This review gives a broad overview of the literature, pointing towards effectiveness of certain specific policies such as cost sharing, managed care competition, reference pricing, generic substitution and tort reform. However, some reservations should be made regarding desirability of these measures. Cost sharing, for example, may reduce both necessary and unnecessary care (Kim et al., 2005; Kupor et al., 1995; Sinnott et al., 2013). Second, it could disproportionally affect access by low income groups, which may be undesirable from an ethical perspective (Denier, 2007). It is also highly unpopular with the electorate and thus comes with political barriers. Thirdly, cost sharing shifts costs to patients, thereby limiting the effect on total healthcare costs. Lastly, cost sharing could have spillover effects to other payers when providers increase treatment intensity of remaining patients (Ravesteijn et al., 2017). Control of pharmaceutical expenditure by reference pricing and generic substitution is promising. However, attention should be given to the possibilities of pharmaceutical companies shifting costs to unregulated areas (Mestre-Ferrandiz, 2003), or patients shifting to more expensive treatments (Soumerai et al., 1993). Tort reform appears an issue specific to the US. A substantial body of evidence favours better coordination of care as an effective way to contain cost. This was one of the few policies where mostly positive effects on the quality of care were reported. However, studies on care coordination often contained a high risk of 
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bias due to self-selection into the program of patients and organisations that have a high propensity to obtain a positive effect. Therefore, the actual implementation of proven concepts of care coordination to other settings may be challenging (Hoogendijk, 2016). Targeting the intervention to patients with high potential benefits may improve effectiveness. Furthermore, case management often comes with substantial upfront costs (Bloem et al., 2017). Although politically appealing, this strategy faces difficult implementation barriers on a short horizon with many different steps and is often highly dependent on specific local conditions. Most studies show mixed and context-dependent results. For example, payment reforms are often thought to have substantial cost saving potential (Hussey et al., 2009). However, no such effect was found consistently, suggesting that payment schemes should be designed with great care to prevent undesirable provider responses and to sort out positive effects on costs and quality. Evidently, policies are interconnected and embedded in a broader health system and some may be reinforced or counteracted by other policies (Liu, 2003). For example competition: under certain conditions, competition may contain costs and specific types of payers (e.g. MCOs) may reinforce this; however, a higher penetration of for-profit providers may lead to higher costs. Moreover, the effect of competition, profit status or payer types may depend on the payment system in place. Mapping policy interrelations and institutions should be an important part of future research on this topic. The adoption of cost-containment policies likely depends on other policy goals such as quality of care, equity and efficiency. In many instances, the pursuit of a cost-containment strategy may come at the cost of one or more of these goals. This would require balance of cost-containment efforts with other important health system goals. Future research should inquire into policy outcomes on all relevant policy metrics and design combinations that sort out an optimal effect.  
3.5 Concluding remarks We collected evidence on the effectiveness of cost-containment policies from a payer perspective, and included 43 original studies and 18 systematic reviews evaluating 72 different cost-containment policies. We compared policy evaluations to policies identified in the literature. Of the 41 groups of cost containment policies, 21 were not evaluated, and even within the remaining groups several policies remain unevaluated. The existing evidence shows that the effectiveness of cost containment policies varies greatly between policies, underlining the need for evidence. Future policy evaluations should focus on the effectiveness of fee schedules, wage controls, capacity controls, prevention and reductions in administrative costs. Special attention should be given to the payer and societal 
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perspective as many evaluations do not take into account cost shifting possibilities by providers and patients.  We summarised the available evidence, providing a broad overview of the literature on effective cost-containment policies. Most evaluations were performed for MCO competition, payment reforms, cost sharing and care coordination. High-quality evidence favors cost sharing, managed care competition, reference pricing, generic substitution and tort reform as effective policies to contain costs. Policymakers aiming to contain costs should resort to these policies to maximise chances of success.  
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
Appendix 3.1: constructing a quality and risk-of-bias assessment tool We use the following risk-of-bias assessment tools and quality assessment tools:  1. The ACROBAT-NRSI risk of bias assessment (Sterne et al., 2014)  2. The Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care Review Group (EPOC) data collection checklist1  3. The Cochrane Non Randomised Studies Methods Group (NRSMG) checklist (Olsen, 2002)  4. EPPI-Centre data extraction and quality assessment guidelines for health promotion outcome and process evaluations (Peersman et al., 1997)  5. The RE-AIM framework to document data on intervention reach, efficacy, adoption, implementation and maintenance(Glasgow et al., 1999),  6. Various quality assessment tools (Evers et al., 2005; Group, 2004; Harbour and Miller, 2001; Sterne et al., 2014; Walker et al., 2012; West et al., 2002).  Based on these existing risk-of-bias assessment tools, we define five domains of quality:  1. Content validity: Describes to what extent the content (measurement, outcomes, topics) of an article is in line with the aim of our review. For example, studies who look at sector costs have lower content validity for our review compared to studies who look at total costs 2. Selection bias: Determines to what extent the results of the review may be biased due to selection of treatment groups and selection of participants within treatment and control groups 3. confounding bias: Measures the extent that the results of the article is biased by factors that are not included in the analysis 4. Measurement bias: Shows the extent that the results may be biased due to errors in measurement and data collection 5. Reliability: assessment of the robustness of the results and the generalizability of the effects.   We tested our assessment tool extensively using pilots and expert focus groups. The full risk-of-bias assessment is openly available at https://www.radboudumc-surveys.nl/iqh/v206/index.php/624933?lang=nl   
Table 3.2: Aggregated results of the review assessment Questions:  1. Was an 'a priori' design provided?  2. Was there duplicate study selection and data extraction? 3. Are the inclusion and exclusion criteria reported in the review?  4. Was a comprehensive literature search performed? 5. Was the status of publication (i.e. grey literature) used as an inclusion criterion?  6. Was a list of studies (included and excluded) provided?  
                                                                1 Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care Review Group: The Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care Review Group Data Collection Checklist. Aberdeen, U.K., University of Aberdeen 1998  
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7. Were the characteristics of the included studies provided?  8. Was the scientific quality of the included studies assessed and documented?  9. Was the scientific quality of the included studies used appropriately in formulating conclusions?  10. Were the methods used to combine the findings of studies appropriate? 11. Was the likelihood of publication bias assessed? 12. Was the conflict of interest included? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total Yes (of 12) 
Gosden 2000 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 12 
Khangura 2012 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 11 
Devereaux 2004 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 11 
Green 2010 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 10 
Sturm 2007 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 10 
Gothe 2015 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N CA CA Y Y 9 
Lee 2015 N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y 9 
Emmert 2012 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y CA CA Y N 9 
Laurant 2009 Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N N 9 
Giuffrida 1999 N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y 9 
Low 2013 Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y CA Y N 8 
Ward 2008 Y Y Y Y Y Y NA NA NA NA Y N 7 
Mackinnon 2001 N Y Y Y N N Y N N Y Y Y 7 
Soumerai 1993 Y CA Y Y Y N N Y Y Y N N 7 
Roberts 2005 N N Y Y N N Y Y Y N N N 6 
Rosenau 2003 Y CA Y Y Y N Y N N CA Y CA 6 
Happe 2014 Y Y N N N N Y Y N CA N CA 4 
Bundorf 2016 N CA Y Y CA N N Y N CA N N 3 Note: Y=yes, N=no, NA=not applicable, CA= cannot answer   
Literature Evers, S., Goossens, M., de Vet, H., van Tulder, M., and Ament, A. (2005). Criteria list for assessment of methodological quality of economic evaluations: Consensus on Health Economic Criteria. International 
journal of technology assessment in health care 21, 240-245. Glasgow, R. E., Vogt, T. M., and Boles, S. M. (1999). Evaluating the public health impact of health promotion interventions: the RE-AIM framework. American journal of public health 89, 1322-1327. Group, G. W. (2004). Grading quality of evidence and strength of recommendations. BMJ: British Medical Journal 
328, 1490. Harbour, R., and Miller, J. (2001). A new system for grading recommendations in evidence based guidelines. BMJ: 
British Medical Journal 323, 334. Olsen, O. (2002). The Cochrane Non-Randomised Studies Methods Group (NRSMG). The Cochrane Collaboration. Peersman, G., Oliver, S., and Oakley, A. (1997). EPPI-Centre Review Guidelines: Data Collections for the EPIC Database London: EPPI-Centre. Social Science Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London. Sterne, J., Higgins, J., and Reeves, B. (2014). A Cochrane Risk Of Bias Assessment Tool: for Non-Randomized Studies of Interventions (ACROBAT-NRSI). The Cochrane Collaboration. Available online at https://sites. 
google. com/site/riskofbiastool/, accessed 9, 2014. Walker, D. G., Wilson, R. F., Sharma, R., Bridges, J., Niessen, L., Bass, E. B., and Frick, K. (2012). Best practices for conducting economic evaluations in health care: a systematic review of quality assessment tools. West, S. L., King, V., Carey, T. S., Lohr, K. N., McKoy, N., Sutton, S. F., and Lux, L. (2002). "Systems to rate the strength of scientific evidence," Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, US Department of Health and Human Services. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
58 
Appendix 3.2: Figures and tables Table 3.3: Search strategy Effective cost containment policies Block 0 (((health care[tiab] OR "health care"[tiab] OR “long term care”[tiab]) AND ((((((((((lower[tiab] OR lowering[tiab]) OR controlling[tiab]) OR control[tiab]) OR contain[tiab]) OR containing[tiab]) OR containment[tiab]) OR decrease[tiab]) OR decreasing[tiab]) AND (("health expenditures"[mesh] OR costs[tiab]) OR cost[tiab])) OR "cost control"[mesh])) AND (("government"[mesh] OR "health policy"[mesh]) OR (government[tiab] AND (policies[tiab] OR policy[tiab])))) Block 1   TI(budget OR “global payment” OR “global payments” OR “fee schedule” OR “fee schedules” OR “rate setting” OR “relative value scale” OR “price list” OR “price lists” OR “regulation” OR “competitive bidding” OR purchasing OR tendering OR “procurement pricing” OR “reference price” OR “reference prices” OR “therapeutic substitution” OR “generic substitution” OR “generics” OR “lower cost substitute” OR “lower cost substitutes” OR gatekeeping OR gatekeeper OR “prior authorization” OR “waiting list” OR “waiting lists” OR “second opinion requirement” OR “second opinion requirements” OR accreditation OR “certificate of need” OR “certificate of needs” OR “hospital planning” OR licensing OR “labor restriction” OR “labor restrictions” OR “effectiveness research” OR “effectiveness analysis” OR guidelines OR “utilization review” OR “reduce overtreatment” OR “evidence based medicine” OR “technology assessment” OR “technology assessments” OR “utilization control” OR “utilisation control” OR monitoring OR standardization OR standardisation OR “drug list” OR “drug lists” OR “formularies” OR “formulary” OR “positive list” OR “positive lists” OR “negative list” OR “negative lists” OR delisting OR copayment OR “user fee” OR “user fees” OR deductible OR “cost sharing” OR “health savings account” OR coinsurance OR prevention OR “health education” OR “health promotion” OR “clinical decision support” OR “patient education” OR “shared decision making” OR “patient empowerment” OR “patient centered medical home” OR “patient centered medical homes” OR “all-payer system” OR “all-payer systems” OR “community care” OR “community based care” OR “health network” OR “health networks” OR “primary care group” OR “primary care groups” OR “selective contracting” OR “informal care” OR “outpatient care” OR “accountable care organization” OR “accountable care organizations” OR “accountable care organisations” OR “accountable care organisation” OR “carve-out” OR “fund holding” OR “health maintenance organizations” OR “health maintenance organization” OR “health maintenance organisations” OR “health maintenance organization” OR “managed care” OR “preferred provider” OR “value based insurance” OR “personal budget” OR “personal budgets” OR antitrust OR “industrial policy” OR “industrial policies” OR centralization OR centralisation OR decentralization OR decentralisation OR regionalization OR regionalisation OR “for profit” OR privatization OR privatisation OR “insurance exchange” OR “insurance exchanges” OR “withhold pool” OR generalist OR generalists OR “substitution of task” OR “substitution of tasks” OR “competition” OR “coordination” OR “case management” OR “disease management” OR cooperation OR “bundled payment” OR “bundled payments” OR “bundling payments” OR capitation OR DRG OR “diagnostic related groups” OR “diagnostic related group” OR “episode payment” OR “pay for performance” OR “payment reform” OR “value based payments” OR “value based payment” OR “prospective payment” OR “prospective payments” OR “gain sharing” OR “shared savings” OR “shared saving” OR “consumer choice” OR “consumer directed” OR “patient choice” OR “administrative simplification” OR “reduce administrative costs” OR “reduce administrative cost” OR “reducing administrative cost” OR “reducing administrative costs” OR “administrative costs reduction” OR “administrative costs reductions” OR “administrative cost reduction” OR “administrative cost reductions” OR “electronic health record” OR “electronic health records” OR “health IT” OR “information systems” OR “information system” OR “information technology” OR “tort reform” OR “tort reforms” OR “malpractice reform” OR “malpractice reforms” OR “liability reforms” OR “liability reform” OR “benchmarking” OR “physician education” OR “transparency” OR “cost reducing innovation” OR “cost reducing innovations” OR OR "price negotiation" OR "price negotiations" OR "negotiating prices" OR "rate negotiations" OR "negotiating rates" OR "profit controls" OR "profit regulation" OR "salary limits" OR "wage controls" OR "price controls" OR "price cuts" OR "price control" OR "controlling prices" OR "premium caps" OR "premium limits" OR "reduce payments" OR "price regulation" OR "expenditure control" OR "expenditure controls" OR "expenditure limit" OR "expenditure limits" OR "reducing expenditures" OR "reduce expenditures" OR "expenditure reductions" OR "expenditure reduction" OR "expenditure caps" OR "expenditure cap" OR "expenditure target" OR "expenditure targets" OR "expenditure ceiling" OR "expenditure ceilings" OR "expenditure constraint" OR "expenditure constraints" OR "expenditure maximum" OR "expenditure cut" OR "expenditure cuts" OR "capacity control" OR "capacity controls" OR "capacity limit" OR "capacity limits" OR "reducing capacity" OR "reduce capacity" OR "capacity reductions" OR "capacity reduction" OR "capacity target" OR "capacity targets" OR "capacity ceiling" OR "capacity ceilings" OR "capacity constraint" OR "capacity constraints" OR "bed control" OR "bed controls" OR "bed limit" OR "bed limits" OR "reducing beds" OR "reduce beds" OR "bed reductions" OR "bed reduction" OR "bed target" OR "bed targets" OR "bed constraint" OR "bed constraints" OR "bed maximum" OR "access control" OR "access controls" OR "access limit" OR "access limits" OR "reducing access" OR "reduce access" OR "access reductions" OR "access reduction" OR "access constraint" OR "access constraints" OR "access maximum" OR "spending control" OR "spending controls" OR 
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"spending limit" OR "spending limits" OR "reducing spending" OR "reduce spending" OR "spending reductions" OR "spending reduction" OR "spending caps" OR "spending cap" OR "spending target" OR "spending targets" OR "spending ceiling" OR "spending ceilings" OR "spending constraint" OR "spending constraints" OR "spending maximum" OR "spending cut" OR "spending cuts" OR "global control" OR "global controls" OR "global limit" OR "global limits" OR "global caps" OR "global cap" OR "global target" OR "global targets" OR "global ceiling" OR "global ceilings" OR "global constraint" OR "global constraints" OR "price control" OR "price controls" OR "price limit" OR "price limits" OR "reducing prices" OR "reduce prices" OR "price reductions" OR "price reduction" OR "price caps" OR "price cap" OR "price target" OR "price targets" OR "price ceiling" OR "price ceilings" OR "price constraint" OR "price constraints" OR "price maximum" OR "price cut" OR "price cuts" OR "payment control" OR "payment controls" OR "payment limit" OR "payment limits" OR "reducing payments" OR "reduce payments" OR "payment reductions" OR "payment reduction" OR "payment caps" OR "payment cap" OR "payment target" OR "payment targets" OR "payment ceiling" OR "payment ceilings" OR "payment constraint" OR "payment constraints" OR "payment maximum" OR "payment cut" OR "payment cuts" OR "reimbursement control" OR "reimbursement controls" OR "reimbursement limit" OR "reimbursement limits" OR "reducing reimbursements" OR "reduce reimbursements" OR "reimbursement reductions" OR "reimbursement reduction" OR "reimbursement caps" OR "reimbursement cap" OR "reimbursement target" OR "reimbursement targets" OR "reimbursement ceiling" OR "reimbursement ceilings" OR "reimbursement constraint" OR "reimbursement constraints" OR "reimbursement maximum" OR "reimbursement cut" OR "reimbursement cuts" OR "benefit control" OR "benefit controls" OR "benefit limit" OR "benefit limits" OR "reducing benefits" OR "reduce benefits" OR "benefit reductions" OR "benefit reduction" OR "benefit constraint" OR "benefit constraints" OR "benefit cut" OR "benefit cuts" OR "benefit evaluation" OR "benefit evaluations" OR "benefit assessment" OR "benefit assessments" OR "technology control" OR "technology controls" OR "technology limit" OR "technology limits" OR "technology constraint" OR "technology constraints" OR "technology evaluation" OR "technology evaluations" OR "technology assessment" OR "technology assessments" OR "specialist control" OR "specialist controls" OR "specialist limit" OR "specialist limits" OR "reducing specialists" OR "reduce specialists" OR "specialist reductions" OR "specialist reduction" OR "specialist target" OR "specialist targets" OR "specialist constraint" OR "specialist constraints" OR "specialist maximum" OR "doctor control" OR "doctor controls" OR "doctor limit" OR "doctor limits" OR "reducing doctors" OR "reduce doctors" OR "doctor reductions" OR "doctor reduction" OR "doctor constraint" OR "doctor constraints" OR "physician control" OR "physician controls" OR "physician limit" OR "physician limits" OR "reducing physicians" OR "reduce physicians" OR "physician reductions" OR "physician reduction" OR "physician target" OR "physician targets" OR "physician constraint" OR "physician constraints" OR "prescribing control" OR "prescribing controls" OR "prescribing limit" OR "prescribing limits" OR "prescribing caps" OR "prescribing cap" OR "prescribing target" OR "prescribing targets" OR "prescribing ceiling" OR "prescribing ceilings" OR "prescribing constraint" OR "prescribing constraints" OR "salary control" OR "salary controls" OR "salary limit" OR "salary limits" OR "reducing salary" OR "reduce salary" OR "salary reductions" OR "salary reduction" OR "salary caps" OR "salary cap" OR "salary constraint" OR "salary constraints" OR "salary cut" OR "salary cuts" OR "wage control" OR "wage controls" OR "wage limit" OR "wage limits" OR "reducing wages" OR "reduce wages" OR "reducing wage" OR "reduce wage" OR "wage reductions" OR "wage reduction" OR "wage caps" OR "wage cap" OR "wage ceiling" OR "wage ceilings" OR "wage constraint" OR "wage constraints" OR "maximum wage" OR "maximum wages" OR "wage cut" OR "wage cuts" OR "income control" OR "income controls" OR "income limit" OR "income limits" OR "reducing incomes" OR "reduce incomes" OR "income reductions" OR "income reduction" OR "income caps" OR "income cap" OR "income ceiling" OR "income ceilings" OR "maximum income" OR "profit control" OR "profit controls" OR "profit limit" OR "profit limits" OR "reducing profits" OR "reduce profits" OR "profit reductions" OR "profit reduction" OR "profit caps" OR "profit cap" OR "profit constraint" OR "profit constraints" OR "maximum profits" OR "maximum profit" OR "markup control" OR "markup controls" OR "reducing markups" OR "reduce markups" OR "markup reductions" OR "markup reduction" OR "markup constraint" OR "markup constraints" OR "markup cut" OR "markup cuts" OR "capital control" OR "capital controls" OR "capital target" OR "capital targets" OR "capital constraint" OR "capital constraints" OR "investment control" OR "investment controls" OR "investment target" OR "investment targets" OR "investment ceiling" OR "investment ceilings" OR "investment constraint" OR "investment constraints" OR "infrastructure control" OR "infrastructure controls" OR "infrastructure limit" OR "infrastructure limits" OR "infrastructure target" OR "infrastructure targets" OR "infrastructure constraint" OR "infrastructure constraints" )  Block 2 TI ( “health care” OR “health care” OR “health system”) OR AB (“health care” OR “health care” OR “health system” )  Block 3 TI (estimate OR estimation OR evaluate OR evaluation OR comparison OR review OR database OR dataset OR empirical OR empiric) OR AB (estimate OR estimation OR evaluate OR evaluation OR comparison OR review OR database OR dataset OR empirical OR empiric) Block 4 TI ( cost OR costs OR expense OR spending OR premiums OR expenditure OR affordability) OR AB 
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(cost OR costs OR expense OR spending OR premiums OR expenditure OR affordability) Block 5 TI (government OR federal OR ministry OR governance OR policy OR macro OR ) OR AB(government OR federal OR ministry OR governance OR policy OR macro OR ) Block 6 Block 1 AND Block 2 AND Block 3 AND Block 4 AND Block 5  Final Block 0 OR block 6  
  Figure 3.2: PRISMA diagram   
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liability
. Legen
d: 3=hi
gh qua
lity, 2=
medioc
re qual
ity, 1=l
ow qua
lity. No
te: SR: 
system
atic rev
iew; IV
: instru
mental
 variab
le; OLS
: ordin
ary lea
st 
square
s; CAN:
 Canad
a; GER:
 Germa
ny; SW
E: Swe
den; DE
N: Den
mark; E
SP: Spa
in; POR
: Portu
gal; GB
R: Unit
ed King
dom, IE
R: Irela
nd, USA
: Unite
d State
s of Am
erica. 
   
  
 
Vo
lu
m
e 
co
nt
ro
ls
 
Po
lic
y 
 
Pa
pe
r 
 
M
et
ho
d 
 
Co
un
tr
y 
 
Ef
fe
ct
 
As
se
ss
m
en
t*
  
Cost sh
aring 
(CDHP
) 
Bundo
rf, 201
6 SR
 (12 stu
dies) 
USA 
Aggreg
ate evi
dence r
eports 
cost sa
vings o
f 5% to
 15% fr
om CD
HP, 
correct
ed for p
atient s
electio
n. Evid
ence on
 quality
 is mixe
d. 
3/12 
Cost sh
aring 
(Deduc
table a
nd 
coinsur
ance) 
Feldste
in et al
., 
1995 
Fixed e
ffects 
and OL
S 
USA 
The stu
dy foun
d signi
ficant p
remium
 loweri
ng effe
cts of d
eductib
les (0.0
6 
percen
t point
 per do
llar ded
uctible
) and c
oinsura
nce (0.
02 perc
ent poi
nt 
per per
cent po
int coin
suranc
e) betw
een 19
85 and
 1992 i
n the fi
xed eff
ects 
model.
 
Cv 
Sb C
b Mb
 R 
2 
2 2
 2 
2 
Cost sh
aring 
(Copay
ment) 
 
Lee et a
l. 2015
 SR (29
 studie
s) U
SA, NLD
, 
ESP, NO
R, 
AUS  
Cost sh
aring c
ontains
 payer 
costs, p
artly by
 shiftin
g costs
 to pati
ents.  
9/12 
Soume
rai et 
al., 199
3 
SR (19 stu
dies) 
USA 
Even sm
all copa
yments
 reduce
 spend
ing, bu
t may r
isk acc
ess to n
ecessar
y 
care.  
7/12 
Joyce e
t al., 
2002 
Two-pa
rt 
logit/li
near 
regress
ion 
model 
USA 
Betwee
n 1997
 and 19
99 for 
1-tier c
opaym
ent pla
ns, incr
easing 
copay 
from $
5 to %1
0 was a
ssociat
ed with
 27% lo
wer dr
ug cost
s. Drug
 spend
ing 
in a 2-t
ier cop
aymen
t schem
e was 7
%-22%
 lower 
than in
 a 1-tie
r schem
e. 
A 3-tie
r plan w
as estim
ated to
 be 2%
 to 7% 
lower c
ost tha
n a 2-ti
er plan
.  C
v S
b Cb
 Mb 
R 
2 
3 3
 3 
2 
Hilman
 et al., 
1999 
Two-pa
rt 
logit/li
near 
regress
ion 
USA 
A 50%
 increa
se in ph
armacy
 copaym
ents be
tween 
1990 a
nd 199
2 from
 
the me
an of $
5 reduc
ed drug
 spend
ing by 
12.3% 
in IPAs
, but no
t 
signific
antly in
 HMOs
.  
Cv 
Sb C
b Mb
 R 
1 
2 3
 2 
3 
Reduce
 
overtre
atment
 
(Utiliza
tion 
review
) 
Moore 
et al., 
2000 
OLS regress
ion 
USA 
Total d
rug exp
enditur
e was 6
.5% low
er in st
ates op
erating
 a drug
 
utilizat
ion rev
iew pro
gram b
etween
 1985 a
nd 199
2. Olde
r progr
ams 
achieve
d more
 cost sa
vings. 
Cv 
Sb C
b Mb
 R 
2 
2 2
 1 
2 
Reduce
 
overtre
atment
 
(Prior author
ization
) 
 
Soume
rai et 
al., 199
3 
SR (0 stud
ies) 
USA 
No dat
a on pr
ior aut
horizat
ion we
re foun
d. 
7/12 
Mackin
non et 
al., 200
1 
SR (6 stud
ies) 
USA 
Based 
on 6 st
udies, t
he auth
ors con
clude t
hat pri
or auth
orizatio
n reduc
es 
drug-re
lated c
osts. So
me evi
dence s
uggests
 that no
n-drug
 related
 costs 
also ar
e reduc
ed, whi
le effec
ts on q
uality o
r acces
s are u
ncertai
n.  
7/12 
Access
 contro
l 
(prescr
iption 
caps) 
Lee et a
l. 2015
 SR (6 s
tudies)
 U
SA, NLD
, 
ESP, NO
R, 
AUS  
Prescri
ption c
aps con
tain pa
yer cos
ts, part
ly by sh
ifting c
osts to
 patien
ts. 
Prescri
ption c
aps ma
y reduc
e utiliz
ation fo
r vulne
rable p
opulati
ons and
 
may sh
ift cost
s to oth
er sect
ors.  
9/12 
* For a
ssessm
ent sco
res, see
 appen
dix 3.1
. Fracti
ons ind
icate sc
ores on
 the AM
STAR r
eview s
cale (ta
ble 3.2
). Cv: c
ontent
 validit
y, Sb: S
electio
n bias; 
Cb: con
foundin
g bias; 
Mb: me
asurem
ent bia
s; R: re
liability
. Legen
d: 3=hi
gh qua
lity, 2=
medioc
re qual
ity, 1=l
ow qua
lity 
Note: C
DHP: C
onsum
er dire
cted he
alth pla
n; SR: s
ystema
tic revi
ew; IV:
 instrum
ental v
ariable
; OLS: o
rdinary
 least s
quares
; D-in-D
: differ
ence in
 differe
nces; U
SA: Un
ited 
States 
of Ame
rica; N
OR: No
rway; B
EL: Bel
gium; K
OR: Ko
rea; CA
N: Cana
da; SW
E: Swe
den; DE
N: Den
mark; H
MO: He
alth ma
intenan
ce orga
nizatio
n; IPA:
 indepe
ndent p
ractice
 
associa
tion; CD
HP: con
sumer-
directe
d healt
h plan.
 
   
  
 
    Policy  
Pa
pe
r 
 
M
et
ho
d 
 
Co
un
tr
y 
 
Ef
fe
ct
 
As
se
ss
m
en
t*
  
Benefit
 packag
e 
(formu
lary 
restric
tions) 
 
Green e
t al. 
2010  
SR (9 stud
ies) 
CAN, D
EN, 
USA, B
EL, 
NOR 
6 studi
es foun
d lowe
r costs 
due to 
drug re
strictio
ns, 2 st
udies f
ound n
o 
signific
ant effe
ct on co
sts. 1 s
tudy fo
und low
er cost
s after 
relaxat
ion of 
drug p
rescrib
ing res
triction
s. 
10/12 
Lee et a
l. 2015
 SR (30
 studie
s) U
SA, NLD
, 
ESP, NO
R, 
AUS  
Reimbu
rsemen
t restri
ctions 
may lo
wer sp
ending
, but co
uld affe
ct qual
ity 
negativ
ely.  
9/12 
Soume
rai et 
al., 199
3 
SR (12 stu
dies) 
USA 
Reduct
ions in
 the be
nefit pa
ckage m
ay have
 no effe
ct on co
sts due
 to 
substit
ution.  
7/12 
Happe 
et al. 
2014   
SR (59 stu
dies) 
USA 
Econom
ic outc
omes o
f formu
lary re
strictio
ns cont
ained c
osts in 
34% of
 
the cas
es, incr
eased c
osts in 
29% an
d were
 neutra
l in 37%
. For cl
inical 
outcom
es this 
was re
spectiv
ely 3%
, 68% a
nd 28%
.  
4/12 
Benefit
 packag
e 
(delisti
ng) 
Park et
 al., 
2016 
Interru
pted 
time se
ries 
and D-
in-D 
analysi
s 
KOR 
No sign
ificant 
effect o
f 2006 
delistin
g polic
y on to
tal cost
s was f
ound.  
Cv 
Sb C
b Mb
 R 
3 
2 3
 3 
2 
Patient
 
educat
ion 
Lee et a
l. 2015
 SR (2 s
tduies)
 U
SA, NLD
, 
ESP, NO
R, 
AUS  
Patient
 educat
ion inc
reased
 generi
c use, b
ut did n
ot redu
ce spen
ding.  
9/12 
Fries e
t al., 
1994 
RCT m
eans 
compa
rison 
USA 
A healt
h prom
otion p
rogram
 for Blu
e Shiel
d mem
bers re
duced 
claims 
costs b
y $3.2 t
o $8.0 m
illion b
etween
 1989 a
nd 199
1. 
Cv 
Sb C
b Mb
 R 
1 
2 3
 1 
1 
* For a
ssessm
ent sco
res, see
 appen
dix 3.1
. Fracti
ons ind
icate sc
ores on
 the AM
STAR r
eview s
cale (ta
ble 3.2
). Cv: c
ontent
 validit
y, Sb: S
electio
n bias; 
Cb: con
foundin
g bias; 
Mb: me
asurem
ent bia
s; R: re
liability
. Legen
d: 3=hi
gh qua
lity, 2=
medioc
re qual
ity, 1=l
ow qua
lity 
Note: C
DHP: C
onsum
er dire
cted he
alth pla
n; SR: s
ystema
tic revi
ew; IV:
 instrum
ental v
ariable
; OLS: o
rdinary
 least s
quares
; D-in-D
: differ
ence in
 differe
nces; U
SA: Un
ited 
States 
of Ame
rica; NO
R: Norw
ay; BEL
: Belgiu
m; KOR
: Korea
; CAN: 
Canada
; SWE: 
Swede
n; DEN
: Denm
ark; HM
O: Hea
lth mai
ntenan
ce orga
nizatio
n; IPA:
 indepe
ndent p
ractice
 
associa
tion; CD
HP: con
sumer-
directe
d healt
h plan.
 
   
 
  
 
M
ar
ke
t s
tr
uc
tu
re
 p
ol
ic
ie
s 
Po
lic
y 
 
Pa
pe
r 
 
M
et
ho
d 
 
Co
un
tr
y 
Ef
fe
ct
 
As
se
ss
m
en
t*
  
Purcha
sers 
 (HMOs
) 
 
Feldste
in et al
., 
1995  
Fixed e
ffects 
model 
USA 
A 10%
 increa
se in H
MO ma
rket sh
are red
uces pr
emium
 growth
 by 
6.5% b
etween
 1985 a
nd 199
2.  
Cv Sb
 Cb 
Mb R
 
2 2
 2 
2 2
 
Bamez
ai, 199
9  
 
First di
fferenc
es 
model 
USA 
Especia
lly in co
mpetit
ive ma
rkets H
MOs an
d PPOs
 lower 
health 
costs b
y at mo
st 15.3
% and 
7.7%, r
especti
vely (1
989-19
94).  
Cv Sb
 Cb 
Mb R
 
2 1
 2 
1 3
 
Robins
on, 
1991  
Varyin
g 
parame
ter 
regress
ion 
USA 
HMO p
enetrat
ion is e
stimate
d to ha
ve led t
o cost s
avings 
of over
 one 
billion 
in 1988
, or 6.7
% to 7.
1% of t
otal ho
spital c
osts. 
Cv Sb
 Cb 
Mb R
 
1 1
 1 
2 2
 
Cherne
w et al
., 
2008   
Instrum
ental 
variabl
e 
estima
tion 
USA 
Increas
e in HM
O pene
tration
 (1994
-2001)
 has co
st-savi
ng spil
lovers 
on FFS
 of 0.3%
 to 0.9%
 per on
e perce
nt incr
ease in
 penetr
ation. 
Cv Sb
 Cb 
Mb R
 
2 1
 3 
2 3
 
Purcha
sers 
(Medic
aid MC
Os) 
 
Harma
n et al.
, 
2011  
D-in-D
 
USA 
No sign
ificant 
differe
nce fou
nd betw
een Flo
rida co
unties 
with hi
gh 
adoptio
n and l
ow ado
ption o
f Medic
aid MC
Os betw
een 20
04 and
 
2008.  
Cv Sb
 Cb 
Mb R
 
2 3
 2 
2 3
 
Burns, 
2009  
Two-pa
rt 
regress
ion 
USA 
For dis
ability 
patient
s no sig
nifican
t differ
ences b
etween
 MCOs 
and 
traditio
nal Me
dicaid 
were fo
und be
tween 
1996 a
nd 200
4. 
Cv Sb
 Cb 
Mb R
 
1 2
 1 
2 2
 
Purcha
sers 
 (Mana
ged car
e) 
Reich e
t al., 
2012  
mixed 
model 
panel a
nalysis
 
with ca
se-mix
 
correct
ion 
CHE 
Contro
lling fo
r patien
t select
ion, ma
naged 
care is 
associa
ted wit
h 
15.5% 
lower c
osts be
tween 
2006-2
009.  
Cv Sb
 Cb 
Mb R
 
1 2
 2 
3 2
 
Ehlert 
et al., 
2014   
Random
 effects
 
panel e
stimati
on 
GER 
A 1% i
ncreas
e in ma
naged 
care co
ntracts
 increa
sed ph
armace
utical 
expend
iture in
 neighb
ouring
 region
s. Tota
l expen
diture 
is incre
ased 
by 0.2%
 to 0.8%
 (0.5-2
 million
 euro) 
betwee
n 2004
 and 20
08. 
Cv Sb
 Cb 
Mb R
 
3 3
 3 
2 3
 
Purcha
sers 
(Menta
l health
 carve o
ut) 
Ma et a
l., 1998
  bef
ore-aft
er 
compa
rison 
USA 
Costs o
f menta
l care d
ropped
 30%-4
0% aft
er a 19
93 carv
e-out. 
Cv Sb
 Cb 
Mb R
 
1 1
 2 
2 2
 
Provid
ers (tel
emedic
ine) 
Reich e
t al., 
2012 
mixed 
model 
panel a
nalysis
 
with ca
semix 
correct
ion 
CHE 
Contro
lling fo
r patien
t select
ion, off
ering o
f telem
edicine
 in man
aged 
care co
ntracts
 is asso
ciated 
with 3.
7% low
er cost
s betw
een 20
06 
and 20
09. 
Cv Sb
 Cb 
Mb R
 
1 2
 2 
3 2
 
Provid
ers (Ho
spice c
are at 
end-of-
life) 
Gozalo
 et al., 
2008   
OLS re
gressio
ns 
USA 
Costs d
ecrease
d by 8%
 on ave
rage be
tween 
1998 a
nd 199
9, main
ly 
driven
 by pat
ients w
ith can
cer, wh
ile pati
ents w
ith dem
entia 
experie
nced n
o signif
icant d
ifferen
ces in c
osts, an
d other
 diagno
ses 
experie
nced in
creased
 costs. 
Cv Sb
 Cb 
Mb R
 
2 2
 2 
2 2
 
Provid
ers (re
habilita
tion 
care) 
Ward e
t al. 
2008 
SR (0 stud
ies) 
 
No evid
ence w
as foun
d on w
hich ty
pe of re
habilita
tion ca
re is m
ost 
cost eff
ective. 
7/12 
   
  
 
 Po
lic
y 
 
Pa
pe
r 
 
M
et
ho
d 
 
Co
un
tr
y 
Ef
fe
ct
 
As
se
ss
m
en
t*
  
Provid
ers (Pa
tient 
centere
d medi
cal 
homes
) 
 
Cole et
 al., 
2015 
matche
d contr
ol 
group 
USA 
Costs w
ere low
er in Lo
uisiana
 PCMH
 betwe
en 200
7 and 2
010, bu
t 
not sig
nifican
tly. Acu
te care
 use did
 not ch
ange. 
Cv S
b Cb
 Mb 
R 
2 1
 2 
2 2
 
Werne
r et al.,
 
2013 
linear probab
ility 
model,
 GLM 
USA 
No sign
ificant 
change
s in cos
ts were
 detect
ed betw
een 20
10 and
 
2011 in
 New Je
rsey. Q
uality i
ncreas
ed for 2
 of 9 HE
DIS qu
ality 
measur
es. 
Cv S
b Cb
 Mb 
R 
1 1
 1 
1 3
 
Provid
ers (Co
mmuni
ty 
care) 
Robert
s et al.,
 
2005 
SR (42 stu
dies) 
CAN, U
SA, 
AUS, G
BR, 
NLD 
Mixed 
eviden
ce for a
ssertiv
e comm
unity tr
eatmen
t (ACT)
, 
intensi
ve case
 manag
ement 
and co
mmuni
ty psyc
hiatric 
nursing
 
was fou
nd, alth
ough fo
r ACT h
igh qua
lity pap
ers poi
nt towa
rds cos
t 
savings
. 
6/12 
Decent
ralizati
on 
 
Costa-F
ont et 
al., 200
8 
Spatial
 lag 
model 
ESP 
Initiall
y costs
 increa
sed aft
er dece
ntraliz
ation w
ith 9%
 to 16%
 
betwee
n 1995
 and 20
02. Cos
t growt
h proce
eded sl
ower a
fter 
decent
ralizati
on by 0
.5% to 
1% per
 year. 
Cv S
b Cb
 Mb 
R 
2 3
 2 
2 3
 
Mosca,
 2007 
Countr
y OLS 
estima
tion  
OECD countr
ies 
Decent
ralized
 health
 system
s have 
12% to
 25% h
igher c
ost gro
wth 
than ce
ntraliz
ed syst
ems.  
Cv S
b Cb
 Mb 
R 
2 2
 1 
1 2
 
Task su
bstitut
ion 
Khangu
ra et al
. 
2012 
SR (3 s
tudies)
 G
BR, IER
 
Two of
 three a
rticles 
found m
arginal
ly lowe
r costs
 after G
P task 
substit
ution in
 the em
ergenc
y depa
rtment
. 
11/12 
Lauran
t et al. 
2009 
SR (11
 studie
s) G
BR, US
A, 
CAN 
The rev
iew fou
nd task
 substit
ution d
ecrease
d costs
 (3 stud
ies), 
increas
ed cost
s (2 stu
dies) o
r had n
o effect
 on cos
ts (6 st
udies).
 
9/12 
For-pro
fit prov
ision 
 
Schlesi
nger et
 
al., 198
6 
OLS es
timatio
n  U
SA 
For-Pr
ofit pur
chaser
s have 
$21 to 
$46 hig
her rev
enues p
er 
membe
r than 
Non-Pr
ofit one
s, altho
ugh no
t signif
icant in
 all 
estima
tions. C
osts ar
e signif
icantly
 higher
 in for-
profit H
MOs.  
Cv S
b Cb
 Mb 
R 
1 1
 1 
2 2
 
Devere
aux et 
al., 200
4 
SR met
a analy
sis 
(8 stud
ies) 
USA 
Averag
ing 8 st
udies f
or prof
it hosp
itals ch
arge 19
% high
er pric
es.  
11/12 
Rosena
u, 2003
 SR (
37 stud
ies) 
USA 
A syste
matic r
eview f
ound 3
7 econo
mic com
parison
s betwe
en for 
profit a
nd non
-profit,
 of whi
ch 23 f
avored
 non-pr
ofit, 5 f
or-prof
it 
and 9 w
ere inc
onclusi
ve. 
6/12 
* For a
ssessm
ent sco
res, see
 appen
dix 3.1
. Fracti
ons ind
icate sc
ores on
 the AM
STAR r
eview s
cale (ta
ble 3.2
). Cv: c
ontent
 validit
y, Sb: S
electio
n bias; 
Cb: con
foundin
g bias; 
Mb: 
measur
ement 
bias; R
: reliab
ility. Le
gend: 3
=high q
uality, 
2=med
iocre q
uality, 
1=low 
quality
. Note: 
SR: sys
tematic
 review
; IV: ins
trumen
tal vari
able; O
LS: ord
inary le
ast squ
ares; 
D-in-D
: differ
ence in
 differe
nces; G
LM: ge
neraliz
ed line
ar mod
el; MCO
: mana
ged car
e organ
ization
; HMO:
 health
 mainte
nance o
rganiza
tion; PP
O: pref
erred p
rovider
 
organiz
ation; C
HE: Sw
itzerlan
d; NOR
: Norw
ay; CAN
: Canad
a; GBR
: Unite
d Kingd
om, IER
: Irelan
d, USA:
 United
 States
 of Ame
rica; FF
S: fee fo
r servic
e; ROI:
 return
 on inv
estmen
t. 
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pe
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M
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Ef
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ct
 
As
se
ss
m
en
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Coordi
nation 
(Case 
manag
ement)
 
Phillips
 et al., 
2014 
Pre-po
st-refo
rm-
compa
rison 
USA 
In Illin
ois, a c
ase ma
nagem
ent pro
gram (
IHC) fr
om 200
6 was a
ssociat
ed 
with a 
reducti
on in c
osts of 
6.5% p
er year
 to 201
0. A sep
arate d
isease 
manag
ement 
progra
m (YHP
) result
ed in co
sts sav
ings of
 8.6%. 
Cv Sb
 Cb 
Mb R
 
3 1
 3 
3 3
 
Muller
 et al., 
1996 
Steppe
d wedg
e 
panel a
nalysis
  
USA 
Maxim
al savin
gs of th
e Arkan
sas pri
mary c
are cas
e mana
gemen
t progr
am 
were 6
.7% (1
991-19
95). Ac
cess to
 care in
creased
. 
Cv Sb
 Cb 
Mb R
 
2 1
 3 
2 2
 
Hawkin
s et al.,
 
2015  
D-in-D
 and 
propen
sity 
matchi
ng 
USA 
A case 
manag
ement 
progra
m for h
igh-ris
k patie
nts, im
plemen
ted 
betwee
n 2008
 and 20
11, is e
stimate
d to ha
ve a RO
I of 1.4
0.  
Cv Sb
 Cb 
Mb R
 
1 1
 1 
1 1
 
Ozmink
owski e
t 
al., 199
9 
 
Logisti
c and O
LS 
regress
ions 
USA 
A healt
h mana
gemen
t progr
am imp
lement
ed by C
itibank
 in 199
4 resul
ted 
in cost
 saving
s of bet
ween $
589 an
d $626
 per pa
rticipa
nt and 
a posit
ive 
ROI of 
betwee
n 4.56 
and 4.7
3.  
Cv Sb
 Cb 
Mb R
 
2 1
 1 
2 1
 
Kranke
r, 2016
 D
-in-D in
 a natu
ral 
experim
ent 
USA 
A non-
signific
ant red
uction 
of $89 
PMPM 
is foun
d for hi
gh-risk
 patien
ts in 
a case m
anagem
ent pro
gram in
 Georgi
a. Thes
e reduc
tions w
ere 
insuffic
ient to 
cover t
he cost
s of the
 progra
m.  
Cv Sb
 Cb 
Mb R
 
2 3
 2 
2 3
 
Coordi
nation 
(Provid
er 
continu
ity) 
De Mae
seneer
 et 
al., 200
3 
Multiva
riate 
regress
ion 
analysi
s 
BEL 
Patient
s switc
hing GP
 were 1
1% mo
re expe
nsive t
han pa
tients w
ith GP 
continu
ity.  
Cv Sb
 Cb 
Mb R
 
2 1
 1 
1 1
 
Compe
tition 
(Insure
rs) 
Melnic
k et al.,
 
1988 
OLS re
gressio
n 
analysi
s 
USA 
Costs in
 Califor
nia reg
ions w
ith low
 degree
 of com
petitio
n incre
ased by
 
1% bet
ween 1
983 an
d 1985
, while 
costs d
ecrease
d by 11
.3% in 
highly 
compe
titive r
egions.
 
Cv Sb
 Cb 
Mb R
 
1 1
 2 
1 2
 
Melnic
k et al.,
 
1995  
state co
mparis
on 
USA 
Califor
nia, ha
ving a p
ro-com
petitive
 legisla
ture, ac
hieved
 lower 
cost 
growth
 than s
tates w
ith regu
latory e
nviron
ments 
betwee
n 1980
 and 
1991. 
Cv Sb
 Cb 
Mb R
 
2 1
 1 
2 1
 
Mobley
, 1998 
 F
irst dif
ference
s 
estima
tion 
USA 
In the l
ong ter
m, Cali
fornia’
s pro-c
ompeti
tive ref
orm lo
wered 
costs, b
ut 
might h
ave jeo
pardize
d publi
c hospi
tal con
tinuity
 (1982
-1990)
. 
Cv Sb
 Cb 
Mb R
 
2 3
 2 
3 3
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4 The marginal benefits of healthcare spending in 
the Netherlands 
Estimating cost-effectiveness thresholds using a translog 
production function  Stadhouders, N., Koolman , X., Van Dijk, C., Jeurissen, P., Adang, E.  Submitted   
Abstract New technologies may displace existing, higher-value care under a fixed budget. Countries aim to curtail adoption of low-value technologies, for example by installing cost effectiveness thresholds. Our objective is to estimate the opportunity cost of hospital care to identify a threshold value for the Netherlands. To this aim, we combine claims data, mortality data and quality of life questionnaires from 2012 to 2014 for 11,000 patient groups to obtain QALY outcomes and spending. Using a fixed effects translog model, we estimate that a 1% increase in hospital spending on average increases QALY outcomes by 0.2%. This implies a threshold of €73,600 per QALY, with 95% confidence intervals ranging from €53,000 to €94,000 per QALY. The results stipulate that new technologies with ICERs exceeding the Dutch upper reference value of €80.000 may indeed displace more valuable care.   
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Chapter 4 
The marginal benefits of healthcare spending in the Netherlands 
 
4.1 Introduction Medical innovations have been a major driver of health care growth (Smith et al., 2009), but also brought along major increases in health and longevity (Cutler and McClellan, 2001; Skinner and Staiger, 2015). Recently, however, a more disturbing trend has become visible as pharmaceutical companies target smaller patient groups, and new drugs are becoming much more expensive at modest effectiveness gains (Pearson, 2017). For example, Spinraza®, a new drug targeting the orphan disease spinal muscular atrophy (SMA), entered the US market in 2017 with estimated treatment costs of $375,000 to $750,000 per patient per year. More and more countries question whether these new medicines should be reimbursed. Denmark refused reimbursement of Spinraza®, citing unacceptable high costs. In the UK, reimbursement was refused pending price negotiations. The Irish National Centre for Pharmacoeconomics suggested a tenfold decrease in the price of Spinraza®, estimated at €501,069 per QALY, before reimbursement would be cost-effective (NCPE, 2017). In the Netherlands a price reduction of 85% was deemed necessary before uptake into the mandatory benefit package would be advised (ACP, 2018). At the same time that these new technologies demand extra funds, health spending is becoming increasingly constrained (Robinson, 2015). Therefore, new technologies increasingly require disinvestment of existing care (Hollingworth et al., 2015).  To guide spending decisions, health losses due to disinvestment should be compared to the gains of innovations. This idea is embodied in cost-effectiveness thresholds: new technologies should add more value than a predefined threshold in order to be reimbursed (Neumann et al., 2014). Countries using thresholds include the UK, New Zealand, Australia and Ireland (Edney et al., 2018; Eichler et al., 2004; Harris, 2016; O’Mahony and Coughlan, 2015). The Netherlands currently uses a range of reference values for new drugs of between €20,000 and €80,000 (Reckers-Droog et al., 2018). However, these thresholds have no empirical base and thus may not truly reflect the opportunity costs, risking inefficient reimbursement decisions (Thokala et al., 2018). If the aim of the health system is to maximise population health, improving the estimate of the opportunity costs could inform the decision process and increase population health. Opportunity costs could be empirically estimated using a supply-side approach (Woods et al., 2016). For the UK, utilising regional variation in spending and outcomes, a threshold of £12,936 per QALY was estimated (Claxton et al., 2015a). Recently, cost-effectiveness thresholds have also been estimated for 
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Spain, Australia, the US and Canada (Ariste and Di Matteo, 2017; Edney et al., 2018; Vallejo‐Torres et al., 2017; Woods et al., 2016).   This paper applies a novel approach for threshold estimation to hospital care in the Netherlands. We define opportunity costs as the health effect of a marginal change in spending for the average patient group. We restrict our analysis to the hospital sector, as this is where opportunity costs for new drugs and innovations are likely to fall. Other thresholds may apply if expenses are reduced in other sectors (e.g. primary care, tertiary care) to fund new technologies in the hospital sector. QALYs are constructed by combining gains due to lower mortality and gains due to increases in quality of life of all patients (Gheorghe et al., 2015). We define a production function with spending and the number of patients as inputs and QALYs as outputs for 11,000 patient groups based on gender, disease category and age category. We approximate the hospital production function using a translog specification, and estimate a fixed effects model on panel data covering 2012-2014. Threshold estimations are known to be sensitive to endogeneity (Martin et al., 2008). This is especially troubling when focusing on spending that aims to reduce mortality, as the health care costs involved with the last year of life are known to be substantial (Polder et al., 2006). Failure to account for these costs could underestimate the effect of health care on survival. As these costs are well studied and known for the Dutch situation (van Baal et al., 2011), we have the opportunity to correct for them. Furthermore, the translog specification accounts for exogeneous changes in health status that may confound the results, as increases in population health are likely to be reflected in reduced patient numbers. As robustness tests for omitted variable bias, we include general health trends (smoking, obesity, alcohol abuse). Estimation of the translog function renders the marginal effect of spending on the mean patient group, which can be interpreted as a supply-side cost-effectiveness threshold (Woods et al., 2016). This may provide information for Dutch policy makers in reimbursement decisions and strengthen the empirical base for using a threshold. Furthermore, we estimate patient group thresholds separately, which may point out inefficiencies in current spending allocation.   
4.2 Data and methods 
4.2.1 Data transformations In the hospital sector, patients lose QALYs as a result of premature deaths (death-related QALY loss) and lower quality of life while being ill (morbidity-related QALY loss). Consequently, extra spending may add QALYs resulting both from prevention of premature deaths and increasing the quality of life of patients. In previous research, elasticities of spending on mortality were estimated, after which the outcome was transformed to QALYs 
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(Claxton et al., 2015a). Due to availability of rich data, including health questionnaire outcome data, we were able to first transform both the mortality data and the health questionnaire data to obtain estimated total QALYs (sum of death-related QALYs and morbidity-related QALYs), and then estimate the effect of spending on total QALYs. Figure 4.1 shows the transformations we used to arrive at the level of analysis. Light blocks represent individual level data and dark blocks represent group level data. The arrows show the transformation steps. Transformations that introduce uncertainty (dark arrows) were subject to Monte Carlo analyses.  
 Figure 4.1: Data transformation and estimation strategy  We combined three datasets on patient group level: health questionnaires, mortality statistics and hospital claims. Hospital claims data contained the euro amount of the claim, a patient follow-up code, patient gender and age, and a DBC code (Dutch alternative to the DRG system) for all hospitals in the Netherlands from 2012 to 2014 (Zorginstituut Nederland, 2017). Claims data prior to 2012 were considered insufficiently comparable due to differences in data collection. Data after 2014 were incomplete at the time of analysis and 
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would introduce selection bias. We defined patient groups based on gender, 5-year age category and disease group. A classification matrix was used to categorize DBC codes into 405 disease groups, based on 3-digit codes from the International Classification of Diseases, version 10 (ICD-10). With two gender groups, 21 age groups and 405 disease groups, 17.010 possible patient group combinations were defined. Of these, 11.079 contained claims. We aggregated claims data to patient group level to obtain total spending per patient group and the number of patients per patient group (step 3.1). Patients submitting claims in multiple ICD-groups feature in multiple patient groups. In total, 91% of total hospital spending was attributed to these patient groups. The remainder mainly constituted additional diagnostics and medication that could not be matched to individual DRGs. 
 
From health questionnaires to morbidity-related QALY loss Health-related questionnaires were collected annually from a representative sample of the Dutch population (CBS, 2010-2015). Health status of respondents above 50 years was routinely included in the questionnaires, which allowed us to construct EQ5D scores. Respondents could be divided into gender-based 5-year age groups and whether they visited a hospital during the year.  Morbidity-related QALY losses on a patient group level were constructed in four steps (1.1 to 1.4 in figure 4.1). In step 1.1, we matched health status questions to a validated QALY-measurement tool (Gheorghe et al., 2015) to obtain individual EQ-5D scores. In step 1.2, using a Dutch EQ-5D algorithm (Lamers et al., 2006), individual EQ-5D scores were transformed into individual QALY scores. In step 1.3, following Edney et al. (2018), we estimated changes in patient QALY scores over time, correcting for demographic trends (see appendix 4.1). Estimations resulted in a time trend in morbidity-related QALY loss per hospitalised patient by age group and gender. A pooled linear regression estimation rendered mean differences between patients and non-patients, which could be interpreted as the potential health gains the hospital sector could still achieve (see appendix 4.1). Combining the two estimates renders per patient group the mean number of QALYs lost due to illness and the mean change in patient QALYs over time. To incorporate uncertainty surrounding the estimates, we included this step in the Monte Carlo uncertainty analysis. In step 1.4, these outcomes were multiplied by the base number of patients in each patient group in 2012, rendering total patient group morbidity-related QALY loss.  We assumed that the average QALY scores of patients before they visit the hospital remained constant over time, and were not affected by exogenous increases in the health of the population (confounding by indication). If the population would get healthier due to factors outside the health sector, the chance of becoming a patient in a given year may 
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decline. This would reduce the size of the patient group, while mean patient health may be unaffected. Therefore, changes in patient QALY scores could be fully attributed to the health sector. Extra spending may increase quality of life of patients who would not have died, but may also avert deaths of patients who would have, rendering the effect on average quality of life of all patients ambiguous (Ochalek et al., 2015). While the health questionnaires were used to measure the primary effect of increases in quality of life of patients (step 1.1 to 1.4), the effect of lower mean quality of life due to increases in survival was introduced in step 2.3 (described below).   
From mortality data to death-related QALY loss Mortality statistics were collected by Statistics Netherlands and contained all nationwide deaths in a given year including information on age, gender and primary cause of death according to the 3-digit ICD-10 codes. The ICD-10 codes allowed appointment of deaths to the same patient groups as defined by claims data (step 2.1). In 3713 patient groups, at least one death was recorded. In total 94% of all deaths were appointed to a patient group with positive spending.   To transform the number of deaths to death-related QALY loss per patient group, we followed Claxton et al. (2015). Contrary to the UK, estimates of healthy life expectancy were readily available in the Netherlands (CBS, 2018). This allowed us to compute healthy years of life lost for deaths in all age groups (step 2.2). Some of the benefits of averted deaths are in the future, requiring discounting to calculate the net actuarial benefit of averted deaths. Following Dutch guidelines, in step 2.3 we apply a discount rate of 1.5% (Zorginstituut Nederland, 2015). As literature provides no consensus on the appropriate discount rate (Claxton et al., 2011), we allowed discount rates to vary between 0 and 5 percent in our sensitivity analysis. If a death is averted, a patient may not fully return to the average health status of the population. Therefore, in step 2.4 we used Dutch disease-specific disability-adjusted life years (DALY) estimates from Hoeymans et al. (2014) to correct for burden of disease (see table 4.2). DALY values ranged between 0 and 1 and included utility losses due to premature death and lower health in life (Hoeymans et al., 2014). In our research, healthy life years were reduced by the relative DALY burden (step 2.4), e.g. a DALY of 0.1 resulted in a 10% reduction in disease specific healthy life years relative to the healthy population. Steps 2.2 to 2.4, rendering the number of QALYs lost due to mortality (Gafni and Birch, 1993), introduced extra uncertainty in the estimates, which was evaluated using Monte-Carlo analysis. By adding the number of QALYs lost due to mortality to the number of QALYs lost due to morbidity (step 2.5), total QALY loss for each of the 11,000 patient groups was obtained.  
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4.2.2 Correcting for reverse causality Reductions in mortality may lower health spending due to fewer mortality-related costs, while increased spending can reduce mortality. Due to this reverse causality, straightforward estimation would result in underestimation of the true effect of extra spending on outcomes, i.e. an upward biased threshold. Because last year of life costs are known in the Netherlands, we were able to correct for the cost resulting from changes in mortality directly, and isolate the effect of changes in spending on changes in mortality. Although a strong and valid instrument is preferred to correct for endogeneity, direct correction may be a good alternative when no valid IVs are at hand (Moreno-Serra and Smith, 2015). To this aim, we split the bi-directional causality by disaggregating spending 
     into last year of life costs         that resulted from mortality, and the costs that do not result from mortality, which we call corrected spending (  ):  
                     (1) By construction, exogenous changes in mortality only influence      , allowing estimation of the effect of changes in corrected spending (  ) on mortality. In order for equation (1) to hold,       should be independent of changes in mortality.  
                                (2) If lower mortality changed the average LYoL-costs, for example if predominantly high-cost deaths were averted, the estimate would be biased downward, while if mostly low-cost death were averted, the effect would be biased upward. Moreover, this correction may be incomplete: if LYoL-costs would increase over time, equation (1) insufficiently corrects for reverse causality, biasing the estimated thresholds upwards.  For the Netherlands, mean LYoL-costs were known for age groups and gender (van Baal et al., 2011). In step 4.1, we multiplied the LYoL-costs by the number of deaths for each of the 11,000 patient groups to obtain the total amount of spending as a result of mortality        . Due to the uncertainty surrounding LYoL-costs, Monte Carlo uncertainty analysis was used. In step 4.2, we subtracted the LYoL-costs from total spending to obtain corrected spending (  ).   
4.2.3 Correcting for omitted variable bias Underlying health status may influence both spending and health outcomes: if fewer patients get ill and die from a disease, for example due to healthier lifestyle, costs for the patient group may be lower, and fewer QALYs are lost due to both mortality and morbidity. Straightforward estimation would erroneously attribute the health gains to the hospital sector, causing thresholds to be biased downward. To correct for omitted variable bias 
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(OVB), others have attributed a fixed part of the gains to factors outside the health sector (Cutler and McClellan, 2001; Hall and Jones, 2004). We correct for OVB by using changes in the number of patients as proxy for health trends. The underlying assumption is that when health of a patient group improves, the number of patients that visit the hospital decreases. This assumption is violated if health trends change treatment intensity and outcomes while keeping patient numbers stable, which could happen in the case of waiting lists. However, waiting lists in the Netherlands only exist for a small number of patient groups and are relatively low (Siciliani et al., 2014). When hospitals respond to lower patient numbers by attracting new, healthier patients through supplier-induced demand, OVB may also remain. Other potential sources of endogeneity include time effects. Cost and outcome variables may be correlated to previous years’ values. We corrected for this using a fixed effects model (Wooldridge, 2010). Furthermore, health shocks may affect future spending, which may bias the estimators upwards. As robustness checks, we corrected for health shocks by including time dummies and lagged effects.   
4.2.4 Empirical strategy We used total QALY loss, corrected spending and the number of patients for each of the 11,000 patient groups as inputs for our empirical estimation strategy. For each patient group   we define QALYs ( ) as an unknown function of corrected spending ( ) and number of treated patients ( ): 
           .          (3) We assumed diminishing marginal returns:                   , and assumed that the production function was differentiable at relevant intervals (Boisverf, 1982). We approach the unknown function       at the mean by defining the second order Taylor polynomial: 
                              
 
 
          
             
 
 
          
  
                                  (4) 
Where α is the group specific productivity parameter, T is the trend in time t, the   coefficients are the cost elasticity parameters and the   coefficients are the treatment elasticity parameters.    contain fixed effects and     is the error term. Evaluated at the mean, the translog function approximates the unknown production function. Using a translog function to estimate the marginal effect of spending is preferred over commonly used explicit specifications –such as the linear or Cobb-Douglas model- if the elasticity is nonlinear and the elasticity of substitution unknown (Boisverf, 1982; Pavelescu, 2011), which are both likely for the heterogeneous patient groups. The elasticity of spending   for the mean patient group was obtained by the first derivative of         ) with respect to log      :  
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                                (5) Next, the elasticity was evaluated at the mean to obtain the marginal effect of spending for the mean patient group:         
       
 
     
       
          (6) Uncertainty with respect to the construction of the outcome variable was incorporated into the estimation by running 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations for all transformations combined, and separately for each individual transformation (Claxton, 2008). We incorporated uncertainty regarding the values for healthy life expectancy, quality of life gains, burden of disease and cost in last year of life (see section 2.1).  
4.2.5 Robustness checks As robustness check, we tested differences in elasticity with respect to gender, age category and main disease category (appendix 4.2). However, these estimates should be treated with caution, as digression from the population mean reduces the accuracy and the validity of the Taylor approximation (Boisverf, 1982). As marginal values may depend on outcome variable and model specification used (Gallet and Doucouliagos, 2017), alternative outcome variables and model specifications were explored (appendix 4.3). We separately estimated mortality, death-related QALY loss and morbidity-related QALY loss as outcome measures. Furthermore, we estimated alternative model specifications; linear models and Cobb-Douglas (per patient) specifications. We included health trends and health shocks, specifically the percentage of (heavy) smokers, the percentage of obesity and the percentage of heavy drinkers.   As patients could have been part of more than one patient group in the case of multimorbidity, in theory spending on one disease-specific patient group may influence mortality of another. We corrected for multimorbidity by defining unique patient groups based on primary diagnosis. After appointing deaths to the unique patient groups based on spending patterns on secondary diagnoses (proportionally or through OLS estimation), data transformations and estimations were performed according to figure 4.1.  
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Summary statistics Summary statistics of the data are presented in tables 4.1-4.3. Real hospital spending was relatively stable around €21 billion between 2012 and 2014. The number of patients declined slightly from 7.4 million to 7.1 million, as did the total number of deaths from 141,000 to 139,000. Per patient hospital spending was highest between the ages of 76 and 
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80, and thereafter declined. Spending and mortality was highest for cancer and circulatory diseases, while most patients visited the hospital with diseases related to the eye and ear and external causes and injuries.  
 
Table 4.1: Summary statistics over time 
 2012 2013 2014 
Total hospital spending in millions of 2014 Euro 20,757 21,031 20,702 
Number of unique patients (x1000) 7,379 7,184 7,112 
Total deaths (x1000) 141 141 139 
 
Table 4.2: Summary statistics by age group in 2014 
Age group Hospital 
spending (million 
euro) 
Number of 
patients 
Number of 
deaths* 
Healthy Life Expectancy 
(net present value) 
Costs in last 
year of life 
0 years 651 162,972 630 38.2  € 25,219  
1 to 5 years  444 283,356 99 37.5  € 8,225  
6 to 10 years  353 271,087 75 35.7  € 7,405  
11 to 15 years  426  275,794 100 33.9  € 8,380  
16 to 20 years  444 286,219 226 31.9  € 10,248  
21 to 25 years  529  315,197 266 29.8  € 12,626  
26 to 30 years  731 350,413 364 27.7  € 15,511  
31 to 35 years  799  361,227 444 25.5  € 17,409  
36 to 40 years  785  354,774 614 23.1  € 18,997  
41 to 45 years  1,028 442,103 1,232 20.5  € 22,535  
46 to 50 years  1,268  492,095 2,152 18.0  € 28,168  
51 to 55 years  1,528  531,656 3,647 15.5  € 33,159  
56 to 60 years  1,749 537,316 5,336 13.1  € 35,690  
61 to 65 years  2,031 567,446 7,880 10.9  € 34,355  
66 to 70 years  2,334 589,323 11,729 8.7  € 31,097  
71 to 75 years  1,975 458,821 13,285 6.5  € 28,362  
76 to 80 years  1,689  374,030 17,286 4.6  € 24,053  
81 to 85 years  1,188  267,380 23,307 3.4  € 17,086  
86 to 90 years  562  138,191 24,875 2.4  € 10,969  
91 to 95 years  172  45,263 18,699 1.6  € 6,607  
95+ years  24 6,883 6,977 1.2  € 4,249  *Due to privacy issues, the total number of deaths is based on official statistics, which use different age groups (1 to 4 years, 5 to 9 years, etc.)     
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Table 4.3: summary statistics by disease category in 2014 
Disease group LYoL corrected 
spending (mln 
euro) 
Number of 
treated 
patients 
Number of 
deaths 
Burden of 
disease men 
(women) 
Certain infectious and parasitic diseases  € 210 120,971 3,104 0.051 (0.045) 
Neoplasms  € 3,655 1,284,510 44,808 0.225 (0.246) 
Diseases of the blood and blood-forming 
organs and certain disorders involving the 
immune mechanism 
 € 138 73,034 485 0.172 (0.166) 
Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic 
diseases 
 € 436  348,113 3,529 0.198 (0.198) 
Mental, Behavioral and 
Neurodevelopmental disorders  € 140 161,118 10,193 0.385 (0.394) 
Diseases of the nervous system  € 667 568,905 6,849 0.162 (0.089) 
Diseases of the eye and adnexa and 
diseases of the ear and mastoid process  € 921 1,937,672 . 0.123 (0.123) 
Diseases of the circulatory system  € 3,051 1,432,255 37,862 0.29 (0.288) 
Diseases of the respiratory system  € 992  647,769 10,454 0.181 (0.166) 
Diseases of the digestive system  € 1,272  622,379 4,374 0.172* (0.166*)  
Diseases of the skin and subcutaneous 
tissue  € 278  528,068 309 0.07 (0.07) 
Diseases of the musculoskeletal system 
and connective tissue  € 2,050  1,375,562 1,046 0.159 (0.137) 
Diseases of the genitourinary system  € 1,450 873,525 3,076 0.142 (0.142) 
Pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium 
and certain conditions originating in the 
perinatal period 
 € 597 292,207 384 0.172* (0.166*) 
Congenital malformations, deformations 
and chromosomal abnormalities 
 € 180  108,750 430 0.132 (0.132) 
Symptoms, signs and abnormal clinical 
and laboratory findings, not elsewhere 
classified (nec) 
 € 747  983,587 5,507 0.172* (0.166*) 
External causes of morbidity and injury, 
poisoning and certain other consequences 
of external causes 
 € 2,931 2,164,496 6,813 0.172* (0.166*) * The mean BoD is used when no disease specific BoD is available  
4.3.2 Main specification results Table 4.4 shows the results of the fixed effects specification. The spending coefficients are jointly significant (p<0.01). Evaluating the coefficients at the mean [(ln(  ); ln( ))=(11.97; 5.10)] resulted in a mean elasticity of spending of -0,1562 (equation 5). The elasticity turned more negative the more patients per patient group, and less negative when spending per patient group was higher, indicating complementarity of inputs and diminishing marginal returns. Next, we translated the mean elasticity of spending to a marginal effect at the arithmetic mean according to equation 6: [F(  ,   ) =(145.73, €1,678,091). A 1% increase in spending (€16.781) on the mean patient group was associated with a reduction in QALY loss of 0.156%*145.73=0.23 QALYs, resulting in a threshold of €73,626. Bootstrapping 100 
                                                                2 Note the negative sign on the elasticity, signaling that an increase in spending on a patient group reduces the number of QALYs lost due to mortality and illness.  
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repetitions, assuming normal deviation around the mean, we found a 95% confidence interval around the threshold value between €59,178 and €88,076. The standard error around the threshold was €7,372.   
Table 4.4: main regression results 
N=13,618 F(6,13611) = 170.35 Prob>F=0.000 R2=0.0817 
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-value p-value 95% confidence interval 
Ln(spending) -0.0461 0.0779 -0.59 0.554 [-0.1988;0.1066] 
Ln(spending)2 0.0033 0.0060 0.55 0.583 [-0.0085; 0.0151] 
Ln(spending)*Ln(patients) -0.0372 0.0127 -2.93 0.003 [-0.0620;-0.0123] 
Ln(patients) 1.3012 0.0837 15.55 0.000 [1.1372; 1.4653] 
Ln(patients)2 0.0222 0.0075 2.95 0.003 [0.0074; 0.0370] 
Time trend -0.0185 0.0017 -10.89 0.000 [-0.0219; -0.0152] 
Constant  35.330 3.456 10.22 0.000 [28.556;42.105]  Data transformations increase uncertainty, which is not incorporated into the thresholds. Therefore, we used Monte Carlo simulations (table 4.5). Including transformation uncertainty increased our confidence intervals to between €54,000 and €94,000. Most uncertainty is attributable to LYoL-costs.  In line with standard Dutch guidelines on HTA research, we used a discount rate of 1.5% to discount future health gains (Zorginstituut Nederland, 2015). As most gains of deaths averted are in the future, a higher discount rate increases the threshold. For example, our point estimate for a discount rate of 3% was €80,800, while a discount rate of 5% resulted in a threshold of €90,200. A 0% discount rate, which has also been advocated in the literature (Parsonage and Neuburger, 1992), lowered the threshold to €66,500. Each percent increase in the discount rate shifted the threshold upwards by €4,700.   
Table 4.5: Outcomes Monte Carlo distributions 
Variable Distribution Range Source Standard error Confidence interval (Euro per QALY) 
Healthy life 
expectancy 
Normally SD from source Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) Netherlands € 877 € 69,400 - € 75,800 
Quality of life 
gains 
Normally SD from regressions CBS health questionnaires € 732 € 69,700 - € 75,100 
Burden of 
disease 
Continuous Between BoD-value and 1 Volksgezondheid en Zorg (2011) € 517 € 66,800 - € 70,500 
Cost in last 
year of life Normally SD is assumed to be 10% of mean Van Baal et al. (2011) € 2,767 € 59,900 - € 80,800 
All variables € 2,789 € 56,600 - € 79,000 
Total uncertainty including uncertainty of the main specification €10,161 €54,000 - €94,000  
Chapter 4 
82 
 
4.3.3 Results per patient group We estimated separate thresholds per gender, age and disease groups (see appendix 4.2). A higher threshold was found for males, but not significantly. This may indicate that spending on females is more beneficial, possibly due to a higher life expectancy. Thresholds over age groups are strikingly constant save the neonates and 95+ year-olds, indicating that spending on age groups largely takes into account healthy life years to be gained, and that a discount rate of 1.5% seems appropriate.   Differences between disease categories are larger. For some disease categories high thresholds were found, i.e. diseases of the blood and pregnancy, while lower thresholds were found in other categories, specifically diseases of the nervous system and diseases of the skin. Potential explanations for these differences include inefficient allocation patterns, differences in QALY valuations, deviations from the mean in the translog estimation and measurement errors. More research is required to assess the clinical relevance of these differences. For most patient groups valid and significant thresholds were found, indicating the robustness of the estimation strategy.  
4.3.4 Robustness checks The robustness checks show that the outcome was sensitive to the structural model employed, but the translog model generally was robust to different specifications (see appendix 4.3). When only patient groups with mortality were included a value of €61,100 per QALY was found, suggesting that our combined measure of disease and mortality related QALYs may not fully capture all health gains. Excluding morbidity-related QALY loss (step 1.1-1.4) raised the threshold to €89,000 per QALY. Estimating the relation between spending and mortality directly resulted in an estimated effect of €275,000 per death averted. Backwards calculations to QALYs rendered a threshold of €42,000 per QALY. Using 2-year QALY gains as outcome measure lowered the threshold slightly to €60,000 per QALY, suggesting spending affecting health outcomes primarily in the same year, but possibly also in the next years. However, estimating the effect of spending in year t on outcomes in year t+1 rendered insignificant and economically unlikely results. This may indicate that our 3-year panel dataset is too limited to estimate robust lagged effects. Neither time dummies to correct for technology shocks, nor health trends to correct for omitted variable bias influenced the threshold estimates, suggesting our OVB correction is appropriate.   Multimorbidity corrections produced divergent results. Proportional multimorbidity corrections resulted in a threshold of €201,000 per QALY (€143,000 - €271,000 per QALY). However, a proportional distribution of deaths implies that higher spending increases the proportion of total deaths being appointed to that patient group. This increases reverse 
The marginal benefits of healthcare spending in the Netherlands  
83 
 
causality, biasing the threshold upwards. When patient group mortality was estimated using OLS, we obtained a threshold of €49,600 per QALY (€46,000 - €63,000 per QALY). However, estimating the number of deaths based on spending patterns aggravates truncation bias, as negative estimates are not allowed. This may bias the threshold downwards. Although multimorbidity corrections are promising, additional corrections may be required to alleviate bias.    
4.4 Discussion This paper presents a novel method to estimate the opportunity costs of care by combining mortality related outcomes and quality of life of patients into one outcome measure and relating it to changes in spending over time. To this aim, we built upon panel data methodology (Felder, 2006; Hall and Jones, 2004) and QALY estimation methods (Claxton et al., 2015a; Gheorghe et al., 2015), accounting for some of the issues raised in QALY threshold estimation (Barnsley et al., 2013; Raftery, 2014). Results indicate that in the Netherlands, at the margin, a QALY costs between €53.000 and €94.000 to produce, with a point estimate of €73.600. Standard economic theory suggests that under a fixed budget, new technologies would need to have an incremental cost effectiveness ratio (ICER) of below €73.600 per QALY in order to increase population health. Although the analysis is rather inclusive, much uncertainty remains. We discuss how the results relate to earlier findings, the risks of bias of the estimates, the factors that could explain uncertainty and next steps to improve the estimates.   
4.4.1 Relation to the literature Several studies have estimated thresholds for high-income countries, ranging from €18.000 to €200.000 per QALY (Claxton et al., 2015b; Thokala et al., 2018; Vallejo-Torres et al., 2016; Vallejo‐Torres et al., 2017). Literature suggests that willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates tend to be higher than supply-side estimates (Vallejo-Torres et al., 2016). Our supply-side estimates are broadly in the same range as Dutch WTP-estimates for hospital care of between €13.000 and €110.000 per QALY (Bobinac et al., 2014; Bobinac et al., 2010; Nimdet et al., 2015).  Research from the US find marginal costs to save a life at age 60-64 of around $800,0003 (Hall and Jones, 2004). For Switzerland, a marginal cost to save a life is found between 700.000 Franc to 3,5 million Franc4 (Felder, 2006). These results are consistent with our estimates. Other research finds significantly higher marginal values, i.e. lower 
                                                                3 At 10.9 healthy life years (table 2), and 2014 dollar exchange rates this would accrue to €69,242 per QALY.  4 This would be between €55,107 and €275,535 per QALY in 2014.  
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thresholds. For example, cross-country research from 2013 finds marginal effects of €20,000 to €30,000 per life year gained for the Netherlands5 (Heijink et al., 2013). One of the most extensive lines of research up to date has been performed by the Centre of Health Economics in England. This line of research, utilizing regional variation in spending, finds threshold values for England of £13,000 per QALY6 (Claxton et al., 2015a; Drummond et al., 2015). Extrapolating this finding to the Netherlands, accounting for income elasticity, renders threshold values of €21,000 to €29,000 (Woods et al., 2016). Possibly, the UK is more efficient or uses cost-effectiveness thresholds more strictly than the Netherlands. Also, thresholds may increase over time, as diminishing marginal returns make it more and more difficult to increase population health by one QALY (Barro, 1996; Murphy and Topel, 2003). Research from 2001 shows that the marginal cost per life year gained for a 65-year old increased from $121,000 in 1985 to $141,0007 in 1995 (Cutler and McClellan, 2001).   
4.4.2 Factors influencing threshold estimation We distinguish between factors increasing uncertainty and factors that could potentially bias the estimators. Claims data may not represent unit costs due to internal cost shifting between departments of the hospital, which may increase uncertainty. The mortality dataset could contain measurement and classification errors. For example, in 2013 primary cause of death classification was altered (Harteloh, 2014). This may increase uncertainty of our estimations, but time dummies do not indicate any bias. Questionnaires used to infer quality of life might contain sampling uncertainty, interrater variation and framing issues, amongst others. For example, very ill patients may be underrepresented. Although quality of sampling by the Dutch Statistical Bureau was excellent, some inaccuracies may be expected. These data limitations primarily increase model uncertainty, but may also lead to small sampling bias in unknown direction.  Increases in model uncertainty by data transformations are captured by the Monte Carlo simulations. However, some extrapolations were necessary, requiring additional assumptions. For example, we had to assume that disease-specific DALYs were stable over age, which may not be valid. Differences in estimations between age groups could in part reflect differences in burden of disease. Morbidity-related QALY loss for ages under 50 was extrapolated, assuming smooth trends. However, nonlinear trends may be present, e.g. when the very young patients are healthier than the linear extrapolation predicts. This could 
                                                                5 A ratio of ~0.6 QALY per life year would imply thresholds of € 37,785 -€ 56,700 per QALY in 2014 euros 6 Or €19,200 in 2014 Euros 7 This is 203,724.08 US Dollars of 2014, or 153,176 Euros of 2014 per life year saved. Using a QALY per year ratio of ~0.6 this would be €255,293 per QALY. In comparison, we find for this age category a marginal value of € 65,000 per QALY. 
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bias the marginal effect downwards. In addition, morbidity-related QALY loss is not disaggregated to disease category, which may explain differences in disease category thresholds. The approximation of the EQ-5D by the health questionnaires was not validated, and may be imprecise. Also, uncertainty in translation of the EQ-5D to QALY values was not incorporated. The use of QALY-values from the literature assumes comparability, which may be a strong assumption (Gafni and Birch, 1993). Furthermore, we assume that the change in morbidity-related QALY loss is constant over time, while spending-related health shocks may be present.  Our indicator may not capture additional health system outcomes, biasing the threshold upwards (Nixon and Ulmann, 2006). For example, in fertility treatments, reductions in morbidity-related QALY loss and death-related QALY loss may not fully capture all benefits. In these instances, our estimation underestimates the true benefits of health spending. Importantly, effects of spending on future mortality and future gains in patient quality of life are not taken into account. Furthermore, our data do not incorporate all health spending, such as private spending, spending on primary care and municipal health spending. This could bias the marginal effect upward if these types of spending are complementary to hospital spending. However, research suggests no correlation between spending types (de Jong et al., 2016).  One major factor influencing our estimation is the correction for reverse causality using cost in the last year of life. This is not disaggregated to disease category, which may explain differences in disease categories. For example, cost in last year of life of a patient that died due to external causes (e.g. traffic injuries) may be lower than the cost in the last year of life of a cancer patient. This would have little effect on the main estimation, as the translog function is estimating the elasticity for the mean patient group, which by definition also has mean LYoL-costs. However, the marginal effect of specific disease groups may be biased upwards or downwards. Secondly, we disregard the possibility that when patients die at the beginning of the year, not all costs in the last year of life fall into the same year. In stable demographic conditions, this effect can be disregarded, but when mortality is decreasing, this would overcorrect for reverse causality, biasing the marginal effect upwards. Lastly, correcting for the costs in the last year of life could cause censoring bias, as patient groups with negative spending (patient groups with low spending, high mortality and lower-than-average LYoL-costs) cannot be log-transformed. In our analysis, this occurs in less than 1% of patient groups. Nevertheless, future research should take this into account using data sampling and correction methods (Greene, 2005).  In summary, analysis of potential biases is inconclusive on whether the model is overestimating or underestimating the true effect. That not all benefits are included fully 
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and that correction for reverse causality may be incomplete may suggest a downward bias of the estimated elasticity (Raftery, 2014). For example, when only mortality-related patient groups are included, a larger marginal effect and lower threshold is obtained. Based on this, our estimates may be interpreted as a conservative threshold.  
4.4.3 Policy relevance and future recommendations The findings, as presented in this paper, are important for policy makers in a number of ways. First of all, the results can be used by Dutch policy makers as a reference value to evaluate new technologies. Our estimates are close to the upper bound of the reference value for new pharmaceuticals of €80,000 euro per QALY. According to our estimates, under a constrained budget new technologies may displace care valued at €73,600 per QALY, suggesting that new treatments and medicines should provide value of more than €73,600 per QALY to maximise total health. In resource allocation, policy makers should compare hospital spending to the value of all other spending alternatives, not just in healthcare but also to other public spending categories like education or infrastructure. Our methodology is suited to estimate marginal value in other areas of health, but estimating value of other government spending would require different methodologies.    Between-country differences of marginal benefits for different disease categories or age groups could reflect clinical differences between countries. While our research provides disease-specific thresholds, several issues require further research before these comparisons may be used to improve allocation of hospital funds. Three additions would be most valuable. Firstly, LYoL costs should be specified to disease category since this is the most important source of transformation uncertainty. Secondly, additional years should be analyzed. This serves three goals: to increase the precision around the estimators; to estimate how thresholds change over time; and to reduce the risk of overfitting. Thirdly, QoL monitoring should be improved, for example by using patient reported outcome measures (PROMs). These three improvements would allow identification of areas that are relatively overfunded or underfunded with more certainty. The relevance of this research for policy making calls for further studies focusing on a single outcome or disease type - requiring fewer assumptions - in order to verify the robustness of our results. Recently, for cardiovascular hospital spending in the Netherlands a cost-effectiveness threshold of €41,000 was estimated for 2010 (van Baal et al., 2018). This indicates that up to 2010, cardiovascular care may have been relatively cost-effective, and shifting additional resources to this patient group could have improved total health. To improve efficient allocation of spending, more research on cost effectiveness of single disease groups should be encouraged. 
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Lastly, other relevant factors need to be taken into account when using thresholds for evaluation of new technologies. Firstly, in our research QALYs do not include differential preferences regarding burden of disease. It could be that a QALY gain for a patient with high disease burden is valued differently than a QALY gain of any other patient. This would still require policy discretion (Harris, 2016). In addition, for technologies with a non-marginal budget impact the thresholds may underestimate the true opportunity costs (Lomas et al., 2018; Paulden, 2016).  To conclude, we set out to use a new and extensive method to calculate the marginal benefits of spending. Application to Dutch hospital data produced a marginal value of €73,600 per QALY, close to the Dutch upper policy reference value of €80,000 per QALY for new technologies. The research shows that although uncertainty remains, the methodology produces policy makers with informative decision input for resource allocation and new technology assessment. Therefore, it would be valuable to extend, improve and compare the results over more years and different settings.   
  
Chapter 4 
88 
 
Appendix to Chapter 4 
Appendix 4.1: Estimating gains in quality of life The following regression models were estimated using robust OLS in StataR:  
                                                                     
                                                        Where subscript i refers to respondent and subscript p to a subset of respondents that visited the hospital in a given year (patients). Patient is a dummy variable, which is one if a respondent visited a hospital and zero otherwise. The # denotes an interaction matrix, which obtains beta coefficients for each vector.    in equation 1 estimates the difference in QALYs between patients and the healthy population for males and females, respectively. The matrix of coefficients    consists of estimates of annual changes in QALYs for patient groups based on age and gender. A linear extrapolation is used to obtain values for patient groups under 50. The data do not allow disaggregation into disease groups. The first equation results in an average amount of QALYs lost due to illness. The second equation estimates a trend in changes in QALYs lost over time for age/gender groups. This trend is correlated to changes in spending on patient groups in our main model, where the results of equation 1 are used to produce QALYs lost due to illness in a manner that allows aggregation with QALYs lost due to deaths. QALY losses due to morbidity are constructed by subtracting 
        from    for every patient per patient group. If this number is zero, the health sector brings all patients back to the health level of the population. In theory, the number could be negative, which would be interpreted as patients visiting the hospital are brought to a higher health level as the general population. Any positive number indicates that patients have lower health than the population, which is what the health sector in theory could achieve if all patients are fully healed. The QALY estimates are extrapolated to patient groups to obtain the total number of QALYs lost to illness per patient group:  
       
                 Not all QALY gains in the population may be attributed to the health sector. Other factors, such as healthier lifestyles and environments may improve QALYs exogenously. However, we assume that all patient QALY gains can be attributed to the health sector due to confounding by indication. This assumes that a patient visits the hospital if the patient is ill, e.g. drops under a certain QALY score. If the health level of the patient population rises exogenously, the healthiest patients do not visit the hospital anymore. Confounding by indication therefore assumes that the initial average QALY scores of patients is constant over time, and not affected by exogenous increases in the health of the population. This 
The marginal benefits of healthcare spending in the Netherlands  
89 
 
means that exogenous QALY gains are not reflected in patient group QALY levels, and changes in patient QALY scores may be fully attributed to the health sector.  Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show the results of the regression on the questionnaires database. The regressions also estimate that on average a male resp. female patient that visited the hospital has 0.08 (se=0.005) and 0.10 (se=0.008) fewer QALYs than the population that did not visit the hospital, corrected for age, demography, time and gender. Females have 0.03 lower QALY rating on average, while all QALY ratings improve over time by 0.005. The number of persons in an age group does not have a significant effect on the QALY rating.  
Table 4.6: health questionnaire regression results 
N=13,618 F(6,13611) = 170.35 Prob>F=0.000 R2=0.0817 
variable Coefficient Standard error t-value p-value 95% confidence interval 
Gender -0.02936 0.00508 -5.78 0.000 [-0.0393;-0.0194] 
Patient  -0.08016 0.00509 -15.74 0.000 [-0.0901;-0.0702] 
Patient x 
Gender 
-0.01870 0.07553 -2.48 0.013 [-0.0335;-0.0039] 
Time trend 0.00455 0.00146 3.11 0.002 [0.0017;0.0074] 
Age  -0.01332 0.00481 -2.77 0.006 [-0.0227;-0.0039] 
Demographics 5.86*10-8 5.84*10-8 1.00 0.315 [-5.6*10-8; 1.7*10-7] 
Constant  -8.09640 2.91358 -2.78 0.005 [-13.807;-2.385]  
Table 4.7: health questionnaire of patients regression results 
N=8,071 F(20,8071) = . Prob>F=. R2=0.0461 
variable Coefficient Robust standard error t-value p-value 95% confidence interval 
Gender 
(male) 
51 to 55 years 0.00167 0.00239 0.70 0.484 [-0.0030;0.0064] 56 to 60 years 0.00166 0.00238 0.70 0.487 [-0.0030;0.0063] 61 to 65 years 0.00167 0.00238 0.70 0.482 [-0.0030;0.0063] 66 to 70 years 0.00169 0.00238 0.71 0.478 [-0.0030;0.0063] 71 to 75 years 0.00168 0.00237 0.71 0.478 [-0.0030;0.0063] 76 to 80 years 0.00167 0.00237 0.71 0.480 [-0.0030;0.0063] 81 to 85 years 0.00165 0.00236 0.70 0.486 [-0.0030;0.0063] 86 to 90 years 0.00165 0.00236 0.70 0.485 [-0.0030;0.0063] 91 to 95 years 0.00157 0.00236 0.67 0.505 [-0.0031;0.0062] 95+ years 0.00148 0.00235 0.63 0.530 [-0.0031;0.0061] 
Gender 
(female) 
51 to 55 years 0.00164 0.00239 0.69 0.493 [-0.0030;0.0063] 56 to 60 years 0.00166 0.00238 0.70 0.487 [-0.0030;0.0063] 61 to 65 years 0.00167 0.00238 0.69 0.488 [-0.0030;0.0063] 66 to 70 years 0.00167 0.00238 0.70 0.484 [-0.0030;0.0063] 71 to 75 years 0.00166 0.00237 0.70 0.486 [-0.0030;0.0063] 76 to 80 years 0.00163 0.00237 0.69 0.491 [-0.0030;0.0063] 81 to 85 years 0.00161 0.00237 0.68 0.496 [-0.0030;0.0063] 86 to 90 years 0.00157 0.00236 0.66 0.506 [-0.0031;0.0062] 91 to 95 years 0.00159 0.00236 0.67 0.500 [-0.0030;0.0062] 95+ years 0.00141 0.00236 0.60 0.549 [-0.0030;0.0060] 
demographics  7.26*10-8 1.58*10-7 0.46 0.646 [-2.4*10-7;3.8*10-7] 
constant  -2.5815 4.7419 -0.54 0.586 [-11.877;6.714] 
 Estimated annual health gain of patients is between 0.0014 and 0.0016 (se=0.0024) QALYs per year, depending on gender and age (table 4.7).These estimates are not significant and 
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contain a high degree of uncertainty. This reflects the low sample size and small effect size. We incorporate this uncertainty in the Monte Carlo analysis. The results of these regressions are extrapolated to lower age categories using linear extrapolation (figure 4.2). 
 
 Figure 4.2: Annual patient QALY gains, by age group and gender 
 
Appendix 4.2: Patient group specific estimates. We estimate the following equations, including interactions with gender, age group and disease group (see tables 4.8-4.10):  
                                           
 
 
           
 
             
 
 
           
 
                              
                                              
 
 
           
 
             
 
 
           
 
                              
                                              
 
 
           
 
             
 
 
           
 
                              
Table 4.8: estimation results by gender 
N=11,079 F(7,11078) = 2313.07 Prob>F=0.000 R2=0.9492 
gender coefficient Robust 
standard error 
p-
value 
elasticity Threshold value Bootstrapped 95%-CI 
Male  -0.03 0.08 0.673 -0.145 € 84,900 € 58,000-€ 112,000 
Female -0.06 0.08 0.46 -0.167 € 65,100 € 43,000-€ 88,000 
Ln(spending)2 0.00 0.01 0.593    
Ln(spending)* 
Ln(treatments) 
-0.04 0.01 0.004    
Ln(treatments) 1.30 0.08 0    
Ln(treatments)2 0.02 0.01 0.003    
Time trend -0.02 0.00 0    
Constant 35.44 3.47 0    
0 
0,0002 
0,0004 
0,0006 
0,0008 
0,001 
0,0012 
0,0014 
0,0016 
0,0018 
m 
f 
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Table 4.9: estimation results by age group  
N=11,079 F(26,11078) = 724.56 Prob>F=0.000 R2=0.9300 
Age group coefficient 
Robust 
standard 
error 
p-
value 
elasticity Threshold value Bootstrapped 95%-CI 
0 years -0.014 0.072 0.849 -0.043  € 418,000  € -112,000,000 - € 111,000,000 
1 to 5 years -0.120 0.081 0.141 -0.176  € 60,400  € 21,000 - € 100,000  
6 to 10 years -0.143 0.084 0.089 -0.197  € 47,300  € 3,000 - € 91,000  
11 to 15 years -0.064 0.087 0.464 -0.120  € 83,000  € -181,000 - € 347,000  
16 to 20 years -0.089 0.083 0.285 -0.151  € 67,100  € 37,000 - € 97,000  
21 to 25 years -0.058 0.082 0.479 -0.125  € 85,000  € 35,000 - € 135,000  
26 to 30 years -0.109 0.087 0.21 -0.180  € 66,400  € -6,000 - € 138,000 
31 to 35 years -0.130 0.090 0.146 -0.204  € 59,400  € 22,000 - € 97,000  
36 to 40 years -0.082 0.087 0.347 -0.161  € 73,300  € -21,000 - € 168,000  
41 to 45 years -0.076 0.083 0.363 -0.162  € 72,500  € -2,000 - € 147,000 
46 to 50 years -0.152 0.082 0.064 -0.242  € 48,500  € 36,000 - € 61,000 
51 to 55 years -0.093 0.079 0.243 -0.185  € 63,200  € 47,000 - € 80,000  
56 to 60 years -0.076 0.084 0.368 -0.171  € 68,400  € 36,000 - € 100,000 
61 to 65 years -0.055 0.078 0.482 -0.153  € 76,800  € 50,000 - € 104,000  
66 to 70 years -0.087 0.077 0.257 -0.185  € 64,300  € 47,000 - € 82,000  
71 to 75 years -0.085 0.078 0.278 -0.179  € 66,000  € 45,000 - € 88,000  
76 to 80 years -0.105 0.077 0.173 -0.194  € 59,100  € 44,000 - € 75,000  
81 to 85 years -0.077 0.075 0.304 -0.158  € 66,600  € 42,000 - € 91,000  
86 to 90 years -0.069 0.074 0.356 -0.133  € 68,000  € 41,000 - € 96,000  
91 to 95 years -0.040 0.070 0.57 -0.075  € 115,400  € 48,000 - € 183,000  
95+ years -0.051 0.073 0.483 -0.048  € 193,400  € 76,000 - € 310,000 
Ln(spending)2 0.005 0.006 0.363    
Ln(spending)* 
Ln(treatments) 
-0.038 0.012 0.001    
Ln(treatments) 1.316 0.077 0.000    
Ln(treatments)2 0.022 0.007 0.002    
Time trend -0.018 0.002 0.000    
Constant  35.124 3.348 0.000       
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Table 4.10: estimation results by disease group 
N=11,079 F(22,11078) = 1393.34 Prob>F=0.000 R2=0.8688 
Disease group coeff. Robust 
SE 
p-
value 
Elast. Threshold value Bootstrapped 95%-CI 
Infectious diseases -0.08 0.08 0.279 -0.162 € 53,500 € 32,000 - € 75,000 
Neoplasms -0.07 0.07 0.311 -0.148 € 68,300 € 28,000 - € 109,000 
Diseases of the blood -0.01 0.08 0.89 -0.086 € 201,800 € -362,000 - € 766,000 
Endocrine diseases -0.05 0.08 0.51 -0.133 € 75,700 € 36,000 - € 116,000 
Mental disorders -0.04 0.07 0.585 -0.106 € 64,000 € 41,000 - € 87,000 
Diseases of the 
nervous system 
-0.23 0.10 0.019 -0.340 € 33,500 € 14,000 - € 53,000 
Diseases of the eye 
and ear 0.01 0.07 0.835 -0.125 € 42,700 € 28,000 - € 57,000 
Diseases of the 
circulatory system -0.05 0.08 0.481 -0.141 € 95,700 € 30,000 - € 161,000 
Diseases of the 
respiratory system 
-0.07 0.08 0.407 -0.174 € 59,600 € 28,000 - € 92,000 
Diseases of the 
digestive system 
-0.05 0.08 0.562 -0.151 € 116,800 € 82,000 - € 151,000 
Diseases of the skin -0.03 0.07 0.7 -0.154 € 38,500 € 20,000 - € 57,000 
Diseases of the 
musculoskeletal 
system 
-0.04 0.07 0.626 -0.143 € 117,200 € 86,000 - € 148,000 
Diseases of the 
genitourinary system -0.03 0.07 0.657 -0.121 € 138,400 € 100,000 - € 177,000 
Pregnancy, childbirth 
and perinatal period 
-0.03 0.08 0.674 -0.099 € 215,800 € 120,000 - € 312,000 
Congenital 
abnormalities 
-0.06 0.08 0.463 -0.106 € 102,800 € 68,000 - € 137,000 
Symptoms not 
elsewhere classified -0.01 0.08 0.864 -0.112 € 71,700 € 50,000 - € 94,000 
External causes 0.16 0.08 0.054 -0.093 € 129,300 € -1,170,000 - € 1,429,000 
Ln(spending)2 0.00 0.01 0.516    
Ln(spending)* 
Ln(treatments) 
0.02 0.01 0.009    
Ln(treatments) 1.29 0.08 0.000    
Ln(treatments)2 -0.04 0.01 0.004    
Time trend -0.02 0.00 0.000    
Constant 33.68 3.42 0.000     
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Appendix 4.3: Robustness checks Table 4.11 summarizes the results of the robustness checks. Individual regression outcomes, specifics and descriptive statistics are available from the authors on demand.   
Table 4.11: summary of robustness checks 
Robustness checks Description Estimated 
threshold 
Confidence 
intervals 
Discount rate Discount rate is varied between 0% and 5%. € 73,600 per QALY (1,5%) € 66,500 (0%) to € 90,200 (5%) per QALY 
Cobb-Douglas 
specification 
A specific health production function with diminishing marginal returns and constant elasticity of substitution. €140,000 per QALY € 113,000 - € 185,000 per QALY 
Cobb-Douglas 
specification, 
mortality only 
Cobb-Douglas health production function, only patient groups with mortality analyzed €104,000 per QALY € 88,000 - € 129,000 per QALY 
Linear specification A linear production function with constant marginal returns and elasticity of substitution €184,000 per QALY € 115,000 - € 472,000 per QALY 
Random effects 
specification 
Translog production function allowing for random variation in the estimated effect Not valid Hausman test rejected (P<0.0001) 
Proportional 
multimorbidity 
correction  
Patient groups are defined on first opened DRG, mortality is appointed proportionally €201,000 per QALY € 143,000 - € 271,000 per QALY 
Estimated 
multimorbidity 
correction 
Patient groups are defined on first opened DRG, mortality is estimated on spending patterns €49,600 per QALY € 46,000 - € 63,000 per QALY 
Per patient 
specification 
Translog model relating per patient outcomes to per patient spending €176,000 per QALY € 116,000 - € 237,000 per QALY 
Linear per patient 
specification 
Linear model relating per patient outcomes to per patient spending €85.000 per QALY € 58,000 - € 153,000 per QALY 
Only mortality as 
outcome 
Only mortality QALYS are used as oucome measure in the translog function €89.000 per QALY € 75,000 - € 102,000 per QALY 
Estimation of cost per 
death avoided 
Mortality is used as outcome measure in the translog model € 475,000 per life lost (61-65 years) €12 million (0 years) – €43,000 (96+ years) 
Estimation of cost per 
death avoided is 
transformed to QALYs 
Elasticity of spending per death avoided is used as input to calculate threshold of euro per QALYs €44,000 per QALY (61-65 years) €318,000 (0 years) - €33,000 (96+ years) per QALY 
One year lag of the 
outcome measure 
Spending in year t influences QALYs lost in year t+1 Negative marginal effects incalculable 
Two year outcome 
measure 
Spending in year t influences QALYs lost in year t plus in year t+1 €60,000 per QALY € 41,000 - € 79,000 per QALY 
Adjusting for 
technology shocks 
Year dummies are included in the baseline model € 73,600 per QALY € 59,000 - € 88,000 per QALY 
Health trends are 
added 
Obesity, smoking and heavy alcohol use are added as health trends € 73,600 per QALY € 59,000 - € 88,000 per QALY 
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5 Do managed competition and active purchasing 
go hand in hand?  
Analyzing provider budget reallocations in the Netherlands 
Stadhouders, N., Maarse, H., Koolman, X., Tanke, M., & Jeurissen, P. Submitted   
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Abstract 
Background: Strategic purchasing is advocated to improve the allocation of healthcare resources. To stimulate strategic purchasing in the Netherlands, managed competition was implemented in the hospital sector in 2006. Meanwhile, non-competitive purchaser systems were retained for long-term care, home care and personal budgets. To test whether active purchasing is higher in a managed competition system, we compare sectors on one possible outcome of strategic purchasing: the extent of reallocation of provider budgets. We design a Market Volatility Index (MVI) and apply this metric to Dutch health care markets. Our aim is to explore whether managed competition reallocates more market shares between providers than the non-competitive purchaser systems. 
Methods: We derive provider budgets from annual statements from 2006 to 2014. We calculate the MVI by expressing cumulative changes in market share between providers as percentage of the total market. We compare the MVI between markets. As robustness checks, we adjusted for the influence of market entry and exit, provider size, selective contracting and percentage of fixed costs.  
Results: In the managed competition system, between 2% and 3% of the total budget for hospital care is reallocated between providers annually. In the non-competitive long-term care system similar MVI are found, of 2.5% in elderly care and 2.1% in disability care on average. A substantially larger MVI, respectively 8.7% and 10.3%, is found for municipalities (single payers) and personal budget holders. All sector MVI decline over time. We reject our hypothesis that budget reallocations are higher in the managed competition market. Our additional analyses confirm that active purchasing by means of budget reallocations seems to be low.  
Conclusion: Market reallocations are low in both single- and multi-payer systems, suggesting purchasers in either system are not actively engaged in reallocating budgets between providers. Although the Dutch reform aimed to stimulate active purchasing by multiple payers, we do not observe higher market dynamics. Furthermore, reallocations decreased over time, suggesting that managed competition did not live up to its promise of increasing allocative efficiency through active purchasing.  
Acknowledgements The authors thank Raf van Gestel for constructive comments on an earlier version   
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Chapter 5 
Do managed competition and active purchasing go hand in hand?  
 
5.1 Introduction To increase efficiency, many countries have sought to improve the purchaser function in health care (Ham, 2008). However, literature provides an unclear image which payer system leads to better outcomes in terms of costs and quality of purchased care (Figueras et al., 2005; Glied, 2009; Jeong and Niki, 2012; Smith et al., 2004; Wranik, 2012). Strategic or active purchasing involves selective reallocation of resources from poor performers to best performers (supply-side steering) and channelling patients from poor to best performers, e.g. by patient education, consultation or prior authorization (demand-side steering) (Beauchamp and Rouse, 1990; Mays and Hand, 2000; Mikkers and Ryan, 2014; Schiff et al., 1994). Active purchasing implies that provider budget allocations change over time. We propose a simple indicator of allocative activity that measures the percentage of the total market share that is reallocated between providers annually. We apply this measure to assess purchaser activity in different healthcare sectors in the Netherlands.  The theory of regulated competition postulates that third-party payers can steer healthcare market to more efficient outcomes by rewarding well-performing providers and disciplining underperforming providers (Enthoven, 1993). The Netherlands implemented a system of managed competition in the hospital sector in 2006, which included, among others, competition between insurers, room for free-pricing and selective contracting and the liberalization of the certificate-for-need regulations (Van de Ven & Schut, 2008; Maarse, Jeurissen & Ruwaard, 2015; Schut et al, 2013). However, the institutional context of purchasing varies significantly between hospital care and three other Dutch healthcare sectors: long-term care, social services and personal budgets. This provides a good case study to assess the effect of system differences on active purchasing.  Our general hypothesis is that the extent of active purchasing depends on the institutional structure: the more the rules of the game stimulate active purchasing, the more purchasers will opt for active purchasing. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that empirically assesses the effects of active purchasing. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: first, a theoretical framework is presented. Next, data and methods are discussed. Third, results and robustness checks are presented. The final section includes a critical discussion of the results of our study.  
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5.2 A framework for active purchasing We assess Dutch healthcare sectors in between two major reforms in 2006 and 2015. Table 5.1 highlights significant differences in the incentives for active purchasing. For hospital care, currently nine insurers compete for market share on the insurance market. Four insurance companies (the ‘big four’) possess about 90 percent of the market. In order to be competitive, insurers aim to set low premiums. As the theory of managed competition postulates, active purchasing allow insurers to save costs and reduce premiums. The percentage of consumers that switch between insurers varies around 7 percent each year (NZa, 2017a). Financial risk of insurers has substantially increased in the research period as a consequence of the government’s policy to restrict ex-post equalization (van Kleef et al., 2014). Our hypothesis is that this institutional structure contains sufficient incentives for active purchasing (+).  By contrast, incentives for active purchasing are (largely) absent in long-term care. In 32 regions, a regional care office acts as single payer, leaving clients no choice of payer. Each regional office receives a block grant for contracting providers, and offices may not overspend. Regional offices do not bear any financial risk (with the exception of administrative costs), but underspending may result in regional budgetary reallocation. They are not allowed to build reserves. This ‘threat’ incentivises each regional office to spend its full budget (Mot and Aouragh, 2010). Our hypothesis is that the combination of the single payer system and the absence of financial risk make active purchasing unlikely (-).   The introduction of the Social Support Act in 2007 delegated social care procurement from the long-term care system to municipalities. As the introduction went along with a significant budgetary cut, municipalities are expected to have strong incentives for active purchasing (Putters et al., 2010). Furthermore, municipalities are financially at risk. If they spend more than the annual state grant, they need to implement budgetary cuts elsewhere, as the room of municipalities for raising extra resources is quite limited in the Netherlands (Maarse and Jeurissen, 2016). At the same time, they can build reserves or increase public spending in other sectors if they manage to save money in social support. Our hypothesis is that the Social Support Act contains strong incentives for active purchasing (++).   Patients that meet requirements for receiving in-kind long-term care have the option to apply for a personal budget of about 70%-80% of in-kind LTC tariffs. The personal budget system is a somewhat exceptional case in table 5.1 because of the absence of a third-party payer (insurer, care office, municipality). Instead, the user acts as the payer. Due to the nature of the opt-out system, personal budget holders are likely to critically assess the quality of providers. Furthermore, personal budget holders have a financial motive to be 
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selective because the budget they receive is less than in-kind LTC-tariffs. Therefore, we expect that the budget holder will engage in active purchasing (++).  
Table 5.1: Overview of sectors in Dutch healthcare between 2007 and 2014 
 Hospital care Long-term care  Social services 
Personal 
budgets 
Purchaser 
system 
Multiple payer system (insurers) Single payer system (regional care offices) Single payer system (municipalities) Multiple payer system (first-party payer) 
Law 
Health insurance Act (Zorgverzekeringswet, ZVW) 
Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (Algemene wet bijzondere ziektekosten, AWBZ) 
Social Care Act (Wet maatschappeljke ondersteuning, WMO) 
Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ) 
Financing system 
Premiums (set by insurer) and income-related contributions (set by government) 
Payroll-related contributions (set by government) Tax funded grant to municipalities (set by government) 
Tariffs about 70-80% of tariffs of LTC in kind 
Freedom of 
payer choice for 
consumers 
Yes No No Yes 
Freedom of 
provider choice 
for patients 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial risk of 
payer 
Increased over time by reducing ex-post equalization Absent (overspending is forbidden) High (no ex-post equalization) High  
Incentives for 
active 
purchasing 
+ - ++ ++ 
 
5.3 Data and Methods Data on publicly financed budgets of Dutch health providers were extracted from annual financial reports from 2007 to 2014 from the online dataset DigiMV (CIBG, 2007-2014). Legislation mandates disclosure of annual statements by providers of hospital care and long-term care with more than one employee. Annual statements contain provider budgets, specified to payer system and type of care. As annual statements contain information on the current year as well as the previous year, data on 2006 was retrieved from the 2007 annual statements. Data were corrected for input errors and missing data by crosschecking with financial reports from the provider website. By internet searching providers with missing years in the dataset, mergers and takeovers were identified. Data from merged providers were aggregated retrospectively starting from 2006 to account for reallocation effects due to mergers.  
Chapter 5 
100 
 
 The final dataset contains 1893 providers, of which 742 (96% of total turnover) have data for all years. This indicates that small providers are likely to have data for only a few years, which could cause selection bias if budget reallocations are biased towards small providers. To take into account reallocations to missing data, total sector spending (including missing data) is used as reference. Total sector spending is derived from annual financial statements of the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports of the Netherlands (2006-2016). The most recent figures are used.   We define the market volatility index (MVI) as the part of the total budget that is reallocated between providers between years. In each year, provider market share is calculated by dividing the provider budget by the sector macro budget. Changes in market shares can be positive or negative, and sum up to zero. The MVI is defined as half the sum of absolute change in market shares, as a gain in market share of one provider automatically means a loss in market share for another provider8. Equation (1) displays our index of market volatility (MVI) mathematically, where S is the macro budget of sector   and    is the budget of each provider  , ranging from 1 to  .  
    
  
 
 
  
    
   
 
      
     
                                 (1) We standardize the MVI by assuming that the unobserved market volatility due to missing data is equal to the observed volatility. This may underestimate total volatility when small providers that do not file their annual statements experience higher volatility than large providers.                                         (2) We calculate equation (2) for each sector: hospital care, elderly care and disability care (LTC), social care and personal budgets. Furthermore, in order to discern between annual fluctuations (e.g. increase in one year and reductions in the next) and structural reallocations (e.g. a trend of reductions in a row), we calculate structural volatility between 2007 and 2014.                                                      (3) Structural volatility (     ) is by definition equal or lower than annual volatility. For each market, we calculate the mean MVI over time, which consist of structural volatility and annual fluctuations.  
                                                                8 E.g. If a payer reallocates 5% of the market, he takes 5% from providers and gives 5% to other providers. The sum of absolute changes in the market is 10%, but the percentage of the market that has been redistributed is half that (5%).  
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5.4 Results Descriptive statistics of the macro (total) budget and spending growth of the sectors are given in table 5.2. Hospital care comprises hospitals and independent treatment centers (ITC). Long-term care consists of home care and nursing home care for elderly and disabled. Social care comprises social support and ancillary home services. Personal budgets have fewer spending restrictions than in-kind LTC care, and can also be spent to purchase services from in-kind LTC providers. Growth of the macro budget is irregular in all sectors. For example, in 2009 the hospital budget increased by nearly 2 billion euro (10%), while nominal growth in 2011 was zero (Rijksoverheid, 2012). Given these irregular growth percentages, high volatility in the market may be expected. Not all providers are required to publish annual reports. Completeness is 85% for hospital care and 95% for disability and elderly care, because of legal exclusions to publish annual statements (e.g. very small companies, independent medical specialist associations, personal budget holders) and missing data. The completeness of the data for social care (20%) and personal budgets (13%) is significantly less, because regulation does not apply for companies that only provide social care and personal budget care.   
Table 5.2: Macro characteristics of the dataset  Hospital care* Long term care* Social care Personal budgets 
Year Budget (mln) (% growth) 
% in DigiMV Budget (mln) (% growth) % in DigiMV Budget (mln) (% growth) 
% in DigiMV Budget (mln) (% growth) % in DigiMV 
2007  €15,600 (0.0%) 88%  € 17,025  96%  € 5,240  18%  €1,330 (18.8%) 11% 
2008  €16,600 (6.4%) 86%  € 18,063 (6.1%) 98%  € 5,540 (5.7%) 20%  €1,660 (24.8%) 10% 
2009  €18,300 (10.2%) 83%  € 19,728 (9.2%) 95%  € 5,700 (2.9%) 21%  €1,960 (18.1%) 11% 
2010  €19,300 (5.5%) 86%  € 20,295 (2.9%) 96%  € 6,010 (5.4%) 21%  €2,160 (10.2%) 11% 
2011  €19,300 (0.0%) 85%  € 21,261 (4.8%) 96%  € 5,900  (-1.8%) 23%  €2,240 (3.7%) 12% 
2012  €20,200 (4.7%) 85%  € 23,833 (12.1%) 93%  € 5,700  (-3.4%) 24%  €2,530 (12.9%) 12% 
2013  €22,200 (9.9%) 85%  € 23,155  (-2.8%) 95%  € 5,500  (-3.5%) 23%  €2,570 (1.6%) 12% 
2014  €22,500 (1.4%) 87%  € 24,131 (4.2%) 92%  € 5,460  (-0.7%) 22%  €2,420  (-5.8%) 14% Source: Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports annual accounts, 2006-2016; Annual reports database (DigiMV 2007-2015) *Excluding mental care  Table 5.3 displays provider level statistics. The mean provider of hospital care has a larger budget than providers in other sectors, but in all sectors, variation in the budget is large 
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(Appendix figure 5.3). In the hospital sector, 42% of providers are ITCs, while for elderly care and disability care providers, 57%, respectively 59% of patients are receiving home care (out-patient setting). The average provider receives almost €3 million from municipalities for social care, while personal budget care is significantly smaller, averaging €0.5 million. Capital expenditures are on average 10% of total expenditures.  
Table 5.3: Descriptive pooled statistics, 2007-2014  
Variable Mean SD Max N 
Hospital budget  € 67,000,000   € 114,000,000   € 774,000,000  2125 
 % ITC  0.42   0.49   1  1815 
Elderly care budget  € 26,500,000   € 44,200,000   € 508,000,000  4274 
 % elderly home care   0.57   0.33   1  4213 
Disability care budget  € 38,100,000   € 64,200,000   € 623,000,000  1525 
 % Disability home care  0.59   0.30   1  1468 
Social care budget  € 2,988,893   € 6,483,502   € 98,200,000  3241 
Personal budgets spent at in-kind LTC 
providers  € 516,271   € 1,029,801   € 15,900,000  4125 
Total provider budget  € 35,300,000   € 75,600,000   € 902,000,000  10387 
 Capital expenditures ratio  0.10   0.09   0.36*  9879 Source: Annual reports database (DigiMV 2007-2015). Note: all minimum values are zero. *99% of the distribution  
5.4.1 Main results: market volatility per sector Figure 5.1 shows mean volatility in hospital care and long-term care is around 2-2.5%, while volatility in social care and personal budget care is between 8-10%. The results for elderly care, disability care, social care and personal budget care confirm our hypotheses. Based on differences in the institutional setting, we expected volatility to be higher in hospital care than in elderly care and disability care. We find no confirmation for this hypothesis, volatility in hospital care being equal to LTC care. In both sectors, volatility is lower than changes in the macro budget (up to 10-12%, see table 5.3), suggesting that these fluctuations in the macro budget are passed on to providers with little concern for reallocations. About half of the volatility is structural, i.e. either a multi-year trend in increases or declines in market share, suggesting year-to-year fluctuations may explain part of the budget reallocations. However, structural reallocations are comparatively low in the hospital sector, suggesting structural active purchasing to be relatively low for hospital care. Based on a number of policies taken to improve the purchasing function in hospital care, specifically reductions in ex-post compensations, we expected market reallocations in the hospital sector to increase over time. However, figure 5.2 shows a downward trend in volatility in all sectors. Again, this confirms our finding that active purchasing in hospital 
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care is relatively low. Some additional explanations may be given, relating to different characteristics of the hospital market. In the next section, we assess the effect of a number of market characteristics on volatility to check the robustness of our findings.   
 Figure 5.1: Mean MVI for Dutch healthcare sectors, 2007/8-2013/4 
 Figure 5.2: MVI over time for Dutch healthcare sectors, 2006/7-2013/4 
 
5.4.2 Robustness checks Our main analysis finds relatively low volatility in the hospital sector. Insurers could use selective contracting and stimulation of entry and exit to reallocate hospital budgets. We 
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test whether these tools are used in practice. Insurers may face additional barriers to active purchasing relating to market differences, such as provider concentration, capital intensity and differences in types of care (e.g. inpatient versus outpatient). We test the effect of these potential barriers.   
Market entry and exit  We research which role entry and exit of Dutch health providers has on the height of the MVI by identifying new providers, and excluding new providers from the main analysis. Combining the hospital and long-term care sector, 463 providers entered the market in the research period for a total of €532 million of revenue in the first year (0.15% of the macro budget). In the same period, 92 providers exited the market, having a cumulative €260 million of revenue before exit (0.07%). Entry and exit are both relatively marginal phenomena, responsible for about 0.1 percentage point change in the budget annually (Appendix figure 5.4). These low entry and exit rates indicate little active purchasing to promote new and innovative providers, consistent with low volatility in both hospital care and LTC.  
 
Selective contracting  Selective contracting is an important tool for active purchasing in hospital sector (Enthoven, 1993). The extent of selective contracting may be viewed as a proxy for active purchasing. Some anecdotal evidence from the Czech Republic suggests that selective contracting in a multi-payer system could lead to distinct changes in market shares, although the size of these changes is not documented (Busse et al., 2001). Therefore, we research the extent of selective contracting in the hospital sector.   Data on selective contracting is obtained from Mediquest, a company that constructs online tools for consumers to facilitate insurance plan choice. Before 2015, few reliable data were available on the extent of selective contracting. Therefore, we use selective contracting and provider budget data from 2015/2016. Selective contracting data consist of an overview per provider of 1655 potential types of care that may be contracted (for example, breast cancer care). For each of the 1655 types of care, it is documented which types of care are actually provided by the hospital/ITC. On average, hospitals and ITCs provide 475, respectively 37 types of care. For each of the nine insurers, it is documented whether each type of care is contracted or not contracted for each provider. This allows calculation of an average contract index per insurer for each hospital/ITC, ranging from zero (not contracted for any type of care) to one (contracted for all types of care). For example, if insurer A contracts provider X for 300 of the 400 potential types of care, the insurer contracting index 
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is 0.75. Next, based on market share of each insurer, a weighted average contracting index (  ) is obtained for each provider, ranging from zero (not contracted for any type of care in any insurer plan) to one (contracted for all types of care in all insurer plans).   The results show that selective contracting is used extensively in the hospital sector, with contracting indices of 0.88 and 0.53 for hospitals and ITCs, respectively. Selective contracting is more likely for smaller hospitals/ITCs (correlation coefficient= 0.40, Appendix figure 5.5a). However, high use of selective contracting may not translate to high market share reallocations. For example, providers may compensate budget loss from one insurer by budget increases from other insurers. Furthermore, under Dutch regulations, non-contracted care need still be reimbursed, although at a lower reimbursement rate. Lastly, selective contracting may be used as a threat to accept stringent contract requirements without effect on the provider’s total budget. Therefore, we also research the effect of selective contracting on hospital budgets. The underlying assumption is that when an insurer excludes a provider from his network, the budget of that provider is reduced. Vice versa, if an insurer adds a provider to the plan network, the budget of that provider is expected to increase. The change in contracting index is related to the change in the hospital budget by using multivariate linear regression.  
                 
                (4) Here, the difference in market share of provider   between 2015 and 2016 is explained by the size of provider   and differences in the contracting index of provider  . The extent of selective contracting changed on average by 13% between 2015 and 2016 (Appendix figure 5.5b). However, no significant relation was found between changes in selective contracting and changes in market share (table 5.4), which does not change when we correct for size. The results suggest that despite extensive use of selective contracting, no effects on provider budget reallocations are found. This is consistent with the results of the main analysis.    
Table 5.4: Relation between changes in market share and selective contracting, 2015-2016  1 2 3 
Contracting index 0.00039 (0.00026) 0.0004 (0.0003) 0.00040 (0.0003) 
Size  0.0421*** (0.0113) 0.00704 (0.0197) 
Size2   1.5090* (0.7502) 
Constant -0.00005 (0.00007 -0.0002** (0.0001) -0.0002 (0.0001)  F( 1,253) = 2.26 R2=0.0042 N=255 F( 2,252) = 7.07 R2=0.0625 N=255 F( 3,251) = 7.59 R2=0.0701 N=255 Note: robust standard errors are in parentheses; sign. *<5%;**<1%;***<0.1% 
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Provider size and capital intensity One factor that may influence market volatility is provider size. Furthermore, the level of concentration in the hospital sector increased during the period of our study (Schut et al., 2013). However, literature examining the effect of provider concentration on prices and costs finds mixed results (Gaynor et al., 2015; Gaynor and Vogt, 2000; Mosca et al., 2007; Schneider et al., 2008). On the one hand, providers may have more difficulties reallocating budgets between large providers due to provider market power and limited alternatives. On the other hand, large providers may have more possibilities to accommodate changes in market share in absolute terms, i.e. a reallocation of one million euro is easier to accommodate for large providers than for small providers. If the former effect dominates, it may provide an explanation for low volatility found in the hospital sector. However, if the latter effect dominates, the hospital market would be expected to have inherently higher volatility, which would imply low volatility in the hospital sector may not be explained by high concentration.  Secondly, sectors with high capital intensity may have lower volatility, because high fixed costs limit the capacity of providers to cope with large negative income shocks. We define capital intensity as interest payments, rents and capital depreciation (as percentage of total revenue). We estimate the effect of provider size and capital intensity on the absolute change in market share over all sectors: 
                               
                      (5) Where      is the market share of provider   in year  ;       is capital intensity and      are year dummies. The error term     is corrected for panel clusters. All sectors are included in this analysis. Quadratic effects are estimated for provider size to allow nonlinear effect. For capital intensity, a negative relation (    ) indicates that this limits the scope of budget reallocations.   Table 5.5 displays the results of the regression. Both market share and market share squared are positive and significantly different from zero. This indicates that the effect of provider size is positive and increasing: larger providers experience a disproportionally larger volatility. However, this effect is small: a 1% increase in market share is associated with a 0.035% increase in volatility for the smallest 50% of providers, 0.036% for the 75th size percentile and 0.039% for the 90th size percentile. These results indicate that higher provider market concentration is associated with more market share reallocations. While small providers may experience more dynamism in relative terms, the absolute effect of budget changes for large providers dominates the total volatility in the market. Based on this, we would expect more market volatility in more concentrated markets. However, despite the hospital sector being more concentrated, reallocations are relatively low. This 
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supports the finding that active purchasing is relatively low in the hospital sector. The results also indicate that higher capital intensity is associated with lower volatility: for an average provider, which experiences an average annual volatility of 0.0049% of the total market, volatility is reduced by 0.000545% (11.1%) for every 10% increase in capital intensity. Capital intensity is higher in LTC than in hospital care (11.0% resp. 8.6%), implying that budget reallocations may be easier in the hospital sector, i.e. volatility is expected to be higher. This also supports our findings that active purchasing is relatively low in the hospital sector.   
 
Type of care  Possibly, budget reallocations are easier for certain type of care. We hypothesize that outpatient care with shorter length of stay display higher volatility. This would imply that a market with high levels of outpatient care would display more volatility. For LTC, we distinguish between nursing home care (in-patient residential care) and home care (out-patient non-residential care). The distinction between nursing homes and home care is not clear-cut: most organisations provide a mix of the two. We define    for each provider as the patients receiving home care as a percentage of all patients (both home care and nursing home care). For hospital care, a distinction is made between traditional hospitals (mostly in-patient care) and ITCs (outpatient care). We define a dummy variable (ITC) that is one if a provider is an ITC and zero if the provider is a traditional hospital. In order to assess the 
Table 5.5: The impact of provider size and capital intensity on provider market share volatility (pooled 
linear regression) 
 Coefficient (clustered standard error) 
Market share on t-1 (MSt-1) 0.0347*** (0.0040) 
(MSt-1)2 0.0171** (0.0078) 
Capital intensity -0.0054*** (0.0016) 
Year= 2007 0.0053*** (0.0012) 
 2008 0.0004 (0.0007) 
 2009 0.0006 (0.0005) 
 2010 0.0004 (0.0003) 
 2012 -0.0002 (0.0004) 
 2013 -0.0004 (0.0003) 
 2014 -0.0011*** (0.0003) 
Constant 0.0013*** (0.0003) 
 F( 10, 1562)=45.88 R2=0.2760 N=8316 Note: clustered standard errors are in parentheses; 2011 is used as base year; sign. *<5%;**<1%;***<0.1% 
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effect of a high percentage of home care patients, both    and     are correlated to volatility: 
                              
                               (6) 
                              
                                (7)  Year effects are captured by year dummies. The error term     is corrected for panel clusters. Equation (6) is estimated for elderly care and disability care separately.   
Table 5.6: The impact of type of care (pooled linear regression with clustered standard errors)  Elderly care Disability care Hospital care 
Market share on t-1 (MSt-1) 0.0468*** (0.0067) 0.0478*** (0.0070) 0.0274 (0.0075) 
(MSt-1)2 -0.0028 (0.0076) -0.011*** (0.0027) 0.0204*** (0.0029) 
Capital intensity % -0.0113** (0.0076) -0.0048 (0.0052) -0.007 (0.0130) 
Home care %  0.0022* (0.0012) -0.0007 (0.0013)  
ITC dummy   -0.0056 (0.0030) 
Year= 2007 0.0110*** (0.0017) 0.0169*** (0.0026) 0.0057 (0.1273) 
 2008 0.0007 (0.0007) 0.0036** (0.0013) 0.0081 (0.0063) 
 2009 0.0042*** (0.0001) 0.003** (0.0011) 0.002 (0.0047) 
 2010 0.0015 (0.0012) 0.0005 (0.0007) 0.0055 (0.0031) 
 2012 0.0004 (0.0005) 0.0044* (0.0017) -0.0017 (0.0027) 
 2013 0.0008 (0.0005) 0.002 (0.0011) -0.0083 (0.0024) 
 2014 0.0017** (0.0006) 0.0005 (0.0009) -0.0047* (0.0023) 
Constant -0.0006 (0.0008) -0.0011 (0.001) 0.0112** (0.0036  F(11,563)=36.22 R2=0.2758 N=3505 F(11,202)=92.76 R2=0.3755 N=1208 F(11,283) =101.42 R2=0.3326 N=1374 Note: clustered standard errors are in parentheses; 2011 is used as base year; sign. *<5%;**<1%;***<0.1%  Table 5.6 shows that after correcting for size and capital intensity, only in elderly care a significant effect is found for outpatient care: a 10 percent increase in home care is associated with a 0.22% change in market share. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence of high growth of home care organisation Buurtzorg during the study period, moving from under €1 million LTC revenue in 2007 to over €250 million in 2014 (Gray et al., 2015). For disability care, no difference in volatility is found between inpatient and outpatient care (Appendix figure 5.6). ITCs do experience a higher degree of volatility than hospitals (Appendix figure 5.7). However, due to the small size, ITCs only account for 0.1% to 0.3% of total volatility in the hospital market. No significant effect of ITCs is found when controlled for size (table 5.6). This indicates that the hospital sector may have lower percentages of outpatient care than the LTC sector, but this has limited influence on volatility. Differences 
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in market structure, such as the level of outpatient care, cannot fully explain the relatively low volatility found for the hospital sector. 
 
5.5 Discussion Active purchasing is an important mechanism to improve healthcare efficiency. One aspect of active purchasing is reallocation of budgets from underperforming providers to well-performing providers. One consequence of this aspect of active purchasing is increased volatility in the market. In order to measure the extent of market reallocations, a Market Volatility Indicator (MVI) was developed. We measured volatility in four Dutch health markets with different institutional settings. We find that for three of four markets, volatility is in line with our hypothesis. In long-term care, regional single payers have few incentives to purchase actively, and we find relatively low volatility. For social care, municipalities were expected to purchase more actively than LTC payers due to higher financial risk. Indeed, we find the market for social care to be much more volatile than the LTC-market. Because patients eligible for LTC can opt-out and self-purchase using personal budgets, it is expected that personal budget care is more volatile than LTC care, which we also find. For hospital care, managed competition principles dictate that insurers purchase actively. However, we did not find more volatility in the hospital market compared to the LTC market. This suggests that for the hospital market, managed competition did not result in increased active purchasing by means of market share reallocations. Our robustness checks confirm this conclusion. The results are also in line with international evidence, showing little qualitative evidence for strategic purchasing by health insurers in the Netherlands, nor in nine other countries (Klasa et al., 2018). The UK, for example, has implemented waves of purchaser reforms, with little effect on provider practice (Bevan and van de Ven, 2010; Brereton and Vasoodaven, 2010; Le Grand, 1999; Porter et al., 2013; Smith et al., 2004). Furthermore, we showed few structural differences between the single payer LTC system and the multi-payer hospital care system, in line with international comparisons (Figueras et al., 2005; Glied, 2009; Jeong and Niki, 2012; Smith et al., 2004; Wranik, 2012). Although budget reallocations in the hospital sector are only one aspect of active purchasing under managed competition, the results suggest that managed competition in the Netherlands does not fully function as expected.   
5.5.1. Strengths and limitations This research is the first that empirically investigates market volatility as the result of (one aspect of) active purchasing. However, factors unrelated to purchasing may influence market volatility. We have assessed a number of factors in our robustness analysis, such as 
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entry and exit, provider concentration, capital intensity and out-patient settings, finding that these factors have minor influence on volatility. However, additional factors, specifically shifts in financing arrangements, renovations and socio-demographic trends, may also increase volatility irrespective of active purchasing. Therefore, our measure of market volatility overestimates the influence of active purchasing on market share reallocations. On the other hand, active purchasing may constitute actions that do not result in market share reallocations. The high extent of selective contracting suggests that insurers may aim to concentrate specific types of care and reduce other types of care within a hospital, without affecting the total budget. Furthermore, active purchasing may focus on cost containment, aiming to reduce growth in all provider budgets. If cost containment does not distinguish between providers, no market shares are reallocated as a result of active purchasing.   While the MVI may be used to compare health systems on active purchasing, the optimal level of market share reallocations is unknown. Volatility is necessary to accommodate changes and improve efficiency, but too high market volatility is likely to risk provider continuity. Furthermore, high market volatility does not necessarily imply that reallocations improve efficiency, i.e. are moving in the direction from low-quality providers to high quality providers. Literature on the effects of quality differences on prices, volumes or market share, finds mixed results (Baker et al., 2003; Chandra et al., 2016; Mukamel and Mushlin, 1998; Rosenthal and Frank, 2006; Werner and Asch, 2005). Furthermore, it generally tends to be unclear whether active purchasing or patient choice drives these results (Werner and Asch, 2005). In order to research whether active purchasing leads to a more efficient allocation of resources, quality of providers should be taken into account. However, currently few valid quality indicators are publicly available for the Netherlands. Due to these limitations, market volatility should be interpreted as a proxy for active purchasing by reallocations of market share, acknowledging that other forms of active purchasing are not taken into account.   
5.5.2. Policy implications One major outcome is that in the hospital sector, volatility is relatively low, which may question the premise that managed competition incentivises insurers to improve efficiency in the hospital market by selectively contracting high-quality providers. Several explanations may be given for the low MVI in the hospital sector. Budget increases require sufficient potential to increase capacity, while budget reductions require adjustments of hospital expenditures, e.g. changes in personnel or capital expenditures. The expenditure side might be relatively fixed, so large changes in the budget might risk provider continuity. This may form a barrier for active purchasing in the hospital market.  
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 In 2012, the government intervened in the hospital market by negotiating an agreement with the representative organisations of hospitals and insurers, reducing real overall hospital growth to 2.5% per year. These agreements did not formally prevent budget reallocations, as within the total hospital budget, purchasers were still supposed to negotiate individual budgets, but the 2.5% limit may have informally functioned as an anchor in individual negotiations. For example, providers may have used the 2.5% mark as a starting bid or minimal offer in the negotiations. This could have lowered market share reallocations, although no trend break after 2012 is found for hospital care. After the reform, insurers were largely compensated for budget overruns (ex-post risk equalisation). Starting from 2012, compensation was gradually abolished, increasing incentives to purchase actively. In combination with the sector agreements, this may have evoked across-the-board cost containment in the short term. Whether increased risk will incentivise insurers to selectively reallocate provider budgets in the long run remains to be seen, but up to 2014 we find little evidence in support.   Purchasers may experience additional barriers in active purchasing. For example, establishing a good relationship with providers may be beneficial for improving outcomes, but may hinder active purchasing (Hughes et al., 2013; Le Grand, 1999; Petsoulas et al., 2014). Evidence from Germany stipulates frictions due to competition in a corporatist health system (Kifmann, 2017). Lastly, in the UK some scholars found that active purchasing is incompatible with the mindset of commissioners (Checkland et al., 2012). A similar explanation could be applicable to the Netherlands: both insurers and LTC- providers may deem themselves unfit to decide for the patient what services from which provider a patient should receive. On the other hand, evidence from the US and the Netherlands suggests that purchasers are to a certain extent able and willing to steer patients (Bes et al., 2017; Mobley, 1998b; Zwanziger et al., 2000). Another explanation could be the credible commitment problem as hypothesised by Boonen and Schut (2010): due to consumers not trusting purchasers to act prudently on their behalf, insurers fear of loss of reputation and customers upon selective contracting of providers (Boonen and Schut, 2010; Mikkers and Ryan, 2014). Possibly, managed competition in the Netherlands might not fully function as envisioned because implementation is imperfect, for example due to a lack of quality transparency (Van de Ven et al., 2013). Lack of valid quality indicators may complicate insurer choice of well-performing providers.   These barriers may question whether active purchasing through budget reallocations is attainable in the hospital sector. However, social care and personal budgets do show high market share volatility. Furthermore, market share reallocations provide a powerful tool to increase efficiency and stimulate quality improvements. While the Dutch 
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health system is sometimes positioned as a positive example of managed competition, our results indicate that additional regulation may be necessary for the system to function as intended (Van de Ven et al., 2013; van Ginneken et al., 2011). Besides improving preconditions for managed competition, such as price and quality transparency, monitoring and benchmarking purchaser activity could further incentivise improvements in purchaser-driven budget reallocations (Greaves et al., 2012). The MVI could be a useful tool for policy makers to monitor purchasing outcomes.  
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Appendix to Chapter 5 a)
 
b)
 c)
 
d)
 e)
 
 
Figure 5.3: Scatterplots of percentage changes in market share per sector, base year (2011) is taken at the mean of the panel dataset. Percentage growth is capped at 100% for clarity. a: Hospital sector; b: Elderly care sector; c: Disability care sector; d: Personal budget sector; e: Municipal care sector 
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 Figure 5.4: MVI of all care, effects of excluding entry and exit of providers. Structural trend is calculated as differences in market share over a period of two years. 
a)  
b)  Figure 5.5: Relation between selective contracting and market share; a) Fraction of care contracted per provider in 2016, sorted by market share; b) Relation between changes in care contracted between 2015 and 2016 and changes in market share 
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a)
  
b)
  Figure 5.6: MVI of inpatient and outpatient care in LTC; a) MVI of predominantly outpatient (home care) and predominantly in-patient (nursing home care) elderly care providers.; b) MVI of predominantly outpatient (home care) and predominantly in-patient (nursing home care) disability care providers. Structural trends are calculated as differences in market share over a period of two years.   
  Figure 5.7: MVI of Independent treatment centers (ITC)  and hospitals. Structural trend is calculated as differences  in market share over a period of two years.   
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6 Do quality improvements in assisted 
reproduction technology increase patient 
numbers in a managed competition setting? 
Stadhouders, N., Kremer, J., Jeurissen, P., & Tanke, M.  Submitted    
Abstract In a system of managed competition, selective contracting and patient choice reward providers for quality improvements through increases in patient numbers and revenue. We research whether these mechanisms function as envisioned by investigating the relationship between quality improvements and patient numbers in assisted reproduction technology in the Netherlands. Success rate improvements primarily reduce volume as fewer secondary treatments are necessary, but this can be compensated by attracting new patients. Using nationwide registry data from 1996 to 2016, we find limited evidence that high quality clinics attract new patients, and insufficiently as to compensate for the reduction in secondary treatments. The net effect of quality increases appears to be a small decline in revenue. Therefore, we conclude that patient choice and active purchasing reward quality improvements insufficiently. Nevertheless, clinics have improved quality drastically over the last years, showing that financial incentives are perhaps less important factors for quality improvements than factors such as intrinsic motivation and professional autonomy.   
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Chapter 6 
Do quality improvements in assisted reproduction technology 
increase patient numbers in a managed competition setting? 
 
6.1 Introduction Governments and health insurers aim to increase the (experienced) quality of care and the population health while containing costs, the so-called triple aim (Berwick et al., 2008; Laurant, 2015). Quality improvements are propagated often as a means to reduce costs. Assisted reproduction technology (ART) treatment is a good case study for this: higher success rates lower the number of attempts and therefore lower costs and –presumably- increase patient satisfaction. ART is an alternative when natural pregnancy fails. Treatment cycles start by ovarian hormonal stimulation, after which one or more eggs are retrieved. Eggs are then fertilized in vitro (IVF) or a sperm cell is injected directly into the egg (ICSI). In about 90% of cycles, one or two fertilized eggs are placed in the uterus. Additional fertilized eggs from the same cycle can be frozen in (cryopreservation), thawed, and placed in the uterus after a first attempt failed. This reduces the burden of starting a full new treatment cycle.   In the Netherlands, three treatment cycles are reimbursed as part of the mandatory benefit package. That is, if certain preconditions (age and BMI) are fulfilled. Tariffs are set by the Dutch Healthcare Authority (table 6.1), while volumes are freely negotiable. Success rates are defined by the percentage of 10-week pregnancies over the total number of treatment cycles (Kremer et al., 2008; Smeenk, 2015). In 2016, 13,458 treatment cycles were started, of which 6,486 involved IVF and 6,972 involved ICSI. An additional 12,116 embryo’s were placed after cryopreservation. Of the 13,458 cycles, 4,781 10-week pregnancies were obtained, a success rate of 36 percent (table 6.1).     Total success rates per started treatment cycle have increased drastically, from under 20 percent in 1997 to 27 percent in 2010 to 36 percent in 2016. Compared to other European countries success rates are higher only in Sweden and Finland (Kupka et al., 2016; Kupka et al., 2014). One possibility to boost success rates is to place multiple embryos at the same time. This increases the number of twins and triplets, which is a risk factor for complications. Multiplets are for that reason regarded as an undesirable outcome. However, over the past years the percentage of multiplets dropped spectacularly in the Netherlands, from 23 percent of 10-week pregnancies in 2003 to 3.8 percent in 2016. Therefore, increases in the success rate increase did not come at the cost of increased risk of complications.  
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Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics on prices, quality and volumes of ART in the Netherlands in 2016 (2010)  
 Treatments 2016 (2010) 10-week pregnancies 2016 (2010) Success rate* 2016 (2010) 
DRG tariff 2016 (2010) Cost per pregnancy 2016 Total expenses (million euro) 2016 (2010) 
IVF cycles 6,486 (8,750) 1,240 (1,683)  19% (20%)  €1,959 (€1,712) €10,400 12.7 (16.4) 
ICSI cycles 6,972 (7,843) 1,627 (1,846) 23% (23%)  €2,225 (€2,172) €10,062 15.5 (19.5) 
Cryo-
preservations** 
12,116 (6,729) 1,914 (1,055) 15% (16%)  €444 (€305) €2,931 5.4 (2.2) 
Total  4,781 (4,584) 36% (27%)    33.6 (38.2) * Each treatment cycle consists of placement of an embryo through either IVF or ICSI plus one or more embryo transfers through cryopreservation. The total mean success rate is therefore higher than individual IVF ICSI success rates. **All cryopreservations are part of either an IVF cycle or an ICSI cycle and add to the success rate of the treatment cycle. Source: (Vektis, 2017) and NVOG (2010-2016)  Cryopreservations add to success rates per treatment cycle, as each placement of a cryopreserved embryo is considered part of a previous treatment cycle. Increases in the use of cryopreservation will therefore increase the success rates and the total number of pregnancies. It is also cost effective: at current tariffs, an investment of €10.000 is required to obtain a 10-week pregnancy for IVF and ICSI, while this is under €3.000 for cryopreservation 9. Therefore, extended use of cryopreservation is expected to improve ART outcomes at lower costs. However, due to much lower reimbursements, higher intensity of cryopreservation also reduces per patient reimbursements for clinics. Total reimbursements dropped from 38 million in 2010 to 34 million in 2016, which can largely be explained by increased success rates and uptake of cryopreservation.  For individual clinics, higher success rates reduce the number of treatments and thus reimbursements per patient. Thus, a financial disincentive for quality improvements exists. On the other hand, in a competitive environment improved success rates could attract new patients and increase total treatment volume. To attract new patients, two mechanisms coexist: patient choice and selective contracting of health insurers (Howard, 2006). Preconditions for patient choice appear excellent: ART is an elective treatment, outcomes in terms of success rates are highly valued by patients (van Empel et al., 2011) and the success rates of clinics are known (Kremer et al., 2008). Due to the favorable preconditions for patient choice in AR, it can be considered a best case study. Patient choice for quality has been demonstrated in a number of studies (Cooper et al., 2011; Howard, 2006). Other research in the Dutch context has previously found patient responsiveness to 
                                                                9 Cost-effectiveness is expressed as the tariff divided by the success rate. E.g. at 20% success rate of IVF, one in five couples obtain a 10-week preganancy at €2,000; resulting in a cost per pregnancy of €10.000. Note that a treatment cycle can include IVF/ICSI and cryopreservation, while the cost effectiveness is calculated separately.  
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quality indicators for angioplasty and hip replacement (Beukers et al., 2014; Varkevisser et al., 2012).  In addition, conditions for selective contracting are compelling. In 2006, Dutch healthcare reform introduced managed competition: insurers compete for patients under a mandatory coverage, where risk equalization prevents cherry picking. Competition on premiums incentivizes insurers to purchase actively to improve provider quality and reduce the cost of care. ART is a field in which insurers can clearly attain both of these goals: steering patients to high quality providers can increase quality and reduce costs. Therefore, we expect that insurers seek to steer patients through selective contracting and active purchasing strategies, especially after the 2006 reform (Cooper et al., 2011; Howard, 2006). For clinics, we therefore expect quality improvements to pay off in terms of revenue due to additional patient streams (Howard, 2006; van der Geest and Varkevisser, 2008). Furthermore, we expect that this effect increased after the 2006 reform. The relation may be influenced by demographics, as regional changes in the number of eligible patients (women aged 30 to 40) can influence clinic patient numbers. Also, travel time may be of influence (Exworthy and Peckham, 2006). Patients have to visit the clinic a number of times in a short time span, which could reduce willingness to travel long distances (Wu et al., 2013). Therefore, we expect the relation between success rate and market share of the clinic to be stronger in regions where multiple clinics are within traveling distance (Cooper et al., 2011). From these premises, we can formulate the following hypotheses:  1. Changes in success rate are positively related to changes in the number of treatments 2. This relation is stronger after the reform in 2006 3. This relation is stronger in more competitive regions The paper is structured as follows: The next section presents the research method, after which our results are presented. We end with a discussion and policy recommendations.   
6.2 Data and methods To analyze the relation between success rate improvements and growth in the number of treatments, we use a panel database from 1996-2016, routinely collected by the Dutch Institute for Obstetrics and Geriatrics (NVOG). This institute annually sends questionnaires to the heads of department of all clinics to collect data on the number of started treatments, the number of placed embryos, the number of 10 week pregnancies and the number of twins/triplets. Data on demographics were derived from the Dutch Statistical Bureau (CBS, 2016). We define a variable (R), which is 1 when the clinic is in a competitive region and 0 if 
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otherwise10 (van der Geest and Varkevisser, 2008). Success rates are published with a one-year delay, which means that patients and insurers are expected to base their choice for the clinic in year t on quality data of year t-1 and earlier. We test the first hypothesis by employing a fixed effects panel regression:  
1)                              Where   is the number of treatments in clinic   in year  . The success rate is given by  , while   (demographics) is the number of women between 30 and 40 in the province. As a robustness check, we test different lag structures.  The coefficient    contains the combined effect of two contradicting mechanisms: increased quality primarily reduces the number of secondary treatments, while as a secondary effect it potentially increases the number of new patients through patient choice and/or active purchasing by insurance companies. In order to test whether quality improvements attract new patients, the secondary mechanism needs to be isolated. However, our database does not contain information on individual patients. Therefore, on a patient level no distinction can be made between first and secondary treatments. However, we are able to calculate the effect of improved success rates on the number of secondary treatments by assuming that the dropout rate after an unsuccessful attempt is fixed. In that case, the number of new treatments  is equal to:  
                            Where   is the dropout rate. We use a fixed dropout rate of 50%. In Germany dropout rates between 40% and 50% are reported (Schröder et al., 2004; Viardot-Foucault et al., 2015). For sensitivity analysis, we range the dropout rate between 30% and 70%. To disregard general trends in the number of patients, we calculate market shares :  
    
   
    
  
   
                 
The regression specification is:  
2)                              To test the influence of travel distance, we interact the coefficient with a competitive region dummy ( ) (van der Geest and Varkevisser, 2008). To test the effect of managed competition, we add interaction coefficient dummy  , which is 1 after the reform. Next, we estimate the effects of success rate on market share of new patients:  
3)                                                            
                                                                10 The competitive region is defined as the densely populated Randstad area (roughly the provinces Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland and Utrecht). In the Appendix alternative definitions are used as robustness checks. 
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In total, we estimate three specifications: 1) estimation of the composite effect of quality on the number of treatments, 2) estimation of the effect of quality on new treatments only, 3) estimation of the effects of competitive regions and on competitive reforms.  As additional analyses, we include instantaneous effects and longer lag periods. Quality indicators are made available with a one-year time lag. This means that quality in year t cannot influence patient choice or purchasing in year t. However, instantaneous effects may occur due to reverse causality: by increasing the number of new treatments, quality of care may decline. Equivalently, quality of care may be improved by reducing the number of treatments. This effect could be caused by more strict guidelines and regulation supported by the government (Van den Boogaard, 2012). However, it also could potentially indicate cherry picking: by refusing patients with low chance of success, quality ratings may be improved. Thirdly, the effect could be caused by supplier-induced demand: treating more new patients –who have lower chances of success- reduces success rates in the same year. All three effects could result in reverse causality, which could justify adding instantaneous quality effects.   
6.3 Results Table 6.2 shows descriptive statistics for the 13 clinics in 201511.   
  Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics of AR-clinics in the Netherlands in 2015 
 5-year mean success rate (sd) Number of treatments Number of new patients (market share)  
Demo-graphics Travel time to nearest competitor ( minutes) 
Amsterdam (AMC) 28.6% (2.5%) 966 643 (7%) 182439 10 
Groningen (UMCG) 23.4% (2.4%) 671 430 (5%) 31469 64 
Maastricht (MUMC) 26.3% (2.4%) 370 233 (3%) 56815 66 
Nijmegen (Radboud UMC) 27.4% (2.7%) 1278 790 (9%) 111513 52 
Rotterdam (Erasmus UMC)  29.1% (2.6%) 1825 1221 (14%) 230357 23 
Utrecht (UMCU) 31.0% (3.1%) 1473 1007 (11%) 81895 33 
Eindhoven (Catharina ZKH) 25.0% (2.9%) 661 444 (5%) 141529 28 
Tilburg (Elisabeth ZKH) 30.0% (2.3%) 974 698 (8%) 141529 28 
Leiden (LUMC) 33.0% (2.1%) 800 554 (6%) 230357 15 
Leiderdorp (MCK) 30.1% (1.9%) 877 549 (6%) 230357 15 
Zwolle (Isala) 26.4% (2.9%) 1388 889 (10%) 65200 55 
Voorburg (Reinier de Graaf) 29.3% (2.1%) 574 356 (4%) 230357 23 
Amsterdam (VU) 40.6% (2.1%) 1611 1105 (12%) 182439 10 
                                                                11 In 2016, the Elisabeth ZKH took over treatments in the Catharina ZKH. Therefore statistics for 2015 are displayed 
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Success rates display a broad spread, ranging from 23.4% in Groningen to 40.6% at the VU Amsterdam. This appears unrelated to the number of treatments, ranging from 370 in Maastricht to 1825 in Rotterdam. Of all treatments, about two-thirds are estimated to be primary treatments.   Table 6.3 shows the main results. No significant relation is found between the number of treatments in year t and the success rate in the previous year (specification 3.1). This negative sign may signal that the effect of reduced number of secondary treatments outweighs the increase in new patients. Also, no significant effect of the success rate in the previous year on the market share of new patients is found (3.2). This absence of a significant positive relation persists when interacting with region and reform (3.3). We conclude that no significant relation is present between quality of care and the number of (new) treatments or the market share of the clinic. 
Table 6.3: Regression results 
 3.1 Number of treatments 3.2 Market share of new patients 3.3 Interaction with region and reform 
Success rate in t-1 -893.3 4.069 1.435 
Interaction with region   3.967 
Interaction with reform   2.887 
Interaction with region and reform   5.849 
Demographics -.00024 .0000104 .0000134 
Time trend 17.3 -.00623 -.0292 
Constant -33303 17.57 63.31 
N (i,t) 245 (13,20) 245 (13,20) 245 (13,20) 
R2 0.0039 0.0172 0.0032 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***P<.01  When multiple lags are tested (table 6.4), significant immediate and lagged negative effects are found on the number of treatments (specification 4.1). This indicates reverse causality: reduction of new treatments improve quality rates. Regardless of this instantaneous effect, the one-year lagged effect of quality on market shares (specification 4.2) captures the effect of quality improvements on patient choice and purchasing. Specification 4.2 shows that a 1% improvement in the success rate is significantly associated with a reduction in market share of 0.98 percentage points in the same year, and an increase of 0.74 percentage points in the next year. The latter effect is more pronounced in competitive regions (specification 4.3). The market-based reform by itself does not have a significant influence, as no significant difference in the effect is found before and after reform. The effect slightly increases after the reform by 0.2 percentage points in competitive regions and 0.005 percentage points in noncompetitive regions, both effects are not significant. Actual competition seems to matter more than competitive reforms. This finding is robust to alternative definitions of years, dropout ratios and competitive regions (see Appendix). In 
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conclusion, a positive effect of quality improvements on new patients may be present, but it is insufficiently large to provide financial incentives for clinics to improve quality.  
Table 6.4: Lag structure regression results 
 4.1 Number of treatments 4.2 Market share of new patients 4.3 interaction with region and reform on quality in year t-1 
Success rate in t -1830.356*** -9.849** -11.866*** 
Success rate in t-1 -481.751** 7.402** 1.650 
Success rate in t-2 371.701  4.236 2.859 
Interaction with region   11.290** 
Interaction with reform   2.161 
Interaction with region and reform   13.159** 
Demographics .0071 .000019 9.97e-06 
Time trend 34.275** .0395 .00628 
Constant -68321.3** -74.94 -6.233 
N (i,t) 243 (13,19) 243 (13,19) 243 (13,19) 
R2 (within, between) (0.1635, 0.0449) (0.0845, 0.0319) (0.1275, 0.0052) 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***P<.01  
6.4 Discussion We demonstrate that quality improvements in ART have no significant effect on the number of treatments, despite what might be expected under the model of managed competition. Our results indicate that both patient choice and active purchasing fall short as means to stimulate efficiency. Patient choice may depend on non-success rate dimensions of quality, such as personal contact of physicians or of the actual travel time to the clinic. We do find evidence that the impact of patient choice increases when the distance to the nearest clinic is reduced. Possibly limited patient knowledge may explain low responsiveness (Vrangbæk et al., 2007). General physicians acting as gatekeeper, should inform patients or influence patient choice (Dixon et al., 2010). It is unknown whether GPs routinely use available quality information.   Regarding active purchasing, results indicate that at the moment the system of regulated competition in the Netherlands does not stimulate active purchasing for assisted reproduction. As preconditions for active purchasing are better for ART than nearly any other treatment, it might be hypothesized that active purchasing by itself is falling short of policy expectations. This could be explained by low acceptance of insured patients to steering from third parties; patient choice is considered an important moral value. It could also reflect hospital market power, as resistance against selective contracting can be severe.  To improve the public’s acceptance of selective contracting insurers could increase transparency in terms of price and quality (Hibbard et al., 2003). However, selective contracting is only a viable option in competitive regions. This could result in a health gap between the urban and rural regions, if predominantly urban regions are motivated to 
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improve quality. Indeed, our results already indicate somewhat higher success rates in the more competitive regions. Furthermore, over the last couple decades quality has improved and costs were reduced in absence of active purchasing and despite perverse financial incentives. Our results stipulate the importance of professional autonomy of medical specialists as a means of quality improvement. The role of health insurers may be limited to stimulating professional development through e.g. trans-clinic learning programs.  This study is contributing to the literature by elucidating the effects of mechanisms of patient choice and active purchasing on incentives to increase quality in a regulated competition setting. This study has several limitations. Firstly, as data is restricted to number of treatments, dropout rates and transfers to other clinics are unknown. However, our results are robust to different dropout percentages in modeling. Secondly, background characteristics of patients are unknown. Some of the differences in success rates may be explained by case-mix, as clinics focusing on more complicated cases may have lower success rates. However, due to the certificate-of-needs status of ART clinics no differentiation or specialization between clinics may be expected. Clinics may also employ patient selection and cream skimming (Brekke et al., 2014). The negative correlation in the same year between success rates and patient numbers supports this. However, the large number of patients in the VU Amsterdam, which is best performing with high patient numbers, suggests that cream skimming may not be a major concern. This is supported by relatively strict guidelines for ART in the Netherlands. However, it would require additional research to definitely rule out patient selection.  To conclude, we found that patient choice and active purchasing is functioning insufficiently to reward clinics for quality improvements. Dutch ART clinics have no financial incentive for quality improvements. Despite a lack of financial stimulus, quality has improved drastically over two decades. This indicates that technological innovations and the intrinsic motivation of health professionals are the dominant mechanisms to improve the quality of care. Currently, both active purchasing and patient choice do not perform sufficiently well to ensure efficient functioning of the ‘market’ for AR. If policy makers seek for an effective system of regulated competition they need to either stimulate active purchasing by insurers, active choice by patients, or both.     
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Appendix to Chapter 6 
Supplementary material Data used for this research is available upon request or can be accessed through the following link: https://www.degynaecoloog.nl/nuttige-informatie/ivf-resultaten/ 
 
Reform years Table 6.5 shows the result of alternative definitions of the reform year. It could be that the reform was anticipated, suggesting a stronger effect when 2006 is taken as a reform year. Also, it could be that the reform took time to implement, suggesting a stronger effect when 2008 is taken as a reform year. In 2012, ex-ante compensation was reduced to improve active purchasing. We research in regression 3 whether the effect was stronger after 2012. We find that the choice of reform year does not influence the results. No significant differences between the alternative specifications were found. We can conclude that the reform did not have a significant influence on the relationship between quality improvements and new patients.  
 
Table 6.5: Reform years regression results 
 1 Reform after 2006 2 Reform after 2008 3 Reform after 2012 
Success rate in t -11.591*** -12.595*** -12.415*** 
Success rate in t-1 1.233 2.418 1.124 
Success rate in t-2 2.978 3.426 2.995 
Interaction with region 11.869** 10.180** 11.309** 
Interaction with reform 1.049 3.455 1.957 
Interaction with region and reform 12.583** 13.245** 13.102** 
Demographics 8.32e-06 .000014 .00001 
Time trend .0168 -.00328 .0114 
Constant -26.770 12.573 -16.170 
N (i,t) 243 (13,19) 243 (13,19) 243 (13,19) 
R2 (within, between) (0.1217, 0.0130) (0.1393, 0.0004) (0.1285, 0.0062) 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***P<.01  
Dropout rates Our model assumes a 50% dropout rate. However, in literature this figure is surrounded with a high degree of uncertainty. Therefore, we test alternative assumptions regarding the dropout rate in table 6.6. We find similar results for all dropout rates, although the size of the effect declines for higher dropout rates. Therefore, we conclude that the dropout rate used in this study does not alter our conclusions. However, we do assume that the dropout rate is the same for all clinics. Clinics differing in their dropout rate could significantly influence the results. Specifically, if high quality is combined with a high dropout rate, the effect of quality improvements on new treatments is larger, while if high quality is combined 
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with a low dropout rate, the effect is smaller. One can assume that if quality is higher, the dropout rate will be lower, suggesting that our estimates are conservative. However, the results on the number of treatments is unaffected by the dropout rate (specification one). We can therefore definitely conclude that higher success rates have no significant effect on the total number of treatments.   
Table 6.6: Dropout rate regression results 
 Dropout rate 30% Dropout rate 40% Dropout rate 60% Dropout rate 70% 
Success rate in t -14.883*** -13.776*** -10.705*** -9.618** 
Success rate in t-1 7.466 4.178 -.457 -2.104 
Success rate in t-2 3.545 2.968 2.430 2.230 
Interaction with region 19.964*** 15.380** 8.127* 5.567 
Interaction with reform 8.628 4.883 -.121 -1.904 
Interaction with region and 
reform 
22.267*** 17.469*** 9.834** 7.138* 
Demographics 3.46e-06 8.07e-06 .000012 .0000135 
Time trend -.0595 -.0211 .0216 .0367 
Constant 125.788 48.895 -36.646 -66.915 
N (i,t) 243 (13,19) 243 (13,19) 243 (13,19) 243 (13,19) 
R2 (within, between) (0.1913, 0.0408) (0.1579, 0.0181) (0.1077, 0.0012) (0.0935, 0.0000) 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***P<.01   
Competitive region definition Other authors have used the Randstad area as definition of a competitive region (van der Geest and Varkevisser, 2008). Other definitions are also possible, which may influence the results. We test two alternatives: one narrower definition, which focuses on four clinics which are very close to each other (within 15 minutes of travel time), one broader definition, which is defined as the Randstad area including Tilburg and Eindhoven (all have competitors within 35 minutes of travel time). Furthermore, we separately test the effect of travel time to the nearest competitor in minutes as effect modifier (specification 3). We find that the competitive effect is predominant in the four clinics that are closest to each other, but the size of the effect is very similar over the different definitions of competitive regions (table 6.7). The third specification confirms that travel time is a significant effect modifier: each additional minute of travel time to the nearest competitor reduces the effect of an increase in success rate on market share by 0.4 percentage points. For example, a 1% increase in quality increases market share by 1.6% when travel time to the nearest competitor is 10 minutes, while this is 0.3% if travel time is 40 minutes. This confirms the hypothesis that patients do choose on quality when the nearest alternative is close, but the effect is too small to compensate the reductions in secondary treatments due to the increase in success rates.   
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Table 6.7: Competitive region regression results 
 1 Narrow definition12 2 Broad definition13 3 Travel time in mins 
Success rate in t -13.206*** -10.767** -11.857*** 
Success rate in t-1 5.404 -8.344*  
Success rate in t-1 (zero travel time between 
competitors) 
  20.238*** 
Success rate in t-2 1.015 2.769 2.321 
Interaction with region 12.109** 12.851***  
Interaction with reform 3.156 -4.133  
Interaction with region and reform 16.952*** 13.769***  
Effect after reform   1.769 
Effect of each additional minute of travel time to 
the nearest competitor (before reform) 
  -.4168*** 
Effect of each additional minute of travel time to 
the nearest competitor (after reform) 
  -.4439*** 
Demographics -4.89e-06 .0000174 2.78e-06 
Time trend .0106 .00149 -.0085 
Constant -11.278 2.115 25.069 
N (i,t) 243 (13,19) 243 (13,19) 243 (13,19) 
R2 (within, between) (0.2493, 0.0308) (0.1470, 0.0031) (0.1775, 0.0107) 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***P<.01      
  
                                                                12 This includes clinics with a competitor within 15 mins: VU Amsterdam, AMC Amsterdam, LUMC Leiden and MCK Leiderdorp 13 This includes clinics with a competitor within 33 mins: UMC Utrecht, Erasmus MC Rotterdam, Reinier de Graaf Voorburg, Elisabeth Tilburg, Catharina Eindhoven, VU Amsterdam, AMC Amsterdam, LUMC Leiden and MCK Leiderdorp  
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7 Do private hospitals outperform public hospitals 
regarding efficiency, accessibility and quality of 
care in the European Union? A literature review 
Kruse, F. *, Stadhouders, N. *, Adang, E., Groenewoud, S., & Jeurissen, P. *Shared first authorship Published in The International journal of health planning and management. (2018);33(2):e434-e453.   
Abstract European countries have enhanced the scope of private provision within their health care systems. Privatizing services have been suggested as a means to improve access, quality and efficiency in healthcare. This raises questions about the relative performance of private hospitals compared to public hospitals. Most systematic reviews that scrutinizes the performance of the private hospitals originates from the United States (US). A systematic overview for Europe is non-existing. We fill this gap with a systematic realist review comparing the performance of public hospitals to private hospitals on efficiency, accessibility and quality of care in the European Union. This review synthesizes evidence from Italy, Germany, UK, France, Greece, Austria, Spain and Portugal. Most evidence suggests that public hospitals are at least as efficient as or are more efficient than private hospitals. Accessibility to broader populations is often a matter of concern in private provision: patients with higher social-economic backgrounds hold better access to private hospital provision, especially in private parallel systems such as the United Kingdom and Greece. The existing evidence on quality of care is often too diverse to make a conclusive statement. In conclusion, the growth in private hospital provision seems not related to improvements in performance in Europe. Our evidence further suggests that the private (for-profit) hospital sector seems to react more strongly to (financial) incentives than other provider types. In such cases, policymakers either should very carefully develop adequate incentive structures, or be hesitant to accommodate the growth of the private hospital sector.  
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Chapter 7 
Do private hospitals outperform public hospitals regarding 
efficiency, accessibility and quality of care in the European Union? 
A literature review 
 
7.1 Introduction It is an ongoing debate what the role of the private sector in the health care system should be. In theory, under competitive forces and the right preconditions, private hospitals might outperform public providers. However, empirical evidence, mostly originating from the United States (US), does not confirm such hypothesis (Hollingsworth, 2003; Schlesinger and Gray, 2006; Sibbel and Nagarajah, 2012). For example, Schlesinger & Gray (2006) find that although the evidence is mixed, it seems to favour non-profit hospitals (Schlesinger and Gray, 2006). Eggleston et al. (2008) analysing differences in quality of care also finds mixed evidence (Eggleston et al., 2008). Herrera et al. (2014) provide an overview of systematic reviews focusing on quality of for-profit (FP), not-for-profit (NFP) and public providers. Among other things, they concluded that FP providers have higher mortality rates (Herrera et al., 2014). US studies illustrate that NFP hospitals seem to mimic FP hospitals on more competitive markets, which might blur the distinctions between both ownership types (Horwitz and Nichols, 2009). Most European health markets are both less competitive and more inclusive than the US, which may provide private providers with different incentives. During the past decades, a high amount of public provision spurred discussions about possible inefficiencies and a movement towards privatization could be observed across Europe (Jeurissen et al., 2016; Maarse, 2006). Nowadays, practically all EU health systems ’contract’ both public and private providers. However, EU countries do differ regarding the scale and scope of private hospitals. In most Bismarck type systems, private hospitals may be on par with public hospitals: public and private providers provide comparable services and are reimbursed in a similar way. To illustrate, in Germany, the private sector, both the FP and NFP sector, run comparatively similar hospitals (i.e. size, type of treatments offered) as public hospitals (Busse and Blümel, 2014). Other countries contain more contextual differences between private and public provision. In France, public hospitals mainly provide acute medical care, whereas FP hospitals seem to specialize in profitable procedures and outpatient care (Chevreul et al., 2015). In Austria, public hospitals are the dominant players, but the non-profit sector also provides a part of the hospitals services (Hofmarcher and Quentin, 2013). 
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However, in most Beveridge systems, the private sector runs parallel to the public sector as an alternative provision (Maarse, 2006). The private sector then also is paid through a parallel private funding scheme (i.e. out of pocket payments or private insurance). Greece symbolizes a hospital sector with a clear parallel private sector. The private sector in Greece includes profit-making hospitals, diagnostic centres as well as independent practices. The services are mainly privately financed through either out-of-pocket payments or private health insurance (Economou, 2010). The UK also held parallel hospitals system, but over the years an increasing number of private hospitals and independent treatments centres (ISTCs) were being commissioned by the NHS (Lafond et al., 2014). Such systematic differences may influence the composition and performance of private hospitals. Furthermore, countries differ on the extent of privatization. In some countries, such as the Nordic countries, hospital ownership is predominantly public, while in other countries, such as the Netherlands, public ownership is nonexistent.  It is currently unknown whether private hospitals outperform public hospitals in the different European health systems. Reviews on this topic are to the best of our knowledge non-existent. The main aim of this review is to compare the private sector with the public sector on efficiency, quality- and accessibility of services within the EU. We are well aware, that the profit status of private hospitals is most likely an important theoretical confounder in explaining differences in performance ever since Kenneth Arrow (1963) pointed to the fact that private non-profit status might function as a way to limit market imperfections in situations of unobservable performance of information asymmetries (Arrow, 1963). However, especially in NHS systems, distinctions between public and private provision are often at least as important as institutional demarcations, as the distinction between FP and NFP hospitals. That is the reason that we focus on the distinction between public and private. However, if indicated in the included studies, we also differentiate our results between FP and NFP private hospitals.  Our review contributes in three ways: 1) to map available literature and to highlight knowledge voids; 2) to identify differences between private and public provision; and finally 3) to find institutional and healthcare system related drivers for differences in efficiency, accessibility and quality of care.  
7.2 Methods 
7.2.1 Definitions Public hospitals can be either state-owned or fully run by public entities; private ownership can be mission-driven (NFP) or return driven (FP) (Saltman, 2003). The term ‘private’ hospitals will be used as an encompassing term throughout this paper, making no 
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distinction between NPF and FP. To compare public and private hospitals, this review will investigate three umbrella outcomes: 1) efficiency, 2) accessibility, and 3) quality of care. Efficiency holds the notion as the extent to which objectives are achieved in relation to the resources consumed (Jacobs et al., 2006). This includes both productivity measures based upon frontier analysis or other regression based approached, efficiency ratios (e.g. employment ratios) and other efficiency outcomes such as length of stay (LOS) or responsiveness to demand. The most applied productivity methods are the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)(Hollingsworth, 2003; Tiemann et al., 2012). Efficiency measures are reflected in multiple indicators such as technical efficiency (maximum output from a given set of inputs or a minimum set of inputs with a given set of outputs), cost efficiency (technical efficiency accounting for the input price), scale efficiency (when the size of the unit is at its optimum) and/or allocative/profit efficiency (cost minimization or profit maximisation) (Coelli et al., 2005). Accessibility is categorized into financial affordability, physical access, informed access, as well as timely access (e.g. waiting times) (Dubois and Anderson, 2013). Quality of care is structured along the lines of the Donabedian model of structure, process and outcomes (Donabedian, 1988). Some studied indicators, such as LOS, can be classified under different domains within the Donabedian framework. Based upon consultations during two expert meetings, such indicators were classified towards the most suitable domain. Another difficulty arises with practice variation. To illustrate; does a high rate of surgical treatments indicate better or poor quality of care? To avoid the complex discussion on practice variation and the ambiguous relationship with quality of care, this review does not look into variation in practices.  
7.2.2 Realist Review  Our study follows a realist review approach. A realistic review is suited to review interventions that are embedded in complex systems, whereby outcomes are dependent and influenced by their contexts (Pawson et al., 2005). Rationales and drivers behind the implementation or growth of the private sector are diverse. Due to the peculiar nature of our ‘intervention’, minor deviations from the realist review protocol were necessary (i.e. no explicit distinction is made between intervention, context and mechanism). This review limits its territory to the EU (28 countries), because the EU countries are, to a certain extent, comparable but have various health care systems. The variety of health care systems can be used to explore how private hospitals perform within various settings. We strive towards a review that “delivers illumination rather than generalizable truths and contextual fine-
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tuning rather than standardization” (p.24) (Pawson et al., 2005). Hence, the empirical findings are embedded within descriptive context.   
7.2.3 Search strategy  The review was conducted from August until October 2015, and updated in June 2017. Data management was done by using Mendeley and Excel. Four databases were searched: Scopus, SocINDEX, Web of Science and EconLit. Grey literature were excluded. The searches in the relevant databases were updated in June 2017. Different search terms were tested before the actual selection of the articles, to reassure the quality and relevance of the included hits. Table 7.1 shows the search terms (see Appendix table 7.7 for further details). 
Table 7.1: Search terms 
intervention private hospital OR privatization OR public-private hospital, OR hospital ownership OR for profit hospital  
Outcome efficiency OR health care quality OR health care accessibility OR hospital admission OR patient admission OR health care delivery OR affordability OR health care utilization OR health care availability 
AND NOT: job satisfaction OR Medicare in keywords (for <2008, United states in Keywords) 
Inclusion 
criteria 
Journal articles in English after 2000 
 
7.2.4 Selection criteria  Figure 7.1 shows the flow chart of the review process. Only research after 2000, conducted in the EU and articles written in English were included. Papers were excluded by matching them with the five PICOS criteria (Table 7.2). In order to safeguard quality and limit selection bias, the full-text and appraisal stage was carried out by two reviewers. 
 
Total hits (original & updated): 
Scopus=1499, EconLit=129, 
SocINDEX=56, Web of 
Science=1604
PICOS criteria: Title and 
Abstract
PICOS criteria: Full-text and 
Quality appraisal
Excluded
Scopus=1412 
EconLit=110
SocINDEX=55
Web of 
Science=1526
Excluded
94
Duplicates
56
Backward and 
forward snowballing
Selected based upon Title and 
Abstract
Backward: 75 Forward: 427
Full-text and Quality 
Appraisal: 
Total: 39 articles
Total articles in review: 35 Total articles in review: 10  
Figure 7.1: Flow chart of selection process 
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Table 7.2 Inclusion criteria for the second phase 
Population Private hospitals; this could be a non-profit or for-profit hospital. Papers that include private hospitals as a control variable are also considered to be eligible.  
Intervention/ 
exposure 
Patients are exposed to the service delivery of private hospitals.  
Comparison A comparison should be made with public hospitals. 
Outcome One of the following three elements should be covered: efficiency, quality of care and accessibility. Articles that only include employment conditions are not taken into consideration. 
Study design  Empirical research, no descriptive papers or economic modelling are included.   Articles were assessed using a standard format to appraise the quality of the studies (appendix table 7.8). The main criteria for exclusion: 1) research designs were considered to be (extremely) weak; 2) poor reporting on the dataset and methodology, or no possibility of a critical appraisal. The two reviewers only included evidence whereby the quality assessment demonstrated that the findings contributed to our research objective (see Appendix for excluded references). In total thirty-five articles could be included.  A snowballing procedure was carried out in December 2015 and January 2016. Forward snowballing identifies articles that refer to the selected articles in the review. Backward snowballing means that the reference list of the articles were included into the review process. Additionally, the literature selected in other systematic reviews covering the EU was included (Hanratty et al., 2007; Hollingsworth, 2003; Sibbel and Nagarajah, 2012; Tiemann et al., 2012; Torchia et al., 2015). Such a snowballing methodology has been assessed as a successful addition to the systematic review by advocates of realist reviews (Pawson et al., 2005). Articles conceived to be useful upon the PICOS criteria went through the same inclusion process. In total, another ten articles could be included, bringing the total number of studies to forty-five.   
7.3 Results  The selected articles are summarized in Appendix table 7.9. Thirteen articles originated from Italy, eight from Germany, seven from the United Kingdom (UK), six from France, five from Greece, three from Austria, two from Spain and one from Portugal. While in Germany, Italy, France and Austria most private hospitals act as a substitute for public hospitals, in the UK, Portugal, Spain and Greece, most private hospitals do complement the public system.   
7.3.1  Efficiency We found twelve articles using productivity functions assessing primarily technical efficiency, three studies also analyzed profit and/or cost efficiency and ten articles reflecting other efficiency measures (e.g. LOS). The evidence on technical efficiency shows no 
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unambiguously conclusion can be made that FP and NFP hospitals are more (cost and/or technical) efficient than public hospitals, although public hospitals seem to be just as efficient as or more efficient than private hospitals. The findings on the other efficiency measures indicate that private hospitals seem to be more responsive to (financial) incentives.   
Productivity functions  The studies that estimated technical and/or cost efficiency use a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (Czypionka et al., 2014; Sommersguter-Reichmann and Stepan, 2015; Tiemann and Schreyögg, 2009, 2012) or a SFA model (Barros et al., 2013; Berta et al., 2010; Daidone and D’Amico, 2009; Herr, 2008; Herr et al., 2011). Other studies contrasts multiple approaches, SFA versus DEA (Barbetta et al., 2007; Herwartz and Strumann, 2012; Lindlbauer and Schreyögg, 2014). The (adjusted) discharged patients (Barbetta et al., 2007; Berta et al., 2010) and the number of inpatient (weighted) cases were most often used as output parameters (Herr, 2008; Herr et al., 2011; Lindlbauer and Schreyögg, 2014; Tiemann and Schreyögg, 2009, 2012). Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) (Czypionka et al., 2014; Sommersguter-Reichmann and Stepan, 2015), outpatient visits (Czypionka et al., 2014), and differentiation of specific procedures (e.g. number of complex surgery, ER treatments) (Barbetta et al., 2007; Daidone and D’Amico, 2009) were used less frequently. With regard to input factors, most studies used the number of beds as a proxy for capital investments; one study used the amount spent on supplies as measurement of the capital used (Tiemann and Schreyögg, 2012). To identify labour inputs, all studies incorporate the number of full-time equivalents (FTE) of physicians, nurses and other staff members (e.g. administrative, non clinicians, teaching staff); one study could not include FTE, but only the number of staff members due to data limitations (Daidone and D’Amico, 2009).  Only the results on technical efficiency are grouped in Table 7.3, since this was the dominant outcome and enhances comparability. The findings show mixed results, but do indicate more favourable results for public hospitals. Four German studies found that public hospitals were more efficient than FP hospitals (Herwartz and Strumann, 2012; Lindlbauer and Schreyögg, 2014; Tiemann and Schreyögg, 2009). One possible explanation is that local governments sell the inefficient hospitals to the private sector (Herwartz and Strumann, 2012). Also German FP hospitals with over a thousand beds were found to operate more efficiently (Tiemann and Schreyögg, 2009). In Italy, one study found that FP hospitals (Lazio Regio) were less technical efficient than public hospitals (Daidone and D’Amico, 2009). Whereas, when comparing NFP hospitals and public hospitals, the different methodologies and years covered caused divergent results (Daidone and D’Amico, 2009). Three studies 
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also concluded that NFP hospitals were less efficient in Germany (Herr, 2008; Lindlbauer and Schreyögg, 2014; Tiemann and Schreyögg, 2009). Berta et al. (2010) reveal that Italian FP hospitals are less efficient than their public/non-profit counterparts, but over time have converged towards the same efficiency level as other types (Berta et al., 2010). Similar converging results were found in Germany (Herr et al., 2011). NFP hospitals in Germany and Italy also show convergent efficiency scores according to a total of four studies (Barbetta et al., 2007; Berta et al., 2010; Sommersguter-Reichmann and Stepan, 2015; Tiemann and Schreyögg, 2012). Two studies, from Austria and Germany, reasoned that private providers are more efficient than public hospitals (Czypionka et al., 2014; Tiemann and Schreyögg, 2012). The German study analyzed the process of privatization, whereby hospitals that converted to FP status also increased their efficiency. This indicates that a longitudinal design might show different results than cross-sectional designs. Hospitals that converted to NFP status initially also show increases in efficiency, however, these diminish over time (Tiemann and Schreyögg, 2012). In the case of Portugal, one study concludes that private hospitals were more cost efficient than their public counterparts (Barros et al., 2013). Using a different methodology – non-oriented super efficiency and different sample selection- no difference in efficiency was found (Sommersguter-Reichmann and Stepan, 2015).  
Table 7.3 Overview technical efficiency of private hospitals compared to public hospitals     Less efficient  No difference  More efficient  
FP 5 studies from Germany & Italy find private for-profit hospitals less efficient than public hospitals (Daidone and D’Amico, 2009; Herr, 2008; Herwartz and Strumann, 2012; Lindlbauer and Schreyögg, 2014; Tiemann and Schreyögg, 2009)  
2 studies from Germany & Ital y find no difference between private for-profit and public hospitals (Berta et al., 2010; Herr et al., 2011)  
1 study from Germany finds private (for-profit) hospitals to be more efficient than public hospitals (Tiemann and Schreyögg, 2012) 
NFP 3 studies from Germany find private non-profit hospitals to be less efficient than public (Herr, 2008; Lindlbauer and Schreyögg, 2014; Tiemann and Schreyögg, 2009) 
4 studies from Germany & Italy find no difference between private (non-profit) and public hospitals (Tiemann and Schreyögg, 2012) (Sommersguter-Reichmann and Stepan, 2015) (Barbetta et al., 2007; Berta et al., 2010) 
1 study from Austria finds private (non-profit) hospitals to be more efficient than public hospitals (Czypionka et al., 2014)   The overarching message in most studies might actually be the fact that reimbursement schemes are of importance. In Italy, FP hospitals were found to be less efficient because they use resources less efficiently. This might be due to the fact that private for-profit hospitals are confronted with specific regulations that set a limit to the number of funded admissions; since such limits fluctuate over time and are quite volatile. FP hospitals might face problems to adjust fixed input resources accordingly (Daidone and D’Amico, 2009). Another 
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indication of the importance of funding schemes might be the fact that after a DRG-based payment system had been introduced in Italy, NFP hospitals converged to the same levels of technical efficiency as public hospitals (Barbetta et al., 2007). In Germany, Herr (2011) also found no statistically significant differences in technical efficiency between FP and public hospitals after a DRG-based payment system had been introduced in 2004 (Herr et al., 2011). Earlier, Herr (2008) showed that private hospitals were on average less cost and technical efficient, maybe because of the fact that in that timeframe there existed an incentive to increase LOS to raise revenues (Herr, 2008). Nonetheless, FP hospitals were found to be more profit efficient than public hospitals, meaning that hospitals have certain output prices and input prices, and FP hospitals choose the best combination of both input and output factors (Herr et al., 2011). However, another study discovered that under the DRG payment system efficiency gains among FP privatized hospitals were significantly lower compared to before the DRG payment system (Tiemann and Schreyögg, 2012). The Austrian DRG system only covers up to 50% of hospital costs and additional funds come from states and operational deficit coverage, determined ex post by the local authorities. Such funds disproportionally accrue to public providers placing the private sector at bay, but possibly also increasing their incentives to operate more cost conscious (Czypionka et al., 2014).  
 
Other efficiency outcomes  A subset of studies does use other outcomes to assess the efficiency of hospital providers. Multiple studies analyse the relationship between ownership and LOS (Table 7.4). A short case-mixed LOS is seen as an indicator of superior efficiency. French private hospitals have longer LOS for knee procedures, but shorter LOS for hip procedures (Maravic and Landais, 2006). For most diagnostic groups, there exists no difference in LOS between UK public hospitals and private ISTCs, although for some treatments, particularly hip and knee procedures, a longer LOS was found for NHS hospitals (Street et al., 2010). Another study using the same dataset as the former study supports the latter findings, whereby LOS in ISTCs is shorter than in public hospitals for hip replacements (Siciliani et al., 2013). Evidence from Italy reports shorter LOS in private hospitals for aortic valve substitution (Fattore et al., 2014). However, LOS was found to be longer in Italian private psychiatric hospitals (Gigantesco et al., 2009). The authors explain this by private psychiatric hospitals being funded on a per diem basis, creating incentives to increase LOS. Indeed, in Greece, LOS was also higher in private mental health clinics (Kondilis et al., 2011). This alludes to the assumption that FP providers seem to apply more revenue maximizing strategies. Overall, per diem funding structures – as in mental health - seem to increase LOS among private 
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providers, while prospective structures as in acute care seem to create an opposing effect. Both underline the idea the private providers respond more intensely to incentives than public hospitals. This is tested in a more head to head approach by Schwierz (2011). The author identifies that the introduction of a new payment system in 2014 pushed for economic discipline and penalized high-cost hospitals, creating incentives for German private hospitals to take over public hospitals (Schwierz, 2011). In general, FP hospitals were also found to respond faster to increasing demand than other ownership types. Public hospitals were more likely to default; therefore privatization became an appealing option (Schwierz, 2011). Another study, also conducted in Germany, analyzes changes in hospital staff after privatization. This study discovers that FP privatization reduced staff per inpatient case (especially nurses, other non-physician clinical staff and other non-clinical staff). Such findings were not found when NFP hospitals were the acquiring party (Heimeshoff et al., 2014). Similar finding were found in Greece, FP hospitals seem to have lower nursing staff rates for nurses compared to the public hospitals (Kondilis et al., 2011).  Finally two studies addressed upcoding. In Italy, Vittadini et al. (2012) looked at registering patients with non-existing complications to increase reimbursement. There was evidence that both NFP and FP hospitals were to some extent engaged in ‘upcoding’ before a specific law against ‘upcoding’ in 2007 was institutionalized. No such evidence was found for public hospitals (Vittadini et al., 2012). Berta et al. (2010) also found that during 2003-2005, FP hospitals had more intense ‘upcoding’ practices than other hospital types (Berta et al., 2010). However, no ownership differences were found after 2005, probably due to more severe checks implemented after 2003 (Berta et al., 2010).   
Table 7.4: Other efficiency measures 
Outcome/ 
indicator  
Number of studies Type (private)  Countries  Impact  
Length of stay 
 
3 Aortic valve substitution, hip and knee procedures in private hospitals or ISTCs Italy, United Kingdom, France Private hospitals have shorter LOS 3 Private (i.e. psychiatric hospitals, mental health clinics) hospitals and specifically for knee procedures  Italy, Greece, France Private hospitals have longer LOS 1 ISTCs (for most diagnostic groups) United Kingdom No difference 
Responsiveness 
to demand 
1 FP  Germany Private hospitals are more responsive  
Employment 1 NFP Germany No difference 2 FP Germany, Greece Private hospitals have lower staff rate  
Upcoding 1 NFP + FP Italy Private hospitals have more ‘upcoding’ 1 NFP + FP Italy No difference  
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7.3.2 Accessibility Included articles examine eleven different indicators of accessibility (Table 7.5). The majority of the included studies do raise concerns about accessibility to private hospitals; most of them flag this issue by analysing the complexity of the cases and various patients’ characteristics. In many countries, private providers do target higher socioeconomic classes, often through parallel private insurance. High income patients hold better access to private hospitals, and that waiting times in the private sector are lower.   
Table 7.5: Accessibility indicators overview 
Concept Number of studies Outcome/indicator  Type (private)
  Countries  Impact  
Affordable 
  
8 SES of patients (e.g. employment status, residents from deprived versus affluent region)  Private (i.a. maternity, psychiatric) , ISTCs 
Italy, United Kingdom, Greece, Spain 
Public hospitals perform better 
 
2 Method of payment (i.e. private health insurance and pay out-of-pocket)  Private Greece 1 Payment per discharge  FP Greece 
Physical 
 
3 Case-mix differences (e.g. cream skimming) FP, ISTCs Italy, UK 1 Access to specialty care (i.e. adjusted rates of revascularization) Private France 1 Admission pattern  Private psychiatric Italy 1 Access to pre-emptive registration FP France 1 Regional physical mobility (number of non-resident patients in the region admitted) Private Italy 
Physical 1 Mean expenditure and usage of drugs FP France No difference 
Affordable 1 Access to specialty care (i.e. ambulatory care services) Private France Private hospitals perform better 
1 Method of payment (i.e. informal payment) Private Greece 
Physical 1 Chance op follow-up treatment Private psychiatric Italy 
Timely 1 Waiting times ISTCs UK  
Affordable access  In the UK, patients of private ISTCs are less likely to coming from deprived residential areas(Mason et al., 2010; Street et al., 2010). One other study concludes that patients in private hospitals diagnosed with prostate cancer come from the more affluent regions (Barbiere et al., 2012). In Greece, monthly family income is positively related to private hospital admissions (Pappa and Niakas, 2006; Siskou et al., 2008; Tountas et al., 2011). In 
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addition, both patients with private health insurance and rural residents are more likely to use private care services (Tountas et al., 2011). Under comparable circumstances FP hospitals generally charge more for admitted patients falling under the Greek Social Health Insurance (SHI) fund (Kondilis et al., 2011). In Greece, more private patients had to pay out-of pocket payments than in public hospitals. On the other hand, and maybe remarkably, “under-the-table” payments were lower in private hospitals (Souliotis et al., 2016).  In Spain, private maternity units/hospitals proportionally treat more patients from higher socio-economic backgrounds (Río et al., 2010; Salvador et al., 2009). In private hospitals the prevalence of caesarean sections was also higher among immigrants in comparison to natives, no such distinctions were found within public hospitals (Salvador et al., 2009). In Italy, patient characteristics differ between private and public (psychiatric) hospitals. Older patients are less likely to be unemployed and make more use of private services (Preti et al., 2009).  
Physical access Private hospitals are often accused of cream skimming and selecting more profitable patients. We found some illustrations to that suspicion. One Italian study argues that FP hospitals were more involved in cream skimming than both public or NFP hospitals (Berta et al., 2010). In the UK, ISTCs treat less complex NHS patients (Mason et al., 2010; Street et al., 2010). In France, a higher percentage of patients with ambulatory care sensitive conditions visit public hospitals in comparison to private hospitals, while the opposite appears for revascularization. The explanation is that in France public and NFP hospitals account for most acute inpatient stays, and FP hospitals provide half the total revascularizations procedures (Gusmano et al., 2013). Regarding a specific case from Italy, Preti (2010) detected that private psychiatric facilities were less likely to admit patients who attempted suicide prior to admission; this might serve as an indicator that high risk mental health patients are less able to access private services (Preti et al., 2010). Patients in private acute psychiatric inpatient clinics were also more likely to receive a follow-up treatment (i.e. rehabilitation and psychotherapy) (Preti et al., 2009). Bonastre et al. (2014) identified that in France no significant differences exist between public and private hospitals in relation to the use of expensive drugs (anticancer drugs), after controlling for case-mix (Bonastre et al., 2014). One French study investigated if hospital types differed in terms of access to renal (kidney) transplantation. The authors observe that FP hospitals were less likely to have patients on the pre-emptive registration list than (public) academic hospitals, corrected for case-mix differences (Riffaut et al., 2015). Pre-emptive transplantation is associated with longer patient survival. Hence, patients in FP hospitals 
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might be disadvantaged in access to such treatments. Regarding regional mobility, a study from Italy found that non-resident patients are more likely to be admitted to private hospitals compared to public hospitals when they could not gain access to care in their own region (Fattore et al., 2014). The authors point out that this is of concern, since patients with financial resources can afford to be more mobile (Fattore et al., 2014).   
Timely access  In the UK, shorter inpatient waiting times are associated with higher rates of private hospital beds (Biro and Hellowell, 2016).  
7.3.3 Quality of care  Quality of care encompasses many different aspects of health care. This is also reflected in the variety of outcome variables found in this review (Table 7.6). The quality of care studies are structured according to the Donabedian model of structure, process and outcomes (Donabedian, 1988) and show mixed results.   
Table 7.6: Quality of care indicators overview 
Concept Number of studies Outcome/indicator Type (private) Country  Impact  
Structure 1 Continuity of care  Private psychiatric clinics Italy Public hospitals perform better 
1 Qualification staff  FP  Greece 
Process 2 Adherence guideline and screening Private  Austria, Italy  1 Appropriate admission Private  Italy 
Outcome 2 Mortality rate (avoidable mortality) FP, private  France, Italy Public hospitals perform better 1 Rehospitalisation rates Private  France 1 Patient’s experiences  ISTCs United Kingdom  No difference 3 Mortality (risk of dying) Private hospitals, NFP & FP  Germany, Italy Private hospitals perform better 
1 Readmission (likely to be readmitted in 30 days)  Private hospitals Italy 1 Patients experience (regarding amenities) ISTCs United Kingdom  
Structure  Kondilis et al. (2011) find that FP hospitals in Greece seem to have less-qualified compared to the public hospitals (Kondilis et al., 2011). One of the possible explanations given by the authors is that FP hospitals might maximize profits and therefore minimize expenses on nursing staff. Another possible explanation is that FP hospitals use nursing staff more 
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efficiently than public facilities. In Italy, private psychiatric clinics collaborated less intensely with the community system as public psychiatric departments do (Preti et al., 2009).  
 
Process  From discharge data extracted from Emilia-Romagna hospitals, the appropriateness of admission was evaluated. Although the number of inappropriate admissions decreased between 2001 and 2005, private hospitals exhibit in all years more inappropriate admissions than public hospitals (Louis et al., 2008). Private hospitals are also showing less adherence to antenatal screening among pregnant women in six Italian regions (Stroffolini et al., 2003). A study on Austrian hospitals shows that adherence to the guidelines for colorectal cancer screening was worse among private hospitals. After the implementation of a guideline for colorectal screening only 3.8% of private hospitals changed their routine practice versus 14.2% of public hospitals (Britto-Arias et al., 2015).  
 
Outcomes  In Germany, Tiemann & Schreyögg (2009) analysed hospital mortality rates. They found that, controlling for case-mix differences, FP and NFP hospitals showed better mortality figures than the public sector. One of the potential explanations for this finding might be that publicly enforced transparency on quality indicators, seems to have stimulated FP hospitals to put comparatively more emphasis on such issues (Tiemann and Schreyögg, 2009).  France was the country were the two included studies on quality outcomes indicated a consistently worse performance for the private sector. Mortality rates for patients aged over 35 and admitted for heart attacks were found to differ among hospital types. Public (non-teaching) hospitals have a lower mortality rates compared to FP hospitals (Gobillon and Milcent, 2016). Rehospitalisation rates, a possible indicator for worse quality, differ as well between French hospitals. Private hospitals have higher rates of 30-day all-cause rehospitalisations of older patients compared to public providers (Gusmano et al., 2014). In Italy, regional degrees of privatization (1993-2003) are used as a quasi natural experimental design to investigate the association between public and private hospital spending on (the reduction of) avoidable mortality. Spending increases on public delivery of health care services was associated with increased reduction in avoidable mortality. However, no such positive effects were found with respect to spending increases on private health care services. This implies that increases of spending on private health care services might hamper the possible reduction in avoidable mortality by investments in the public 
Chapter 7 
 
146 
 
sector (Quercioli et al., 2013). Contrary results indicate that patients in private hospitals are less likely to be readmitted and less likely to die within thirty days after discharge, although the impact of the latter was found to be much lower (Moscone et al., 2012). This corresponds to the results of a multi-level analysis, also from Italy, which assessed that the risk of dying was significantly less in private hospitals (Berta et al., 2013).  Both Pérotin (2013) and Owusu-Frimpong (2010) examine UK patient experiences (Pérotin et al., 2013). The latter study finds that users of ISTCs have higher satisfaction rates, than the users of public facilities for amenities, for instance obtaining attention from doctors (Owusu-Frimpong et al., 2010). However, Pérotin did not find a significant difference on the reported overall patient experiences between public and private clinics. Differences that were found seemed to relate to other variables such as patient characteristics (Pérotin et al., 2013). 
 
7.4 Discussion This review points to various messages. Findings on efficiency show mixed results, but do suggest that the public sector is at least as or more efficient as the private sector. Many papers mention that the institutional context might be an important constraint for the efficiency for the private sector. For example, Austrian NFP hospitals seem to be ‘induced’ to operate with high levels of operational efficiency. There exists quite some evidence that the private sector seems more sensitive to incentives than the public sector. This was shown for a range of indicators such as responding to changes in demand, upcoding, or adjusting LOS. Differences in LOS seem to depend on type of treatment, whereby consistent evidence shows the private sector has shorter LOS for hip procedures compared to the public sector and type of payment: per diem funding increases LOS in private settings more than in public surroundings, especially for mental health.  As expected, in South European countries and also in the UK where a parallel and partly duplicate system exists between private and public provision, the private sector is used by the more affluent population, who may experience for example lower waiting times and better amenities. This suggests that universal access and a broader inclusion of private providers in the mainstream health system might be an important option to reduce such disparities in access. The same goes for cream-skimming which, although higher in private hospitals, might be prevented by sophisticated case-mix corrections in the payment structures.  Private hospitals may perform better on observable quality outcomes such as for example exist in Germany and Italy for mortality and readmissions. In France, private hospitals specialize in certain (elective) procedures. One might expect better outcomes for 
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private hospitals as a result of such specializations, but in France the findings predominantly seem to favour public hospitals. This casts doubt on the advantages of private hospital specialization.   
7.4.1 Limitations This realist review analyses a complex and context dependent issue and thus is subject to various limitations. Included studies used a wide range of indicators; research designs vary substantially. This makes it somewhat problematic to extrapolate or generalize these findings. Many findings relate to specific diseases and/or indicators implying they do not necessarily hold for a broader spectrum of diseases. Studies covering efficiency showed more consistency among their use of parameters and methodology. We also were able to only include studies from a limited number of EU countries. The majority of the evidence compromises a few countries: Italy, Germany, France, the UK, and Greece. However, these five countries do cover for a substantial part of the total EU population and – more importantly – cover for most healthcare system types (tax-funded or social insurance, multiple payer and single payer, decentralized and more centralized). Including articles not written in English could broaden the scope of this research. Furthermore, transferability of our results from one country to another is a difficult and complex task (Goeree et al., 2007). The performance of different types of hospital ownership may be highly dependent on their embeddedness in health system ecosystems. Schlesinger and Gray (2006) mention a valid criticism when stating that “much apparent inconsistencies in the effect of ownership emerge when scholars carelessly combine findings based on different health services or performance measures”(p. 289)(Schlesinger and Gray, 2006). Indeed, private hospitals may compete, specialize or complement public providers, which could partly explain conflicting outcomes. A more thorough understanding of the position of the private sector in the wider health system could aid policy makers in designing sound and evidence-based policies in this area.   
7.4.2 Conclusion We reviewed forty-five studies on the performance of the private hospital sector in EU countries. To our knowledge, this to date is by far the largest review on this issue in EU countries. We sought to fill this gap in the literature. We provide policymakers with several take-away messages. Firstly, the private hospital sector consists of many complex layers. Both a polarizing political debate and traditional economist reasoning towards the superiority of a free or (loosely) regulated market also in healthcare do not suit the complexity of the issue. Secondly, our evidence shows that one should take a careful note to 
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the incentives built into the health care systems, because they seem to be an important driver for either the divergence or convergence of the private and public sector. FP providers seem to respond more intensely to incentives, which may produce undesirable policy effects if the incentive structure is not well designed. Fine-tuning such structure, e.g. hospital payment systems, becomes even more important if the role of the private sector increases. It is not clear if all countries hold the steering powers to fulfil for such preconditions. Thirdly, despite popular opinion that enhancing the role of the private sector increases efficiency, we find little evidence to support this claim. Most evidence shows that public hospitals are as efficient as or more efficient than private counterparts. For Beveridge countries, we found that access to private hospitals is substantially worse for patients with either low incomes or a more complex case-mix. Finally, this review highlights that policy ‘shopping’ among research results, although possible for this subject, is dangerous. The evidence on private sector performance should be critically assessed; research designs (i.e. indicator specification, methodology and sample selection) do cause divergent results between studies. Our assessment is that, the supposed superior performance of the private sector – and especially the private non-profit hospital sector – for Beveridge countries depends on full inclusion in the health system to guarantee broader access to the private sector; for all countries it then is important to design incentive structures that minimize the opportunities for opportunistic behaviour and for quality of care includes transparency. Overall, this review could contribute to the discussion on the role of the private sector in providing hospital services in the European Union and how different systems, institutions, and incentive structures might affect the public and private hospital sector. 
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Appendix to Chapter 7 
Table 7.7: Search string Scopus Before 2008 
Search in Title, Abstract and Key Block 1: ( private -within 2 words- hospital ) AND efficiency OR "health care quality" OR "quality of health care" OR ( health care -within 3 words- access* ) OR "hospital admission" OR "patient admission" OR afford* OR "health care -within 3 words- delivery" OR "health care utilization" OR "health care availability" AND NOT "job satisfaction"  OR Block 2: hospital AND privatization AND efficiency OR "health care quality" OR "quality of health care" OR ( health care -within 3 words- access* ) OR "hospital admission" OR "patient admission" OR afford* OR "health care -within 3 words- delivery" OR "health care utilization" OR "health care availability" AND NOT "job satisfaction"  OR Block 3: "public private*" -within 3 words- hospital ) AND efficiency OR "health care quality" OR "quality of health care" OR ( health care -within 3 words- access* ) OR "hospital admission" OR "patient admission" OR afford* OR "health care -within 3 words- delivery" OR "health care utilization" OR "health care availability" AND NOT "job satisfaction"  OR Block 4 "hospital ownership" AND efficiency OR "health care quality" OR "quality of health care" OR ( health care -within 3 words access* ) OR "hospital admission" OR "patient admission" OR afford* OR "health care -within 3 words- delivery" OR "health care utilization" OR "health care availability" AND NOT "job satisfaction"  Block 5 "for profit hospital" AND efficiency OR "health care quality" OR "quality of health care" OR ( health care -within 3 words- access* ) OR "hospital admission" OR "patient admission" OR afford* OR "health care -within 3 words- delivery" OR "health care utilization" OR "health care availability" AND NOT "job satisfaction"   And no Keywords "Medicare" OR "US" OR "United States"  Limit to Journal, Article, English After 2008 
Search in Title, Abstract and Key Block 1: ( private -within 2 words- hospital ) AND efficiency OR "health care quality" OR "quality of health care" OR ( health care -within 3 words- access* ) OR "hospital admission" OR "patient admission" OR afford* OR "health care -within 3 words- delivery" OR "health care utilization" OR "health care availability" AND NOT "job satisfaction"  OR Block 2: hospital AND privatization AND efficiency OR "health care quality" OR "quality of health care" OR ( health care -within 3 words- access* ) OR "hospital admission" OR "patient admission" OR afford* OR "health care -within 3 words- delivery" OR "health care utilization" OR "health care availability" AND NOT "job satisfaction"  OR Block 3: "public private*" -within 3 words- hospital ) AND efficiency OR "health care quality" OR "quality of health care" OR ( health care -within 3 words- access* ) OR "hospital admission" OR "patient admission" OR afford* OR "health care -within 3 words- delivery" OR "health care utilization" OR "health care availability" AND NOT "job satisfaction"  OR Block 4 "hospital ownership" AND efficiency OR "health care quality" OR "quality of health care" OR ( health care -within 3 words access* ) OR "hospital admission" OR "patient admission" OR afford* OR "health care -within 3 words- delivery" OR "health care utilization" OR "health care availability" AND NOT "job satisfaction"  Block 5 "for profit hospital" AND efficiency OR "health care quality" OR "quality of health care" OR ( health care -within 3 
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words- access* ) OR "hospital admission" OR "patient admission" OR afford* OR "health care -within 3 words- delivery" OR "health care utilization" OR "health care availability" AND NOT "job satisfaction"   And no Keywords "Medicare"  Limit to Journal, Article, English Search string: EconLit & SocINDEX Search Terms (AB "private w/2 hospital" OR AB ( privatization AND hospital ) OR AB "hospital ownership" OR AB "for profit hospitals" OR AB "public private w/3 hospital" OR AB "PPP w/3 hospital") OR  (SU ( "private w/2 hospital" OR ( privatization AND hospital ) OR "hospital ownership" OR "for profit hospitals" OR "public private w/3 hospital" OR AB"PPP w/3 hospital" ) 
Search Options  Published Date: 20000101-20151231 Source types  
Academic Journals and English 
Search string: Web of Science  TS="private hospital" OR  TS=(privatization AND hospital) OR  TS="hospital ownership" OR  TS="for profit hospital" OR  TS="non profit hospital" OR  TS=("public private" AND hospital) OR  TS=(PPP AND hospital))  AND LANGUAGE: (English) AND DOCUMENT TYPES: (Article) 
Indexes=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, A&HCI, ESCI Timespan=2000-2017 
 
Table 7.8: Quality Appraisal form  Component Ratings of Study: Score Justification/ Comments Strong=3 / Modest=2/ Weak=1     A) DESIGN     Outcome of interest as main (3) or control variable (2/1)?     Cross-sectional (2/1) or longitudinal (3)     Prospective (3) or retrospective (2/1)     Is the method of analysis appropriate? (Strong, modest, weak)     Is the method of analysis sufficiently rigorous? (Strong, modest, weak)     B) Quality of reporting      Enough data have been presented to show how the authors arrived at their findings (Strong, Modest, Weak)     Enough information is given what the methodological design is? (Strong, Modest, Weak)     Enough information is given where the data comes from and what the characteristics are of the sample (i.e. summary statistics and sample sizes). (Strong, Modest, Weak)      C) Selection bias     Strong: The selected individuals/hospitals are very likely to be representative of the target population      Moderate: The selected individuals/hospitals are at least somewhat likely to be representative of the target population     Weak: The selected individuals/hospitals are not likely to be representative of the target population      D) Confounders (i.e. region, demographics)     Strong: will be assigned to those articles that controlled for most relevant confounders      Moderate: will be given to those studies that controlled for relevant confounders, but explicitly mentions that it missed some relevant confounders     
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Weak: will be assigned when the relevant confounders were not controlled for (for instance, ANOVA)     E) Data collection methods     Strong: The data collection tools have been shown to be valid; and the data collection tools have been shown to be reliable      Moderate: The data collection tools have been shown to be valid ; and the data collection tools have not been shown to be reliable or reliability is not described .     Weak: The data collection tools have not been shown to be valid or both reliability and validity are not described.     F) Outcome variable      
The choice of measurement of the outcome variable (accessibility, quality 
of care efficiency) is valid?  
    Strong: Clear connection with one of the three concepts, and/or is generally accepted by scholars (e.g. DEA)     Moderate: a couple of validity issues arise. The connection between the outcome variable and the concepts of interest is moderate (e.g. only one disease is analyzed)      Weak: serious concerns about how the outcome variable (one of the 3 concepts) is measured     G) Number of hospitals      Strong: more than 10 hospitals are included in the analysis     Moderate: between 3 and 10 hospitals are included in the analysis     Weak: only 2 hospitals are compared      H) Context      Strong: Includes many different contexts/regions, high complexity in demographic characteristics      Moderate: Combines 2 or 3 different regions      Weak: One very specific region with specific characteristics     J) Independence      Is this an independent study? Yes (3) Debatable (2) No (1)     K) Drop-outs- Only if applicable     Strong: (If applicable: will be assigned when the follow-up rate is 80% or greater).      Moderate (If applicable: will be assigned when the follow-up rate is 60 – 79%).     Weak: (If applicable: will be assigned when a follow-up rate is less than 60% or if the withdrawals and drop-outs were not described).      Total score  Additional comments   Answers to comments Do the results seem to be valid?    Do the results seem to be reliable?    Are the results relevant? Does it fall within the scope of our research question?     Can the results be generalized?      In or out If needed: justification Final judgment made based on the score and the additional comments     
 Excluded after quality appraisal 
 Browne, J., L. Jamieson, J. Lewsey, J. van der Meulen, L. Copley and N. Black (2008). "Case-mix & patients' reports of outcome in Independent Sector Treatment Centres: Comparison with NHS providers." BMC health services research 8: 78. 
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Chapter 8 
General discussion  This chapter starts with a summary of the main findings of this dissertation (8.1) and a discussion of its strengths and weaknesses (8.2). Next follows an in-depth discussion on three main topics. The international findings on effective cost containment policies are discussed for the Netherlands, including a few suggestions to improve its effectiveness (8.3), followed by a discussion on the implications of the marginal value of hospital care (8.4) and the performance of managed competition in the Netherlands (8.5). Policy recommendations and suggestions for future research are presented in section 8.6. The chapter ends with some concluding remarks (8.7).   
8.1 Overview of the main findings This thesis focuses on effective and efficient cost containment policies from the perspective of the Netherlands. Chapter 1 discussed the necessity of an effective cost containment policy to reduce the burden on public finance and improve efficiency in the health sector. In 2006, the Netherlands implemented a particular approach for cost containment in the hospital sector, based on the principles of managed competition. In this system, competing insurers bear responsibility for both quality improvement and cost containment. The Dutch government generally underwrites the functioning of the managed competition system while keeping direct intervention to a minimum. Additional cost containment policy instruments include expenditure caps, statutory benefit package restrictions and an increase of the level of deductibles. Evidence on the functioning of the managed competition system, mostly qualitative, is mixed. Evaluations suggest that the expenditure cap did not improve efficiency, benefit package restrictions have been ineffective in cost containment, and cost sharing has had little effect on total costs (Plexus, 2014; Rekenkamer, 2013; van de Ven et al., 2009). This thesis addresses these issues by providing an overview of cost containment options, quantitatively assessing aspects of managed competition and providing a threshold for setting the expenditure cap and restricting the benefit package.   To obtain an overview of cost containment policy options, chapter 2 collected the peer-reviewed articles on cost containment policies in OECD countries (including the Netherlands) that have been published since 1970. From 710 articles, 2,250 policies to reduce costs were extracted. Based on similarity, these policies were categorised in four main categories: budgeting, price controls, volume controls and market-oriented policies. This overview only included policy options, not whether these were actually effective in 
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containing costs. In the peer-reviewed literature, the number of policies peaked in the early nineties and from 2009 onwards. Policy options in the literature more frequently related to market provision systems such as Germany and France than to public provision systems such as the UK. Market-oriented solutions were popular in the US literature, and increasingly so after 2009. In contrast, market-based controls were more popular in public provision systems, while market provision systems (other than the US) evoked relatively more suggestions for budgeting and price controls. This suggests convergence between market provision systems and public provision systems, while the US continues to focus on market-oriented policies.   In chapter 3 we performed a systematic review of the effectiveness of cost containment policies, building upon the literature collected in chapter 2. From the literature on OECD countries since 1970 we collected 43 empirical evaluations and 18 reviews. To accommodate highly variant methodologies we developed a tailor-made quality assessment. While 42 out of 61 studies demonstrated effectiveness, it also appeared that studies meeting high-standard methodological requirements were less likely to find a positive result for cost containment. High-quality studies showed that cost sharing and managed care competition were effective in containing costs, as well as generic substitution and reference pricing for pharmaceutical spending. We also found cost reductions for tort reform in the US. However, we did not find any evidence for over half of the policy groups identified in chapter 2.   Policy makers need information on the effects on health outcomes when deciding to reduce the budget or include a new technology into the benefit package. This is expressed in the marginal value of care: the effect on health, expressed in Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs), of a marginal reduction in the hospital budget. To guide Dutch policy makers in new technology assessment, we estimated the marginal value of hospital spending in chapter 4. A novel methodology was designed to incorporate the extensive data on spending and health outcomes available for the Netherlands. Using data from 2012-2014, we estimated the marginal value of spending at €74,000 per QALY with 95% confidence intervals between €53,000 and €94,000 per QALY. Compared to international estimates, value lost by a marginal reduction in hospital spending is low, suggesting that the expenditure caps between 2012 and 2014 of 2.5% real growth in hospital volumes may not have been too stringent. However, these estimates suggest that some technologies that recently entered the market, such as Orkambi® and Spinraza®, would have led to a net reduction in QALYs. Lastly, substantial differences in marginal values between disease categories may signal inefficiencies in the hospital sector, suggesting potential targets for active purchasing in the managed competition system.  
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 In chapter 5 we empirically investigated one presumption of the managed competition system. According to theory, managed competition incentivises insurers to selectively contract the most efficient providers to improve quality and reduce costs. Selective contracting entails the reallocation of funds from underperforming providers to well-performing providers. Using data from 2007 to 2014 we compared the extent of these reallocations to other healthcare markets in Dutch health care with different purchasing arrangements and incentives. We hypothesised that reallocations in hospital care (managed competition) would be higher than in long-term care (a corporatist single payer system lacking incentives to purchase actively). Furthermore, we hypothesised that reallocations would be high in a system where municipalities purchase care under almost maximal financial risk, and where patients self-purchase care using personal budgets. While the latter two hypotheses were confirmed, the former was not; we found little evidence that insurers purchase more actively than corporatist single payers. We conclude that this aspect of managed competition does not –yet– function as envisioned.   Chapter 6 described the results of a case study to further substantiate the findings of chapter 5. Assisted reproduction (AR) is one of the hospital procedures in the Netherlands where relevant quality information is publicly available. Furthermore, preconditions for patient choice and selective purchasing appear to be comparatively good for this service. Therefore, insurers were expected to actively engage in selective contracting and to steer patients towards high performing providers. All the more since hospitals with good outcomes have lower costs: fewer attempts are necessary. Any efficient health system therefore would ensure that high-quality hospitals attract more patients. Using data from 1996 to 2016, we found little evidence for this premise. The lack of active purchasing implies that hospitals experience few financial incentives to improve quality, as revenue would be lost. Nevertheless, quality spectacularly improved over the research period for all 15 AR centres in the Netherlands. While managed competition did not function as envisioned in terms of steering patients, government objectives of quality increased and cost reductions were still obtained.   Managed competition may require private parties to compete, either on a for-profit base or a non-profit base. In the Netherlands, hospitals are private, non-profit entities. Countries contemplating introducing managed competition principles may require privatisation of public hospitals. This could affect outcomes, as public hospitals may experience incentives differently than private hospitals. To research ownership differences in efficiency, access and quality, chapter 7 collected evidence from the literature published since 2000 from European countries with a mix of private and public hospitals. The results found few structural differences between private and public hospitals. Factors such as profit 
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status may be more decisive in explaining differences, although a number of other reviews found few hospital differences in the US. The results suggest however that private hospitals may react more strongly to market incentives. This is especially relevant for the Netherlands, because it stipulates the importance of governing managed competition incentives appropriately.    
8.2 Strengths and weaknesses This thesis contributed to the knowledge on the effectiveness of cost containment policies, with a focus on the Dutch healthcare system. Although different institutional settings and priorities might make the empirical results less relevant for other countries, general lessons hold international relevance: the challenges in effective cost containment shown in chapter 2 and 3, the estimation and application of marginal value of care in chapter 4, the limited power of purchasers to actively reallocate budgets and steer patients in chapters 5 and 6, and the effects of hospital ownership in chapter 7.   This thesis takes a macro perspective, allowing identification of effects on a level relevant for policy makers. While a macro perspective is useful in identifying effects and trends relevant for policy makers, one limitation is that micro-level mechanisms may remain elusive. While chapter 2 provided an extensive mapping of cost containment policies that appeared in the literature, often the specific parameters are left open for interpretation. For example, literature may suggest coinsurance to be effective in containing costs, but it leaves open for example how to determine the optimal coinsurance rate, to set benefit inclusions and exemptions, or whether to introduce a stop-loss. Furthermore, factors such as public acceptance, political viability or effects on access and equity are also of importance. These choices require substantial policy scrutiny, for which research has yet provided few answers. More research is needed to provide guidance on how to design country-specific blueprints for a successful implementation.    Chapter 3 analysed effectiveness from a payer and societal perspective, excluding micro-level interventions to reduce costs. A payer and societal perspective is recommended to evaluate cost containment policies, as micro-level quality/efficiency improvements rarely result in cost savings at the macro level (Klink et al., 2017). For example, hospital cost savings due to a specific intervention may be compensated for by increases in other types of care. While exclusion of lower-level policies was necessary to inform policy makers on the effect of cost containment policies from the perspective of total costs, this strategy could risk missing effective policies. However, inclusion of lower level perspectives would require a thorough understanding of how cost savings on the micro level might translate to effects on the macro level. This is a promising area for future research.  
General Discussion 
163 
 
 In chapter 4 we estimated the relation between cost reductions and quality loss at the macro level, concluding that for every €73,600 taken from the hospital sector, one quality adjusted life year might be lost. Research on the macro level does not provide any clues on how this relation materialises at the micro level: which treatments have been displaced, which patient groups were harmed by cost reductions, which efficiency increases were obtained and which disease areas have been more prone to cost reductions. Substantial differences in marginal values between disease categories were observed, but more research will be necessary to verify these findings and provide clues to potential efficiency gains.  In chapters 5 and 6 we investigated the effects of managed competition on market shares on a macro level. While to our knowledge this was the first study providing quantitative evidence on the effects of active purchasing, the precise mechanisms remain elusive. Providers are possibly able to stabilise market share by compensating market share losses by one insurer for gains by another. Moreover, insurers may steer expenditures towards effective interventions within a hospital. For example, they ask hospitals to specialise in specific treatments at the cost of other treatments, within a given budget. Little evidence is available that insurers actively engage in specialisation requirements, although they may enforce minimum requirements formulated by the medical specialist associations (Mesman et al., 2017). Also, the large differences between marginal effectiveness of spending between disease categories in chapter 4 suggest little steering on cost effectiveness of treatments. Additional research may focus on contracting between hospitals and insurers (Ruwaard, 2018), the effects of contracts on allocative efficiency, how hospitals react to restrictive contracts and how purchasers could stimulate hospitals to increase efficiency. Quantitative research on the effects of insurer purchasing of price and quality on a micro level may be required to fully assess the effectiveness of managed competition.  A major limitation in chapter 7 is that no distinction has been made between for-profit and non-profit private hospitals. Aggregating for-profit and non-profit hospitals in a comparison with public hospitals may elude important differences in performance. Studies from the US did not find structural differences in performance of for-profit and non-profit hospitals (Hollingsworth, 2003; Schlesinger and Gray, 2006; Sibbel and Nagarajah, 2012). However, this finding could perhaps not be extrapolated to Europe. A second limitation is that differences in hospital performance may depend on institutional factors. Pita Barros and Siciliani distinguish two markets for private hospitals: as complements to the public sector and as competitors of public hospitals (Pita Barros and Siciliani, 2011). Outcomes may depend on which market a private hospital operates. Private hospitals under complementary insurance may target more affluent consumers, for example by offering 
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higher quality or care, additional services or lower waiting times. This might translate to high access for affluent consumers in terms of waiting times, although higher quality of care may come at a cost of lower efficiency due to additional inputs and extra capacity. On the other hand, private hospitals competing with public hospitals under mandatory insurance may act in a similar way to public hospitals and have similar outcomes in terms of access, quality and efficiency. A distinction between these two markets may therefore be necessary to fully assess differences in ownership. A complication in this distinction is that ownership may be endogeneous, for example when poorly performing public hospitals are privatised, or vice versa. Furthermore, this may depend on the health system and institutions in place. For the Dutch managed competition system, being fully private, introducing public hospitals has not been a relevant policy option. More research is required to determine the optimal mix of public, private non-profit and private for-profit hospitals in relation to existing systems and institutions.   This thesis implicitly assumes that effective policies might be transferable to other systems. However, socio-political factors influence an effective implementation and transferability across healthcare systems. For this reason, political feasibility and implementation need to be assessed in greater detail. Market-oriented policies that improve efficiency may invoke less resistance than command-and-control policies such as budgeting or price controls, but may result in more evasive behaviour. As effective cost containment policies jeopardise incomes of health professionals and access of patients, socio-political resistance may be expected. As another example, based on the economic utilitarian paradigm of the cost-effectiveness theory, new technologies should not be reimbursed if they displace more valuable care. However, socio-political arguments, such as disease burden and age of the patients, but also media attention, visibility and lobbying may be equally important factors in the assessment of new technologies. Chapters 5 and 6 scrutinised the role of insurers in the active purchasing of hospital care. However, the role of insurers in the socio-political system is generally disregarded. For example, insurers may function as countervailing forces to hospitals, being less dependent on politics than nationalised purchasers. It is conceivable that the system of managed competition in itself raised hospital awareness for the importance of quality improvements and cost containment, which could spur intrinsic hospital efficiency gains. This is compatible with the findings of chapter 6, showing quality improvements and cost reductions in the absence of active purchasing or active patient choice. Assessing the socio-political functions of insurers under managed competition is actually beyond the scope of this thesis. Specifically, the question how insurers in the Dutch managed competition system can steer patients towards 
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preferred providers is an important topic for future research requiring combined efforts of social, political and economic disciplines.   This thesis aimed to analyse how governments can effectively contain costs. Besides effectiveness, policy makers should also consider other policy aims when choosing optimal cost containment policies (Daniels et al., 2009). Examples are effects on quality, equity, access, solidarity and accountability. Transparent and just policymaking requires scoring cost containment policies on multiple dimensions. Accountability for reasonableness, for example using a Benchmark of Fairness developed by Norman Daniels (Daniels et al., 2000; Daniels et al., 1996; Daniels et al., 2009), could be applied to cost containment policy decision making. Additional research could demonstrate the usefulness of multi-dimensional decision-making tools in transparent policymaking.   Politicians and policymakers often routinely favour an increase in efficiency to improve the fiscal sustainability of health care over more ‘hard’ choices such as reducing benefits or increasing out-of-pocket payments. Many studies seem to support such claims, pointing towards the existence of substantial ‘waste’ within the healthcare sector (OECD, 2017b). Considering such political support and empirical estimates of the level of waste, the difficulties of real life implementation of such policies is remarkable. Reducing wasteful spending may receive more support in the field, up to the realization that this may imply reductions in incomes for health professionals or access for patients (Evans et al., 1989; Lomas et al., 1989). In a complex, adaptive system, policies to improve efficiency and reduce costs may be circumvented more easily than command-and-control policies. Credible policymaking needs to take into account interests of different stakeholders, which may not be aligned with aims of cost containment.   
8.3 Effective cost containment policies 
8.3.1 Lessons for the Netherlands  We can learn a lot from experiences of cost containment in other countries. Chapter 2 found that most cost containment strategies could be implemented in any country. To illustrate, table 44 in appendix 7 provides an overview of 41 cost containment policies and their potential application in the Netherlands. In nearly all categories policies have been enacted or formulated to a certain extent, with most policy options remaining relevant. Two exceptions are prospective payments, which more or less have been implemented, and tort reform, which is not a source of concern in the Netherlands. We will now highlight the possible application to the Netherlands of the policies that have proven to be most likely to be effective according to the conclusions drawn in chapter 3.  
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Cost sharing Since 2008 a mandatory deductible has been applied to all medical care in the Netherlands covered under the Health Insurance Act, including hospital care. This deductible replaced a no-claim system, which was shown to be less effective in containing costs (Remmerswaal et al., 2017). Care for persons under 18, as well as GP visits and some preventative services are exempt from cost sharing. Additional copayments may be required for certain on-label drugs, physical therapy and medical transportation (Garattini and van de Vooren, 2013). In return for a lower premium, an additional voluntary deductible of up to €500 can be offered (van Winssen et al., 2015). Insurers may additionally steer patients to preferred providers using deductible exemptions, with mixed effects (van der Geest and Varkevisser, 2016). The statutory deductible has increased over the last years, from €150 in 2008 to €385 in 2018. Noncompliance rates following referrals have also increased, although this could not be causally related to the deductible increases (van Esch et al., 2017). In 2012, additional copayments for mental care were introduced of €200 per year for outpatient care and €150 per year for inpatient care. In response, mental care utilisation decreased by 13.4%, rendering €13 million in savings. However, acute admissions increased as well, signalling reductions in necessary care (Ravesteijn et al., 2017). Despite reductions in utilisation, additional copayments were abandoned in 2013 (Lambregts and van Vliet, 2018). Additional research should focus on the effects of increases in the mandatory deductible, as well as the relative effectiveness of alternative cost sharing arrangements, such as co-payments and coinsurance. While cost sharing may be used to reduce costs in the Netherlands, consistent with international evidence (Frean and Pauly, 2018), this could reduce both necessary and unnecessary care (Lambregts and van Vliet, 2018; Newhouse, 2004). Furthermore, deductible increases disproportionally burden the less affluent, which may prove to be unpopular. The current government has actually refrained from deductible increases up to 2021. While cost sharing may be effective, attention should be given to distributional effects, reductions in necessary care and public acceptance of cost sharing arrangements.   
Managed care and competition Managed care is on the increase in the Netherlands (Klink et al., 2017). Furthermore, competition principles have been introduced and expanded since 2006. A positive relation between competition and quality has been found for a selection of hospital treatments in the Netherlands (Beukers et al., 2014; Croes et al., 2018; Ruwaard and Douven, 2014). However, as chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate, there is much to be gained by improving insurer competition, specifically on the purchaser market. Insurers are known to have low 
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bargaining power towards hospitals and GPs (Schut and Varkevisser, 2017). Therefore, improvements in the functioning of the Dutch managed competition system should involve a strict competition policy (Schut and Varkevisser, 2017). Overall, policies to promote managed care and competition remain promising to contain costs in the Dutch hospital sector. However, important questions, for example on the effects of integrated networks, freeriding by other insurers, paying for performance and population based payments, remain to be answered.   
Generic substitution and reference pricing  Policies implemented in the Netherlands include internal and external reference pricing, mandatory generic prescribing, mandatory generic substitution and tendering (Rémuzat et al., 2015; Wouters et al., 2017). The Dutch Minister of Health, Welfare and Sports is able by law to set maximum prices for pharmaceuticals based on prices in Belgium, the UK, France and Germany. In 2012 these regulations were evaluated, concluding that they were effective in reducing pharmaceutical prices, and that these effects could be further increased if this approach were to be expanded (Huizendveld et al., 2012). Furthermore, the cost-saving potential of tendering has been acknowledged by stakeholders in the Netherlands (Vogler et al., 2017). A study from 2011 showed substantial potential in a further improvement of the uptake of generics (Pechlivanoglou et al., 2011). Insurers have also been purchasing actively on pharmaceuticals (van Ginneken, 2016). In 2013, the volume of generics in the Netherlands was 70%, which was higher than the European average, but lower than Germany (80%) and the United Kingdom (83%). Prices of generics were lowest after the UK (Wouters et al., 2017). Therefore, although the Netherlands has made much progress in the containment of pharmaceutical expenditures, additional policies could still be effective. However, offsetting effects of pharmaceutical policies are to be expected. For example, patient charges and prescription regulation turned out to be ineffective in reducing the total costs due to an offsetting volume response (Starmans et al., 1994). Also, restrictive pharmaceutical policies may reduce access to necessary care. More research will be needed on the long-term effects on quality of care and cost shifting by pharmaceutical companies to other drugs or other countries. It is unclear to what extent governments can or need to mitigate the effects of cost containment policies on reduced access to necessary care.   
Tort reform In the Netherlands, medical specialists are personally liable and mandatorily insured for liability. Little is known about the costs of medical liability in the Netherlands, but cost estimates range between €15-€45 million, or 0.02-0.05% of the total healthcare costs 
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(Wijne, 2013). Overall, medical liability is considered to be a relatively minor issue in cost containment, and tort reform is unlikely to contribute substantially to cost containment in the Netherlands (Laarman and Akkermans, 2018).   
8.3.2 Inquiry into health system responses to cost containment policies Although many cost containment policy options have been documented, it has proven to be rather difficult to contain the costs of health care. Few policies have been evaluated, and most policies show mixed or conflicting results. Several explanations could be given, relating to the methodological challenges in identifying and researching causal effects. However, it is perhaps simply difficult to contain costs in general. The healthcare system is comprised of many stakeholders, who all interact and respond to policies in ways that are difficult to predict. Policies designed to contain costs may therefore not actually achieve their goals, as the health system is likely to mitigate effects of cost containment policies (Burns and Pauly, 2018; Evans et al., 1989; Lomas et al., 1989). To contain costs effectively, governments need to anticipate these responses. Appendix 7.1 presents an equilibrium model to this aim, defining four equilibriums in the health sector:  1. The provider market equilibrium, where total spending equals all budgets of all providers; 2. The provider budget equilibrium, where provider income equals expenses;  3. The bargaining equilibrium, where providers and purchasers negotiate prices and volumes; 4. The patient market equilibrium, where the demand for care equals the supply of care.  This multiple-equilibrium system helps explain why cost containment policy proves to be difficult: policies that affect one of the equilibriums have implications on the others. Furthermore, the model helps predict how providers and patients will respond to cost containment policies.   The provider market equilibrium states that total spending equals the sum of all provider budgets. In order to contain total costs, both the number of providers and the budget per provider must be contained. Solely restricting the number of providers may invoke increases in the budgets of remaining providers, while only restricting provider budgets may induce new providers to accommodate excess demand. The provider budget equilibrium states that the budget is the sum of the number of patients, treatment intensity and reimbursement rates. Any reduction in a provider budget involves containing the number of patients, treatment intensity and reimbursements. For example, only reducing the number of patients or the reimbursement rate may be counteracted by an increase in 
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treatment intensity of patients. Furthermore, to avoid a spending deficit, any decline in revenue must be compensated by a reduction in labour costs, capital expenses, inputs or profits. Policies to reduce hospital expenses, such as wages or capital costs, may not reduce the total costs if the income side (the hospital budget) remains unchanged. The bargaining 
equilibrium predicts that the height of the provider budget is the result of the relative bargaining position of both the purchaser and the hospital. If the fallback option of no agreement is unattractive for the provider, the budget negotiated will be lower, whereas it will be higher if the fallback option of no contract is unattractive for the payer. Purchasers need to take into account effects of other cost containment policies in budget negotiations in order to reduce the total costs. Furthermore, in case of multiple payers, any reduction in the budget negotiated by one payer may induce attempts of the provider to negotiate a higher budget in negotiations with other payers. Lastly, the patient market equilibrium describes the interaction between supply and demand. In equilibrium, supply (as determined by the other equilibriums) equals demand (as determined by the needs and price paid by patients). Policies that reduce supply may invoke reduced access and waiting lists. Policies that reduce demand may result in excess supply and increased treatment intensity.   The four models indicate that policies targeting a single equilibrium are likely to be associated with counterbalancing effects in other equilibriums. The model outcomes are consistent with the results from chapters 2 and 3, as the model simultaneously incorporates the possible targets for cost containment and demonstrates that single policies are likely to be ineffective. Appendix 7.1 provides examples of applications of the model on cost containment policies relevant for the Netherlands: budgeting, cost sharing, managed care and benefit package restrictions. A combination of policies targeting multiple equilibriums could increase the likelihood of policies being effective in containing costs. Policy makers could use the model to predict policy responses and monitor their effectiveness. Table 46 in appendix 7.1 also provides suggestions for further model development.     
8.4 The marginal value of spending Chapter 4 includes an extensive discussion on the strengths and limitations of the methodology and policy implications of the marginal value of hospital spending in the Netherlands. In this section we discussed the applicability of supply-side thresholds in new technology assessment, reflecting upon mechanisms to improve efficiency and reduce risk of displacement.  The use of a threshold based on supply-side estimates of opportunity costs assumes that these opportunity costs are fixed. However, opportunity costs in the hospital sector may vary with the stringency of the budget, defined as the relation between the height of the 
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budget and the demand for hospital care. In turn, demand depends on socio-demographic factors (demand for regular care) and technological advances (the number of new technologies entering the market). More specifically, opportunity costs increase as the budget is reduced, as the need for regular care increases (e.g. ageing) and as the number of new technologies entering the market increases. These factors predict that the opportunity costs of a given new technology are rather flexible, while the assumption of fixed opportunity costs may not hold.   To illustrate, consider a standardised model of new technology (NT) adoption presented in figure 8.1. In a given year, a number of new technologies enter the market, ordered from high marginal value (cost-effectiveness) to low marginal value. Adding technologies to the benefit package under a fixed budget requires funding from within the healthcare sector. Liberating funds may displace valuable existing care. The chance of displacement will be small when the budget impact of all combined technologies is low, as funds may be liberated by productivity gains and waste reduction. For the first, very cost-effective new technologies entering the benefit package, value lost due to displacement is low, while net value gain is high (at the left side of figure 8.1). However, as more and more technologies are added to the benefit package the total budget impact will increase and displacement of valuable care becomes more likely, with opportunity costs increasing. Beyond point NT*, these opportunity costs become higher than the gains of the last new technology added to the benefit package. Any additional approved new technology will reduce total health, displayed as the coloured triangle ABC in figure 8.1. Total value gained in a year is equal to the integral of the new technology curve minus the displacement curve, displayed as the trapezoid in dark. For excessive NT close to NT*, the total net value gain to the health system is likely to be positive. In optimum, new technology will be adopted until the marginal value of the new technology equals the marginal value of displacement, which is at NT*. Suboptimal market outcomes could be a reason for government intervention. Total health may be increased by setting a threshold for new technology adoption equal to point A. This automatically ensures that new technologies to the right of NT* will be rejected.   In this model, a reduction in the hospital budget would shift the displacement curve to the left, since the budget reduction adds to the reduction in existing care. Hence, displacement costs will be higher when the hospital budget is reduced (Paulden, 2016). An increase in patient demand would make reductions in existing care more valuable, while also shifting the displacement curve to the left. More new technologies entering the market would shift the new technology curve to the right, increasing the opportunity costs in optimum. The chance that a specific new technology finds itself to the right of NT* therefore 
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depends on the amount of other new technologies that enter the benefit package that year as well as the stringency of that year’s budget. Because new technologies are generally only assessed once and in isolation, a supply-side opportunity cost approach to a new technology assessment may not result in socially optimal decisions. Instead, a demand-side threshold might be preferred as being more stable over time.     
Figure 8.1: Implementation of new technologies and value lost due to displacement  In a semi-fixed budgeted system such as the Netherlands, thresholds may increase over time due to diminishing marginal returns, making it increasingly costly to improve population health (Barro, 1996; Murphy and Topel, 2003). This is for example demonstrated by Cutler et al, showing that in ten years the marginal cost per life year gained for a 65-year old increased by $20,000, from $121,000 in 1985 to $141,00014 in 1995 (Cutler and McClellan, 2001). Recent estimates for cardiovascular cost-effectiveness in the Netherlands in 2010 also show sharp increases in thresholds over time (van Baal et al., 2018). Based on the author’s calculations, a mean elasticity of spending on mortality of 0.19 renders marginal cost to save a life at age 70-74 between €800,000 and €1,000,000 in 2010, which is comparable to other estimates (Felder, 2006; Hall and Jones, 2004). However, using 1994 values given in the paper, significantly lower costs to save a life can be obtained of between 
                                                                14 This is 203,724.08 US Dollars of 2014, or 153,176 Euros of 2014 per life year saved. Using a QALY per year ratio of ~0.6 this would be €255,293 per QALY. In comparison, we find for this age category a marginal value of € 65,000 per QALY. 
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€260.000 and €280.000. Furthermore, extrapolating the elasticity from Van Baal et al. (2018) using Dutch cost of illness data of 201515, a marginal value to save a life of age 70-74 between €1.7 and €4.6 million is obtained, a relative increase of 113%-450%. This demonstrates the high plasticity of a supply-side threshold.  Opportunity costs do provide valuable information for policy makers with respect to the stringency of the budget. An example would be the Dutch society being willing to pay €50,000 for a QALY. A marginal value of care of €74,000 per QALY would then imply that the budget is too high and that cost containment could improve total welfare. While a new technology of €60,000 per QALY does not lower total welfare at the moment, a first-best solution would be to reject the new technology and reduce health spending. Similarly, if society’s willingness to pay would be €100,000 per QALY, a first-best solution would require both an expansion of the budget and an adoption of all technologies up to €100,000 per QALY. Summarising, we advise policy makers to use a demand-side threshold for new technology assessments and opportunity cost estimates to set appropriate hospital spending limits. Despite opportunity costs being more suited for budget setting than for the use of a cost-effective threshold, they may still provide an argument for rejecting reimbursement of very cost-ineffective treatments, especially until robust demand-side thresholds become available.  
 
Reducing opportunity costs The use of cost-effectiveness as a criterion for new technology assessment implies that the hospital sector is inefficient in displacing care with the lowest value in response to budget reductions (Eckermann and Pekarsky, 2014). If it were efficient, cost-ineffective new treatments would not be adopted in practice in the first place. This also implies that displacement effects could be reduced by improving efficiency of decision making at a micro level.   Consider figure 8.2, introduced in chapter 1. New technologies require additional funds at the micro level, as the new technology will be adopted by the health professional. A practitioner can obtain funds by reducing existing care (rationing) which, depending on the value of the care reduced, can be considered a displacement. Health professionals may demand extra funds from provider boards and CEOs in response to new technologies, transferring cost pressures to a higher level. This is what these boards often experience in practice. Provider boards in turn may demand extra funds from purchasers, adding to budget pressure on a further higher level, or use prioritisation to distribute budget 
                                                                15 In 2015, spending on CVA was €1916 (€1365), while mortality rates were 0.59% (0.16%) for males (females) aged 70-74 (RIVM, kosten van Ziekten 2015, www.statline.rivm.nl).  
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pressures amongst health professionals. In turn, health professionals confronted with budget pressures may revert to rationing of care to patients. As a result, the effects of new technologies will spread throughout the health system.   So far, little is known on how these decisions are taken in practice on the level of providers and health professionals. In practice, explicit prioritisation seems to be sparsely used. Since 2015, 14 cases have been identified for Australia, Canada, the UK, New Zealand and Sweden (Polisena et al., 2013; Rooshenas et al., 2015). A potential barrier is that even low-value care may provide value for a subset of patients (Garner and Littlejohns, 2011). No relation was found between a new technology uptake and prioritisation or rationing in either the UK or the Netherlands (Adang et al., 2018; Appleby et al., 2009; Schaffer et al., 2015; Schaffer et al., 2016). Absence of sufficient information was mentioned as a limiting factor in taking prioritisation and rationing decisions (Marks et al., 2013). In order to reduce value lost due to budget restrictions and uptake of new treatments, more research will be necessary on how to improve decision making on the micro level. Measuring cost effectiveness of existing treatments and empowering providers to prioritise based on cost effectiveness may improve the efficiency of prioritisation and rationing mechanisms. When faced with budget restrictions and new technologies, efficient rationing and prioritisation may allow providers and health professionals to reduce negative effects on health. Recently, initiatives have been aiming to identify low-value care (Wammes et al., 2016). Chapter 4 provides additional guidance through calculation of disease-specific and age-specific thresholds, showing substantial divergence. Disease categories with relatively low marginal values, such as diseases of the blood, pregnancy and neonatal care may require further studying to identify cost-ineffective treatments.   
Chapter 8 
174 
 
8.5 Purchasing in a managed competition setting Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate that selective purchasing does not seem to function as intended in the hospital sector. Reallocations of provider budgets were low, and in the case of assisted reproduction, reallocations were not directed towards high-quality hospitals. Some potential explanations may be high hospital market power, in combination with high information asymmetry, high hospital fixed costs and low patient acceptance of restrictions through purchasing. This may be illustrated by the multi-equilibrium model in appendix 7.1. For example, the bargaining equilibrium predicts that budget outcomes reflect relative bargaining positions determined by each party’s disutility of no agreement. The disutility of no agreement may be higher for insurers compared to hospitals, shifting market power towards hospitals. More specifically, not reaching an agreement for a hospital could have limited budgetary consequences, since emergency care is fully reimbursed for out-of-plan hospitals, and non-contracted care still needs to be reimbursed by law up to about 75% of the costs (Schut and Van de Ven, 2011). The budgetary consequences of exclusion from a single restricted choice plan might be rather small. For an insurer, not reaching an agreement could result in negative publicity, reputation loss and loss of customers. Furthermore, insurers are legally required to purchase sufficient care. Therefore, the threat of selective contracting might not be very credible, shifting market power to hospitals.   The provider budget equilibrium predicts that reductions in the hospital budget may be compensated by budget increases for other activities. Given that hospital expenses such as capital and wages may be relatively fixed, hospitals might aim to smooth income (Boterenbrood, 2014), which, in combination with high market power, could explain low reallocations. Potentially, hospitals compensate budgetary reductions due to selective contracting by increasing costs for other insurers. This type of cost shifting has been observed in the US (Frakt, 2011). Lastly, the patient market equilibrium predicts that if access to care has been restricted by active purchasing, excess demand may lead to patients switching to another hospital. Insurers therefore may be required to increase the budget of contracted hospitals in response to selective contracting, given the legal duty to provide sufficient care, thereby further reducing the gains of selective contracting. Based on these considerations selective contracting may currently not be a credible treat for hospitals, because it reduces the capabilities for insurers to purchase actively.   Several policy recommendations could be distilled to improve the purchasing function. A number of recommendations, formulated by Van de Ven and colleagues in 2013, are still deemed relevant (Van de Ven et al., 2013; van Kleef et al., 2014). One major recommendation was more stringent merger control. Effective antitrust policy may improve the bargaining positions of insurers. For example, insurers appear to have sufficient 
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bargaining power in mental care, which is less concentrated than hospital care (Westra et al., 2016). Other recommendations include improvement of risk equalisation, improvement of quality transparency, and improvement of payment mechanisms (van Kleef et al., 2014). New payment mechanisms could include outcome-based payment schemes (Vlaanderen et al., 2018), while some additional policy recommendations could also be made. Besides reducing legal requirements to contract sufficient care and reimburse 75% of non-contracted care, the government could improve the relative bargaining position of insurers by increasing public acceptance of selective contracting. These measures reduce the disutility of no agreement for insurers and make selective contracting a more credible treat. As free choice of healthcare providers is an important value in the Netherlands (Victoor et al., 2012), this would require a paradigm shift in public opinion. However, evidence from the US and the Netherlands suggests that patients may be willing to trade off free choice for a lower premium (Bes et al., 2017; Mobley, 1998a; Zwanziger et al., 2000). This is also demonstrated by increases in the uptake of restricted choice plans and voluntary deductibles (NZA, 2017b). However, the managed care backlash in the US demonstrates that public opinion, supported by a strong hospital lobby, could quickly turn against selective contracting, requiring a significant amount of policy scrutiny (Blendon et al., 1998). Secondly, a more flexible labour market would provide hospitals with more room to manoeuvre on the expenses side. This could lower the disutility of no agreement for hospitals and make it easier to accommodate changes in the income side. Thirdly, addressing patient demand could reduce the mismatch between available (limited) supply and demand. This may require patient education, empowerment and person-centred care (Ekman et al., 2011). Insurers find it rather a challenge to steer patients to efficient providers due to a lack of trust (Klink et al., 2017). More research will be necessary on how insurers can influence demand and align interests to steer patients towards the most efficient providers. One reason for low acceptance may be patients’ expectations that insurers mainly contract on price and not on quality. For example, in mental care insurers selectively contract on price in the absence of quality indicators (Westra et al., 2016). While contracting up to now primarily focuses on price or lumpsum payments, it should be more focused on quality (den Exter and Guy, 2014). Lastly, the question how purchasers could stimulate quality improvements requires more attention. A well-functioning managed competition system should provide sufficient incentives for hospitals to improve quality. The issue of how hospitals could create an innovative environment where health professionals may continuously strive to improve quality while containing costs may require more research. A number of promising developments are currently taking place in this area, for example at the hospitals Bernhoven and Rivas (Kroon, 2018). Chapter 6 
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demonstrates that even in the absence of sufficient incentives, hospitals could still improve quality. Possibly, factors such as the intrinsic motivation of health professionals should be taken into account in purchasing.  What are the implications for countries contemplating installing or expanding principles of managed competition in their health systems? While qualitative evidence is mixed, empirical evidence of positive effects tends to be scarce in Dutch health care: only limited effects on inpatient costs and volume following the 2006 reform were found (Krabbe-Alkemade et al., 2017). Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate that managed competition may not have had the intended effects in terms of active purchasing. Given the important role of purchasing in stimulating efficiency, each country needs a well-working purchasing system. However, the problems faced by active purchasing in the Netherlands are likely to be expected in other health systems as well. Theoretically, managed competition may be the best bet to improve purchasing, as supported by sparse empirical evidence demonstrating positive effects of competition in the US setting (Melnick and Zwanziger, 1988, 1995; Mobley, 1998b). Therefore, although the managed competition system in the Netherlands has its shortcomings, in potential the system could be a promising option to obtain efficient purchasing. This may be a time-consuming process, requiring continuous government intervention (Van Ginneken, 2015). Countries implementing managed competition should therefore not expect any immediate improvements, but in the long run, managed competition may be the best bet to improve active purchasing. Empirical evidence on the effects of active purchasing in other sectors is very much needed.   
8.6 Policy recommendations and suggestions for future research A number of policy recommendations and suggestions for future research that have been given throughout this thesis have been summarised in this section. Chapters 2 and 3 collected effective cost containment policies, finding few policy evaluations performed on a macro level. Most interventions were evaluated on either a provider level or a patient level. However, reductions in hospital costs or patient pathway costs do not automatically imply lower spending for payers or reductions in total healthcare spending. Therefore, cost containment policy evaluations should take a payer or societal perspective. Inclusion of non-peer-reviewed publications and literature in other languages may improve the overview of cost containment policy options, and add to evidence on effectiveness for more OECD countries. Effects of cost containment policies on other government aims, notably quality, efficiency, access and equity should also be collected to improve policy decision-making. These policy aims should be weighed in a transparent manner, for example by developing a tool to improve accountability for reasonableness. One promising research topic is to apply 
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Norman Daniels’ Benchmark of Fairness to cost containment policies (Daniels et al., 1996). This could provide a benchmark that compares advantages and disadvantages on a number of policy dimensions, which could in turn improve transparent policy making.   Mixed results were found for many cost containment policies, suggesting that no single policy is effective under all circumstances. To ensure effects, policies need to be monitored and fine-tuned after implementation. Anticipating behavioural responses may help in designing effective combinations of policies, including ‘soft’ policies to spur behavioural changes. Furthermore, some cost containment policies that were found to be effective, such as budgeting or cost sharing, may not increase efficiency. This also requires the need for a well-designed policy mix. A combination of policies may be more effective in preventing cost shifting and compensating effects, as predicted by the multi-equilibrium cost containment model. Further development of the multi-equilibrium cost containment model could support effective policy making. Lastly, more research is needed on differences in the design and implementation of specific cost containment policies as well as the interaction between different policies and institutional settings in relation to their effectiveness.   The opportunity costs of hospital care may be used as a threshold for assessing new technologies for adoption in the benefit package. However, given that supply-side thresholds based on the marginal value of care may be highly variable to changes in budgets and socioeconomic factors, demand-side thresholds may be more appropriate. More research will be necessary to answer the question how much society is willing to pay for new technologies. Nevertheless, marginal values provide important information on the stringency of the budget and the relative efficiency of health spending. In order to guide decision making on setting appropriate budgets and reallocating spending to improve efficiency, more robust estimates are required. Improvements in the current study in chapter 4 include adding more years, better quality information and better estimates of costs in the last year of life. Additional studies may be required, focusing on single disease categories, regional variation and health sectors other than the hospital sector.   Managed competition has the potential to greatly improve efficiency through active purchasing, yet so far little evidence has been found to support this claim for the Netherlands. Therefore, governments should aim to improve the bargaining position of insurers by means of active merger control (Schut and Varkevisser, 2017), improving public acceptance of selective contracting and improving credibility of selective contracting, e.g. by reducing mandatory reimbursements for non-contracted care (Van de Ven et al., 2013). Increasing quality transparency and production cost transparency is paramount to the success of selective contracting. Monitoring budget reallocations according to chapter 5 
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could improve active purchasing. While this thesis demonstrates the limited activity in selectively reallocating budgets towards preferred providers, other aspects of active purchasing require further research. The question how insurers could best steer patients towards preferred providers requires more research, for example regarding the possibilities of prior authorisation, the role of the GP as (selective) gatekeeper and the role of patient information in choosing providers. Furthermore, insurers may develop activities to reduce unnecessary care and increase efficiency. How and to what extent this occurs in practice and what this will imply for cost containment is an area of future research. Future research on proprietary status should focus on the interaction between ownership, profit status and the institutional role of the private sector. Furthermore, the effect of differences in ownership in budget negotiations in the context of managed competition is a promising area for further research.    Currently, a trend is visible in the Netherlands towards healthcare networks, quality improvements and appropriateness of care (Kabinet Rutte III, 2017). While networks hold promise as a means to improve appropriateness of care, accountability and control are reduced, increasing the risk of cost shifting and supplier-induced demand. Proper management and monitoring of networks by purchasers is an area of future research. Several bottom-up initiatives are emerging in the Netherlands and other OECD countries, using quality improvement programmes to contain costs on a hospital level (Ekman et al., 2011; Hildebrandt et al., 2010; Kiers, 2017). In order to assess the potential of these initiatives as effective and efficient cost containment policies, evaluations on a payer level will be needed. Application of the multi-equilibrium model (appendix 7.1) would allow for an assessment of the effects of quality improvements on cost containment, while providing empirical verification of the most likely market responses. While these developments hold promise as a means to effectively and efficiently contain costs, more research demonstrating their effectiveness on a payer level will be necessary.   
8.7 Conclusions This thesis aims to contribute to the question how the (Dutch) government could contain costs effectively and efficiently. For this purpose a number of gaps in the literature were addressed. First, a comprehensive overview of cost containment policy options was distilled from the literature. Next, evidence on effectiveness was collected from a payer and societal perspective. A third review contributed to evidence on hospital characteristics associated with performance by reviewing differences between public and private hospitals in Europe. An encompassing empirical evaluation of hospital spending and outcomes rendered the marginal value of hospital care in the Netherlands. Last, empirical evidence was collected to 
General Discussion 
179 
 
assess active purchasing of insurers in the hospital sector, both on a macro level and through a case study in assisted reproduction. The results demonstrated that containing costs is challenging. Budgeting may be effective, but value may be lost when budgets are reduced. A multiple-equilibrium model provides guidance on how to improve effectiveness through combinations of policies. A number of policy options are available for the Dutch government to contain costs effectively. One promising set of cost containment policies would be to improve the preconditions for managed competition. Particular attention should be given to the healthcare purchasing market, as this market does not yet seem to function as envisioned. In addition, the government could further contain pharmaceutical costs by improving reference pricing systems and generic substitution. While privatisation of hospitals may be more in line with the principles of managed competition, it is unclear what is to be expected in terms of improvements in efficiency, quality and outcomes. The marginal value of hospital spending may guide policy makers in setting appropriate expenditure limits, assessing new technologies and improving allocative efficiency.   This thesis demonstrates that to target complex phenomena such as cost containment, a broad and multi-layered approach rather than a focus on a single aspect is required. Effective and efficient cost containment policy research requires incorporation of behavioural and countervailing effects, acknowledging the political and societal barriers and facilitators, linking the micro level to the macro level, combining quantitative and qualitative evidence and assessing both financial and non-financial incentives. Tackling the issue of sustainability of healthcare systems inevitably requires a multidisciplinary approach. This thesis provides a number of starting points, although much more progress can and should be made in this area of research.   
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Appendix to chapter 8 
Table 8.1: Application of cost containment policies to the Netherlands 
Cost containment 
policy 
Application to the Netherlands 
Macrobudget Total public health expenditures are prospectively capped under the “Budgettair Kader Zorg” (BKZ) at the start of the cabinet, as part of government regulation called “Zalmnorm”.  
Sector budget Industry agreements on expenditure caps per sector can be seen as a form of sector budget 
Price limits In the hospital sector, most prices are freely negotiable, although prices of specific treatments (DBC-A segment) are maximised and could be reduced as form of cost containment policy. Furthermore, maximum prices for long-term care could be reduced. 
Fee schedule Fee schedules have been implemented in long-term care (called ZZPs) and could be implemented as maximum prices to replace the freely negotiable prices in hospital care (DBC-B segment). 
Price negotiations Price negotiations, such as competitive tendering procedures, have been implemented by some municipalities to contract social care providers. Most prices in the Netherlands, even maximised prices in DBC-A segment and LTC, are freely negotiable. Furthermore, the government has been involved in price negotiations for expensive pharmaceuticals.  
Reference prices A reference pricing system, both internal and external, is used for pharmaceuticals in the Netherlands, but could be expanded. Furthermore, personal budgets are prices as 70% of the maximum price for comparable in-kind care.  
Wage controls Wage controls for nursing staff are complicated due to automatic wage adjustments negotiated through bilateral agreements between government and labour associations (called “OVA-convenant”). The government did successfully contain costs of education and public services by controlling wages during the crisis (called “nullijn”). Efforts were made to increase the percentage of salaried medical specialists compared to independent medical specialist groups.  
Capital controls Capital controls were used extensively but were mostly abandoned as part of the 2006 reform.  
Input price 
reductions 
Purchasing associations between hospitals have been formed to reduce purchasing costs of pharmaceuticals and medical appliances.  
Profit controls Profits are banned in most of the sector, although in some sectors, notably home care, profits are still allowed. Controls on profit margins of pharmaceuticals are uncommon.  
Access control Access to specialist care is controlled by general physicians (GP gatekeeping), other forms of access controls and rationing are less common for hospital care. In LTC, access is controlled by indication from an independent assessment organisation (Centrum Indicatiestelling Zorg (CIZ)) 
Capacity control Capacity controls have been used extensively, but were largely abandoned after the 2006 reform. For few specialised services capacity controls apply (called Wet Bijzondere Medische Verrichtingen (WBMV)). 
Improving 
appropriateness 
Few tools to improve appropriateness are currently used, such as benchmarking, clinical practice variation research, prior authorisation or utilization review. Insurers (and government) may readily implement these policies 
Labour 
restrictions 
Labour restrictions apply for medical specialists by limits on the number of student places (called numerus fixus).  
Cost sharing Cost sharing is used to reduce the public share of costs but not to reduce total costs or to improve appropriateness (see introduction and below).  
Benefit package Benefit package restrictions are used marginally and with limited success. For example, in 2012 physical therapy for certain conditions and dental care between 18 and 23 was excluded from the mandatory benefit package.  
Prevention  Prevention is a small part of total expenditure under separate legislation (called wet publieke gezondheid, Wpg). Municipalities are mainly responsible for prevention and health promotion.   
General Discussion 
181 
 
New technology 
control 
New technologies and pharmaceuticals generally are automatically included in the benefit package. In case of doubt on effectiveness, temporary exclusion may be given (called “sluis”). In that case, new technologies are assessed by the National Health Care Institute (Zorginstituut Nederland (ZIN)) and a recommendation is given to the Minister of Health on whether to include the new technology into the benefit package, giving the Minister possibilities to negotiate on prices.  
Patient 
empowerment 
In 2012 a choosing wisely campaign was launched (called Verstandig Kiezen) to empower patients and professionals to improve shared-decision making in healthcare. 
Third party payer 
structure 
The competing insurer structure is core to the 2006 reform. However, managed care plans, restricted choice plans etc. Have been marginally developed 
Provider 
structure 
The 2006 reform spurred innovative provision models, specifically a sharp increase in independent treatment centres. International developments, such as the patient centred medical home, telemedicine, etc., have been slowly spreading to the Netherlands.  
Government level In 2015, part of LTC (home ancillary care) was decentralised to municipalities and part (home nursing care) was centralised to nationally operating health insurers. 
Responsibility 
redefinition 
The government actively stimulates task redistribution from medical specialists to nursing staff. 
Ownership Private non-profit provision by foundations is the norm, although private for-profit and non-profit provision by companies has become more predominant.  
Antitrust policy A formal body has been responsible for merger control and antitrust policy, although performance on both objectives has been heavily criticized. 
Risk 
redistribution 
In 2012, ex-post risk equalization for hospitals was gradually removed. The ex-ante risk equalisation system is well-developed, although additional improvements may be possible.  
Payment reform In 2012, a minor reform of the DBC system took place (DBC-DOT). Some experiments with shared savings (Hayen et al., 2015), bundled payments and pay for performance have been performed, but so far this has been a marginal phenomenon 
Competition  Payer and provider competition has been a cornerstone of the 2006 reform. In long-term care, competition is scarcely used.  
Prospective 
payments 
Prospective payments have been introduced in most or all healthcare sectors. Some retrospective elements may be present in LTC. 
Coordination Care coordination could be improved; insurers are little active in care coordination, and provider coordinative efforts have been complicated by different financial budgets (called schotten). Coordination programs for specific diseases, e.g. Parkinson’s disease, COPD and heart failure have been launched.  
Consumer choice Consumer choice has been improved by the 2006 reform through standardisation of benefits and choice supports. Still additional efforts could be made.  
Contracting  Legislature to improve selective contracting failed in congress in 2012.  
Patient choice Patient choice is considered an important moral value in the Netherlands and is permitted in all health sectors. However, information to support patient choice is mostly lacking. 
Health IT Legislation to implement a national electronic patient record system failed in congress in 2012. As a result, health IT systems rarely allow data exchange between providers.  
Tort reform Provider liability is not considered an issue for cost containment in the Netherlands, and tort reform is unlikely to save any costs 
Administration  Administrative expenses in the Netherlands are considered high, and much of a societal issue. Administrative simplification is high on the policy agenda 
Transparency  Despite 2015 being the year of transparency in healthcare, little has been achieved in increasing transparency on any level. Prices and quality remain obscure.  
Management  The role of management has received some attention in LTC when improvement programs were started in 2015 (called In voor zorg!) 
Reduce waste Waste reduction has been an important topic for the government, for example in 2013 a website was created where waste could be reported  
Reduce fraud Fraud reduction has received particular attention in personal budgets. In 2013, a taskforce on fraud reduction was started to improve fraud detection of personal budgets.  
Innovation  In 2016 a platform was created to support cost-saving innovations in healthcare.  
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 Appendix 8.2: A multi-equilibrium model to assess cost containment policy 
effects The model consists of two stages. In the first stage, the model describes the health system by four equilibriums:  1. provider market equilibrium  2. provider budget equilibrium 3. bargaining equilibrium 4. patient market equilibrium These four equilibriums predict response options of healthcare agents. First, the equilibriums are described in detail. Next, the most likely response option is modelled. Third, the model is demonstrated by analyzing relevant cost containment options. Last, recommendations are given.  
The provider market equilibrium The first equilibrium is the most straightforward: total health spending is by definition equal to the sum of the budgets of all providers. Mathematically, total healthcare spending (T) is defined as the sum of individual budget (b) of each provider (s), ranging from 0 to S.  
     
 
   
 
This equilibrium has one major consequence: reductions in the total budget (cost containment) must cause a reduction in a selection of provider budgets or a reduction in the number of providers (or both). For the moment, I focus on total public spending, which is the primary concern for policy makers. Additional potential extensions of the model include disaggregation to public spending and private spending:  
                   This would add a third possibility: reductions in the public budget (public cost containment) must lead to (a combination of) either: (1) a reduction in (some) provider budgets; (2) a reduction in the number of providers; (3) an increase in private spending. The third option has been widely hypothesized (Dobson et al., 2006). Policy makers should keep in mind that a successful reduction in the public budget might have spillovers on the private market. For brevity, I will focus on the public budget without loss of generalization.  
 
The provider budget equilibrium Next, we zoom in on the provider budget accounting identity. By assumption, the provider budget can be decomposed into patient numbers, treatment intensity (i.e. the number of 
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treatments per patient) and the reimbursement per treatment. For many health systems that use DRG-systems, this is intuitive: the provider budget is the sum of all DRGs, which have a reimbursement price, are tied to patients, and each patient may have multiple DRGs. This disaggregation is explained more clearly by the response options of providers: when the provider budget is reduced, providers can either: (1) reduce the number of patients; (2) reduce the treatment intensity per patient; (3) reduce the reimbursement price per treatment. For example, in health systems with fixed reimbursement prices, budget reductions must materialize in fewer patients or lower reimbursement per patient (lower treatment intensity). When providers are budgeted through block grants, if the budget is reduced and providers manage to retain patient numbers and treatment intensity, the (shadow) price per treatment must be lower. Mathematically, the budget (b) of provider (s) is disaggregated into the number of patients (v), the treatment intensity (i) and the reimbursement price (r): 
             
 
   
 
The provider budget, independent of whether it is reimbursed through block grants or DRGs or other payment systems, constitutes the provider income. To further zoom in, the provider budget equilibrium is expanded by the identity that income equals expenses. Providers use the income to pay for labour, capital and inputs, while obtaining a profit as the margin between income and expenses. Labour is defined as the number of employees times the wage rate. This can be extended by introducing different educational and employment profiles, but for the purpose of our model, it suffices to assume a homogenous labour market. Capital expenses consist of interest payments, capital stock depreciation, inputs and a profit margin. For simplicity, we assume that the interest rate equals the depreciation rate, so interest payments are equal to the capital stock times the interest/depreciation rate. The production input component includes medicines and assistive devices supplied by the provider. Differences between income and expenses are profits, which I include under expenses to complete the provider budget equilibrium identity:  
             
 
   
                 Which states that the number of patients   times treatment intensity   times reimbursement rate   should be equal to the labour costs (number of staff   times the wage ), capital costs (interest rate   times capital stock  ), input costs (   and profits ( ). We assume the wage rate and interest rate are exogenous. Again, this results in a number of provider response 
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options: when the provider budget is lowered, providers either: (1) reduce personnel; (2) reduce capital investments; (3) reduce inputs; (4) reduce profits.   In retrospective payment systems, the provider budget is endogenous: the result of the number of patients times treatment intensity times reimbursement rates. However, virtually no pure retrospective systems exist today. Practically all providers are limited in their ability to increase their budget. These limits are the result of purchaser-provider negotiations. Three possibilities can be discerned: (1) the reimbursement rate is negotiable, the number of patients is variable; (2) both the number of patients and the reimbursement rate are negotiable; (3) the budget is negotiable, while the number of patients and the reimbursement rate is variable (block grants). In order to include purchaser effects, the bargaining outcome is modelled.  
The bargaining equilibrium I start by modelling negotiations on the reimbursement rate, and extent the model to allow negotiations on block grants and on both the reimbursement rate and the number of patients. I start with describing the bargaining equilibrium in the case of competing insurers, and later on relax this assumption to allow single payers. I model the outcome of the price negotiations as a Nash bargaining solution (Halbersma et al., 2011). The Nash bargaining solution is the maximization of the product of providers’ and purchasers’ surplus over the fallback option.   In the bilateral negotiation, a provider and an insurer bargain over the height of the reimbursement rate. For the provider, coming to an agreement is valuable. If no agreement is reached, the provider misses out on patient flows that are redirected to contracted providers. The difference between the utility of agreement and the disutility of disagreement defines the range of reimbursement rates the provider is willing to accept. When the difference in utility of accepting the minimum reimbursement rate and the disutility of not being contracted is zero, the minimum reimbursement rate is obtained. This could be defined as the zero-profit reimbursement rate (see the provider budget equilibrium). For the insurer, disagreement on the reimbursement price excludes the provider from the network. This reduces patient choice and may reduce the value of insurance for the customer. The maximum price the insurer is willing to pay is the price where disutility of paying reimbursement price    equals disutility of excluding the provider from the network. If the minimum price the provider is willing to accept is lower than the maximum price the insurer is willing to pay, then an agreement can be beneficial for both parties, and any reimbursement rate within the range is possible. The Nash bargaining solution is found by finding the reimbursement rate that maximizes the combined utility of 
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both parties. This is the potential Pareto-optimal point: neither party can be made better off without making the other party worse off.   Mathematically, provider bargaining surplus is the difference between provider utility of the reimbursement rate after agreement      and the budget without agreement (   . The bargaining surplus for purchasers is the value of adding the provider to the network of providers (            ), relative to the cost of the reimbursement rate (   : 
        
       
        
           
        A reduction in the negotiated reimbursement price implies that either     must increase or 
    must decline. The bargaining maximization problem provides some relevant insights. For example, if only one payer is present, the fallback option of provider s (      ) is zero (no contract at all), while if multiple payers are present, the fallback option is the budget after negotiations with other payers, which is higher than zero. Therefore, bargaining position of providers is higher in a multi-payer market than in a single payer market. Furthermore, concentration on the payer side increases the disutility of not having a fallback option for providers, which reduces   , while concentration at the provider side increases the value of inclusion in the network, which increases   .   In extension, bargaining can include patient volumes. Effectively, this fixes         as the collective outcome of all agreements. In case of price-times-volume-contracts, the bargaining maximization problem becomes:  
                    
       
        
          
        Where      and      are set. In case of block grants, the bargaining maximization problem becomes:  
                   
       
        
          
        Where     is set and    and    are variable. The utility derived from    remains undefined, but could be defined as the foregone profits of missing the budget agreement in the case of profit maximisation and the difference in the budget in the case of budget maximisation (non-profit providers). In the case of reimbursement bargaining, providers can respond to lower bargaining outcomes by (1) increasing the number of patients; (2) increasing treatment intensity; (3) reducing the budget. In the case of price*volume bargaining, the relevant responses to lower bargaining outcomes are (1) reducing the budget; (2) increasing treatment intensity16. In the case of block grant negotiation, providers can respond to lower bargaining outcomes by (1) reduce the number of patients; (2) reduce treatment intensity; (3) reduce the reimbursement rate. For the remainder of this paper, I 
                                                                16 If bargaining is on number of patients, treatment intensity and reimbursement rate, providers have no option but to reduce the budget. If bargaining outcome is number of treatments and reimbursement rate, providers have the option to substitute the number of patients and treatment intensity within the set budget. 
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will use block grand negotiations as default, but this can be adjusted to specific settings. So far, these equilibriums focus on the supply side. However, the number of patients (v) is also dependent on the demand for care. Supply side reductions may have implications for the demand side. Therefore, we introduce a fourth equilibrium equalling supply and demand.  
The patient market equilibrium Supply, in terms of number of patients helped in the healthcare sector, depends on the number of providers, the budget per provider, the average treatment intensity and the average reimbursement rate, obtained by rearranging the budget identity:  
                   
 
   
 
The demand side is assumed to depend on the needs of the patient and the price patients pay for care (cost sharing). Patient need is a subjective measure, imperfectly related to health status. This means that not all patients that should visit the hospital based on health status do so, and not all patients that visit the hospital have a health status that would require care. However, demand for care is expected to increase when health status deteriorates. Secondly, we assume that patient demand is influenced by the height of the copayments, where higher copayments reduce the need for care. Again, the relationship is individual and subjective, which means that personal preferences and sentiments (and income) influence the relation. Therefore, we assume that demand depend on needs, copayments, and waiting lists, but do not make further assumptions on the precise relationship. We return to this issue later. Mathematically, Demand (D) is a function of patient needs (N) and the price that patients need to pay for health (C):  
               Where         is increasing in   and decreasing in  . In healthcare, supply may be limited by the total budget constraint, which may cause excess demand (waiting lists ):  
           
 
   
          
The equilibrium implies the following provider responses. If the supply of care is reduced, for example by reductions in the provider budget (  ), without addressing the demand side, then excess demand increases, which will result in increased waiting lists . Reductions in the demand side without interventions on the supply side result in five response options: (1) the number of providers declines; (2) the budget per provider declines; (3) the treatment intensity increases; (4) the reimbursement rate increases; (5) waiting lists are reduced.  
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The combined model The equilibriums are combined to obtain the following multi-equilibrium equation:  
     
 
   
              
        
           
       
 
   
            
 
   
 
   
                 
 
   
                  The total budget is the sum of all provider budgets is the sum of the outcome of provider-payer negotiations is the sum of the reimbursement income per provider is the sum of provider expenditure is the sum of patient demand times treatment intensity times the reimbursement rate. If a policy reduces the outcome of one of the equations, all other equations have to adjust. Table 8.2 lists the response options per equilibrium.   
Table 8.2: Partial equilibriums and response options to a reduction in the total budget Equation Description  Response options to a budget reduction 
   
 
   
 Provider budget equilibrium 1) provider budget reduction 2) number of provider reduction 
           
 
   
          
           
        
Bargaining equilibrium 1) reduce purchaser bargaining surplus  2) increase provider bargaining surplus  
       
 
   
 
   
 Provider income equilibrium 1) lower patient numbers  2) lower treatment intensity 3) lower reimbursement rate 
                
 
   
 Provider expenses equilibrium 1) reduce personnel 2) reduce capital investments 3) reduce inputs 4) reduce profits 
                  Demand equilibrium 1) demand reduction (=waiting lists increase) 2) treatment intensity reduction 3) reimbursement rate reduction  
A further inquiry into reductions in the demand for care Many cost containment policies aim to reduce the demand for care, for example, increased cost sharing, prevention, benefit package restrictions and health education. Earlier it was mentioned that the demand for care depends on care needs and copayments, but that these are not perfectly correlated to the true health status of the population. If people would be able to perfectly assess their health status, then cost sharing, for example, would reduce the desire to seek care of people that at the margin have the highest health status. This would imply an efficient outcome. However, in reality we observe that increased cost sharing also deters people with low health status, which would imply an inefficient outcome, which must mean that people cannot perfectly assess their health status. To formalise the argument, I 
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propose a matrix of health status and the desire to seek care (figure 1). Desire to seek care ( ) depends on the expected utility  of seeking care given the need ( ) and the disutility 
     of paying for care (cost sharing):  
                      Cost sharing in turn may be a function of the reimbursement rate, which is for sake of clarity not taken into account. Most people have a high desire to seek care when the health status deteriorates (upper right quadrant), or do not seek care in case of minor illness (lower left quadrant). However, a fraction of the population seeks care without medical necessity (upper left quadrant) or shies away from seeking medically necessary care (lower right quadrant).  
 By individually modelling each individual’s ability to assess his health status, one would end up in the familiar case where reductions in demand both reduce overtreatment and increase undertreatment at the same time. Furthermore, some policies, notably health education, can improve the ability of individuals to assess their health status, and thereby reduce over- and undertreatment at the same time. Lastly, some policies restrict access to care for certain patient groups, such as selective contracting, prior authorization and utilization review. If these are targeted towards objective health status, one would come to the familiar finding that selectively reducing access may be unpopular to patients, as perceived needs may differ from health status. Through political processes and patient association lobbying, budgets may be increased to accommodate access based on perceived needs rather than health status, potentially increasing ‘unnecessary care’ from a medical perspective.  
 
Applying the model The model provides us with possible responses to cost containment policies. However, this does not tell us which response is most likely. Based on theory and empirics, some predictions can be made. To illustrate the model, I will describe the effects of four of the 
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most cited cost containment policies in detail: budgeting, cost sharing, benefit package restrictions and managed care organisations.  
 
Budgeting Budgeting is interpreted in the model as reducing the total budget T. Table 8.2 shows that reductions in the total budget invoke either a reduction in the number of providers or in the budget per provider (or both). Which of the two effects is predominant depends on the bargaining equation. A need for cost containment increases the purchaser’s value of excluding a provider from the contract, which reduces the purchaser’s bargaining surplus and reduces the agreed-upon budget. Therefore, it is more likely that reduction in the total budget manifest as reductions in the providers’ budgets rather than reductions in the number of providers, although some exits may occur to add credibility to the threat of no contract. Reductions in the number of providers are automatically adjusted for in the other equations but the last, which is indifferent to both options.   If provider budget reductions are most likely, in the third equation either the number of patients, the reimbursement rate or treatment intensity needs to be reduced. If reimbursement rates are flexible, as in the case of block grants, it is conceivable that providers reduce the reimbursement rates while keeping patient numbers and treatment intensity intact. However, the reimbursement rate can only be reduced up to the point where the reimbursement rate equals the cost price of treatment (given by the profit margin in the expense equation), and therefore reductions in the reimbursement rate are limited. This depends on profit status and competition in the market. A large reduction in the total budget, non-profit providers and competitive markets make it more likely that providers will either reduce treatment intensity or reduce the number of patients. Of these rationing strategies, the second is most likely: doctors may aim to help each patient as well as they can without concessions on treatment intensity, and then help the next patient, until the budget is depleted. In fact, this will lead to waiting lists if demand remains unchanged. Providers also have to reduce their expenses. Due to budgeting, therefore, a reduction may be expected in providers’ profitability, employment, capital investment and inputs. How providers cope with budget reductions on the expenses side is an empirical question, but some general effects may be expected. Capital expenses are relatively fixed, while labour tends to be slightly more flexible. The extent to which profits may be reduced depends on the proprietary status of providers and the competition in the market. Highly competitive, non-profit providers have fewer possibilities to reduce profits. Therefore, in competitive, non-profit markets, employment is most likely to be reduced. Lastly, the demand equation: if providers respond to budget reductions by reductions in reimbursements or reductions in 
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treatment intensity, the same number of patients can be treated for a lower total budget. However, we have postulated that reductions in the number of patients on the supply side are most likely. If fewer patients receive care without addressing demand for care, the supply will be insufficient to meet demand. This will manifest in patients that demand care cannot receive care. Therefore, budgeting is likely to increase waiting lists. If providers can selectively treat patients with low health status first, this may not be a major issue, but due to the difference between actual and perceived health status, patients may disproportionally oppose waiting lists. In conclusion, the model predicts that budgeting is most likely to contain total costs, increase waiting lists, reduce treatment intensity and reduce employment in healthcare, especially in non-profit, competitive markets with fixed reimbursement rates.   
Cost sharing Increased cost sharing is often proposed as a mean to reduce costs. In the equilibrium model, cost sharing manifests in the demand equation, where higher cost sharing causes more people to refrain from seeking care. The people that refrain from seeking care may be the people that value the care least, at the margin, but due to inconsistencies between perceived health and actual health, increased cost sharing may both increase overtreatment and reduce undertreatment. Furthermore, the disutility of seeking care depends on patient income, so lower incomes are more likely to refrain from seeking care when cost sharing increases.   The equilibrium equations predict that the reduction in demand leads either to increased reimbursement rates, increased treatment intensity or a reduced total budget. If providers and payer negotiate on reimbursement rates, treatment intensity may be increased or budgets may be reduced as a response to lower demand. As budget reductions require reductions in expenses (profits), while increases in treatment intensity do not, the latter may be preferred by providers. Changes in demand may have little influence on budget negotiations, only when changes in demand are known upfront by payers it may reduce the utility of contracting all providers slightly (       and thereby reduce the surplus of a positive bargaining outcome, which reduces   . More likely, the budget negotiations are unaffected by changes in demand, implying that providers react to lower demand by increasing treatment intensity or increasing the reimbursement rate. In the case of block grants, hospitals may treat fewer patients for the same budget, i.e. increase (shadow) reimbursement rates. Cost sharing therefore is likely to stimulate providers to 
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compensate by increasing treatment intensity and reimbursement rates17, unless purchasers anticipate reductions in demand in their budget negotiations. In that case, cost sharing may reduce total costs, with standard consequences on the provider expenses side (reduced profits, employment, inputs and/or investments).   
Benefit package restrictions Benefit package restrictions may reduce demand by reducing the utility of people to seek care: as some benefits cannot be obtained, people refrain from seeking care. Alternatively, benefit restriction may require people to pay the full price of treatment if they seek care, which drastically increase the cost sharing curve, and refrain people from seeking care. As benefit restrictions are based on actual health status rather than perceived health status, patients may oppose benefit restrictions. In both cases, demand is reduced and similar findings result as in the previous case: unless payers anticipate reductions in demand, purchasers compensate reduced demand by increasing treatment intensity. Furthermore, it may be conceivable that benefit package restrictions have little influence on patients’ decision to seek care. However, benefit package restrictions may limit provider treatment intensity for some patient groups. Providers can compensate this by increasing reimbursement rates or treatment intensity of unrestricted patient groups in the case of block grant negotiations or in the case of PxQ-negotiations or reimbursement rate negotiations, the utility of agreement of providers is lower, reducing the provider bargaining surplus, which increases the bargaining outcome. This effect partly compensates for cost containment effects. In conclusion, providers respond to benefit package restrictions by (1) increasing treatment intensity (of unrestricted patient groups), (2) increasing bargaining efforts/internal reimbursement rates. Therefore, cost containment effects of benefit restrictions may be limited.   
Managed care organisations Managed care organisations have been proposed as cost containment policy. Managed care organisations are allowed to have limited provider networks, increasing the utility of exclusion of a provider from the network. As a result, payer bargaining surplus is lower, reducing provider budgets and the number of providers. However, as we have seen, if supply-side cost containment is successful, waiting lists may emerge, unless demand, reimbursement rates or treatment intensity is reduced. MCO’s may respond to this by negotiating reductions in reimbursement rates, utilization controls and prior authorization 
                                                                17 If cost sharing is a function of reimbursement rates, hospitals are limited in increasing reimbursement rates as a response to lower demand, and budget reductions may be more likely. 
Chapter 8 
192 
 
to reduce treatment intensity and health promotion/prevention to reduce demand. Because MCOs may address multiple equilibriums, it may be expected that cost containment is relatively successful. As a consequence, on the payer side market exits and reduced employment, profits, investments and inputs may be expected. For example MCOs may negotiate lower prices for pharmaceuticals, thereby reducing provider input expenses. As provider may negotiate with payers other than MCOs, MCOs change the bargaining condition. On the one hand, due to the reduction in MCO budgets providers may value agreement with traditional plans more, which increases provider bargaining surplus and reduces the budget agreement between traditional plans and providers. On the other hand, demand reductions may increase the unmet need of patients, which implies that patients may value inclusive networks of traditional payers more. This lowers the utility of the payer fallback option, and reduces the bargaining outcome of traditional payers, increasing the provider budget. Increased payer competitiveness due to MCO could therefore have both positive and negative spillover effects on traditional payers. Furthermore, MCO strategies to reduce demand may be focused on health status rather than perceived need, reducing patient utility.   
Limitations Extending the model would provide insightful modelling possibilities. However, some reservations should be made. The model is designed specifically to assess the effect of cost containment policies, and may not be suited for assessment of other interventions. Secondly, the model remains a simplification of reality. This may suffice for most cost containment policies, but for specific policies, the model may be incomplete. For example, moving from fee-for-service to pay-for-performance payments may be challenging to assess in the current framework. Thirdly, parts of the model are still uncertain, specifically regarding behavioural responses. Although the model provides a set of possible responses, the most likely response may require empirical confirmation. As the model comprises of multiple individual agents in different roles, responses may depend on individual preferences, requiring agent-based model extensions. Lastly, if payers and providers incorporate the outcome of the model into negotiations, the model may suffer from the Lucas critique (Favero and Hendry, 1992).  
Model extensions The model at some points makes simplistic assumptions, necessary to keep the effects tractable, and distil general effects. However, extending the model may improve quantitative predictive capability. Some extensions have been mentioned. An overview of 
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proposed extensions is given in table 8.3, allowing design of an agent-based model which can be calibrated to specific health systems. This would allow better quantitative assessment of the impact of cost containment policies.   
Table 8.3: model extensions 
Extension Equilibrium Description  
distinguish between 
private and public 
spending 
Eq 1 
                   
Distinguish between 
sectors 
Eq 1                           Allows sector budgeting 
Introduce differences 
between payer 
bargaining 
Eq 2 Payers may have different motives (for-profit, non-profit, public) that influence their utility, and may influence responses to cost containment policy, for example in their response to reductions in demand. 
Endogenize bargaining 
function 
Eq 2 Payers may choose bargaining models based on preferences and implementation of cost containment policies.  
Explicate utility 
functions 
Eq 2 Explication of utility functions allow a mathematical solution to the bargaining maximization problem (Halbersma et al., 2011). 
Allow provider quality 
differences 
Eq 2  Cost containment policies may be directed through budget negotiation towards low-quality providers 
Explicate treatment 
intensity 
Eq 3 Valuation of treatment intensity in terms of patient utility 
Model provider 
responses 
Eq 3 Eq 4 Most likely response option depends on individual provider characteristics 
Model labour market Eq 4 Endogenize wage rate through labour market models 
Allow risk premiums Eq 4 Capital costs may depend on provider characteristics 
Explicate personnel 
composition 
Eq 4 Differences in personnel types, education and wage rates 
Allow differences in 
productivity 
Eq 2 Eq 4 Some providers may be more productive than others, which would influence bargaining positions 
Cost sharing depends on 
reimbursement rate 
Eq5 If cost sharing is a function of the reimbursement rate, increases in the reimbursement rate reduce demand.  
Model patient 
sentiments 
Eq 5 Patient utility may differ on culture and depend on local circumstances. E.g. cost sharing acceptance or different demand in a crisis 
Model income inequality Eq 5 Income inequality influences individual responsiveness to cost sharing 
Dynamic model all Multi-year models allow to trace policies over time and allow intertemporal effects (e.g. multi-year bargaining)      
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Summary Western economies have experienced healthcare cost growth over sustained periods of time. Healthcare cost containment holds the potential to prevent excess spending that adds little benefits, reduce crowding out of other valuable government expenditures, retain solidarity principles in healthcare and increase efficiency of spending. However, containing health care costs has been a challenge for most OECD member states. Countries have implemented an array of cost containment policies over the years, aiming to achieve these goals. In 2006, the Netherlands, aiming to contain costs and improve efficiency, introduced principles of managed competition into the health sector. This thesis inquires into the government aim of designing effective and efficient cost containment policies, using the Dutch hospital sector as case study. Four themes are defined, addressing knowledge gaps in the literature and aiming to improve understanding of the macro-level mechanisms of cost containment and quality improvement:  1) Effective cost containment policies at the government level;  2) The relation between cost containment and health outcomes at the macro level;  3) The role of purchasing in improving quality and containing costs;  4) Structural hospital characteristics associated with performance.  Collecting policy options to contain costs, 2250 policies from 710 articles since 1970 were categorized into 41 groups. Four primary categories for cost containment were identified: volume controls, price controls, budgeting and market oriented policies. Price controls and budgeting appeared substantially less often in literature. Market oriented policies were suggested more often for countries with public provision of health care, as well as for the US system. In contrast, budgeting was studied more extensively under market provision systems. Effectiveness of cost containment policy options was systematically reviewed, including 43 original studies and 18 systematic reviews. Payment reforms (10 studies), managed care (8 studies) and cost sharing (6 studies) were evaluated most. Of 41 major groups of cost-containment policies no evidence was available for 21 groups, while results for 13 groups were inconclusive. High-quality evidence suggests that a combination of cost sharing, managed care competition, reference pricing, generic substitution and tort reform may contain costs effectively.   Cost containment policies may affect health outcomes. For example, hospital budget reductions may displace existing, high-value care. By combining claims data, mortality data and quality of life questionnaires for 11,000 patient groups from 2012 to 2014, the value lost upon marginal reductions in hospital spending for the Netherlands was estimated. A fixed effects translog model estimated a threshold of €73,600 per quality adjusted life-year 
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(QALY), with 95% confidence intervals ranging from €53,000 to €94,000 per QALY. The outcome may be used by the Dutch government to determine the optimal hospital expenditure cap, improve allocative efficiency and effectively make decisions which technologies should be reimbursed as part of the mandatory benefit package.   To improve efficiency of spending, managed competition was implemented in the hospital sector in 2006. Meanwhile, non-competitive purchaser systems were retained for long-term care, home care and personal budgets. The hypothesis was tested that insurers under managed competition purchase more actively than the non-competitive purchaser systems by reallocating more market shares between providers. The Market Volatility Index (MVI), expressing cumulative changes in market share between providers as percentage of the total market, was calculated for each market using annual statements from 2006 to 2014. Finding equally low volatility for hospital care and long term care of between 2% and 3% of the total budget, the main hypothesis was rejected. A substantially larger MVI, between 6% and 13%, was found for municipalities (single payers) and personal budget holders. Robustness checks, adjusting for the influence of market entry and exit, provider size, selective contracting and percentage of fixed costs, supported these findings. Although the Dutch reform aimed to stimulate active purchasing by multiple payers, we find little evidence that managed competition increased budget reallocations between providers by means of active purchasing.   In assisted reproduction in the Netherlands, success rate improvements lower costs per patient, as fewer secondary treatments are necessary. Providers may lose revenue, unless success rate improvements attract a sufficient number of new patients. Well functioning purchaser systems would steer patients towards high-quality providers, thereby containing costs while providing incentives for hospitals to improve quality. Using nationwide registry data from 1996 to 2016, very limited evidence was found that high-quality clinics attracted more new patients. The net effect of quality increases was shown to be a small decline in revenue. Therefore, we concluded that quality improvements are insufficiently stimulated by patient choice and active purchasing. Nevertheless, clinics have improved quality drastically over the last years, showing that despite limited patient and payer responsiveness, the healthcare system goals of increased efficiency and lower costs are attained in assisted reproduction.   Private provision of hospital care has been suggested as a means to improve access, quality and efficiency in healthcare. Chapter 7 reviewed evidence from Italy, Germany, UK, France, Greece, Austria, Spain and Portugal, suggesting that public hospitals are at least as efficient as or are more efficient than private hospitals. Access to private hospitals is higher for more affluent populations, especially in parallel private systems such as the United 
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Kingdom and Greece. Evidence on quality of care is mixed. All in all, hospital ownership seems of relatively minor importance in determining hospital performance, although a number of factors, such as profit status and institutional setting, may confound this relationship.  This thesis set out to answer the question how governments, specifically the Dutch government, could contain costs effectively and efficiently. Literature reviews indicated that the Dutch government may contain costs effectively through (a combination of) budgeting and cost sharing, managed care and competition, as well as generic substitution and reference pricing. Budgeting may reduce health outcomes at the margin. The marginal value of hospital care, estimated at 73.600 per QALY, could guide policy makers in setting expenditure caps, assessing new technologies while monitoring and improving allocative efficiency. Managed care and competition may improve active purchasing through budget reallocations to high-quality providers. However, this may require active monitoring and intervention by the government, as currently managed competition in the Netherlands does not guarantee active reallocations. The results showed the complexity of containing costs effectively, supported by a multiple-equilibrium model presented in the discussion. Governments need to combine policies for multiple targets and monitor progress to attain the goals of efficiency improvements and cost containment.   Healthcare cost containment has been a major challenge, and will increasingly be so in the years to come. To target such a complex phenomenon, a broad and multi-layered approach is required. International research projects combining disciplines, approaches, study designs and levels of analysis are required to provide policy makers with some guidance to contain healthcare costs while retaining a high-quality, accessible healthcare system.    
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Samenvatting De uitgaven aan de gezondheidszorg stijgen elk jaar, niet alleen in Nederland, maar in alle Westerse landen. Gaven we in 1972 in Nederland minder dan 6% van het Bruto Binnenlands Product aan de zorg uit, inmiddels ligt dit percentage ruim boven de 10%. Factoren zoals innovaties en technologische ontwikkeling, demografische ontwikkelingen en leefstijltrends, stijgende inkomens en welvaart en een groeiende vraag naar hooggeschoold personeel dragen ertoe bij, dat de zorg harder groeit dan de economie. Deze groei is op termijn niet houdbaar. De stijgende zorgkosten moeten namelijk worden opgevangen door een stijging van premies en eigen betalingen, belastingen, staatsschuld of beperking van andere overheidsuitgaven zoals onderwijs en infrastructuur. Al deze maatregelen lopen op termijn tegen hun grenzen aan, wat kostenbeheersing noodzakelijk maakt. Bovendien wordt een deel van de zorguitgaven ondoelmatig besteed, zoals onderzoek naar praktijkvariatie, onnodige zorg en diagnostiek, overbehandeling, verspilling en fraude aantoont.   Internationaal ligt de grootste uitdaging voor de betaalbaarheid bij de ziekenhuissector. Deze sector neemt immers de meeste kosten voor haar rekening. Ook in Nederland is de ziekenhuiszorg de laatste jaren sterk gegroeid. De invoering van de Zorgverzekeringswet (Zvw) in 2006 heeft zorgverzekeraars een grote rol toebedeeld bij betaalbaarheid van de Nederlandse ziekenhuiszorg. De beleidstheorie veronderstelt dat zorgverzekeraars door het systeem van gereguleerde concurrentie worden gestimuleerd om actief en selectief de meest doelmatige zorg in te kopen. Dit zou de stijging van de zorguitgaven moeten beperken. Sinds 2012 wordt tevens getracht om door middel van hoofdlijnenakkoorden met de zorgsector de uitgavenontwikkeling te beteugelen. De overheid heeft in die zin een coördinerende rol in het betaalbaarheidvraagstuk. Ook bepaalt de Minister van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (VWS) welke zorg door de basisverzekering wordt vergoed. De Minister wordt hierin geadviseerd door het Zorginstituut Nederland. De stijgende zorguitgaven houdt de vraag relevant hoe deze effectief beheerst kunnen worden. De vraagstelling van deze thesis: hoe kunnen de zorguitgaven worden beperkt met behoud van doelmatigheid? Deze vraagstelling wordt gesplitst in vier subvragen:  
- Welk kostenbeheersingbeleid is effectief? 
- Welk effect heeft een beperking van ziekenhuisuitgaven op gezondheidsuitkomsten in Nederland? 
- Speelt actieve zorginkoop van zorgverzekeraars een rol bij doelmatigheid en betaalbaarheid? 
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- Zijn private ziekenhuizen doelmatiger dan publieke ziekenhuizen? Hoofdstuk 2 beoogt door middel van een classificatie van beleidsopties voor kostenbeheersing een antwoord te geven op de eerste deelvraag. Hiertoe zijn acht verschillende literatuurdatabases doorzocht op wetenschappelijke artikelen die één of meer beleidsopties benoemen voor één of meer landen van de Organisatie voor Economische Samenwerking en Ontwikkeling (OESO). In totaal zijn 2250 beleidsopties uit 710 artikelen verzameld. De meeste opties (52%) hadden betrekking op de Verenigde Staten (VS), gevolgd door Canada (9%) en Duitsland (7%). De beleidsopties werden ingedeeld vier hoofdgroepen. Een eerste groep maatregelen richt zich op het reguleren en beperken van de prijs van zorg. Hieronder vallen maatregelen die de hoogte van de vergoedingen reguleren en maatregelen die de kostprijs van loon en kapitaal reguleren. Een tweede groep van maatregelen betreft het beperken van het zorgvolume. Hieronder vallen maatregelen die de vraag naar zorg beperken en maatregelen die het zorgaanbod beperken. Een derde groep maatregelen heeft tot doel het totaal van prijzen en volumes door middel van budgettering te beperken. Een vierde groep maatregelen grijpt niet rechtstreeks in op prijzen of volumes, maar beoogt de marktprocessen te beïnvloeden die uiteindelijk de prijzen, volumes en zorguitgaven bepalen. Deze maatregelen richten zich bijvoorbeeld op de rol van de zorginkopers, zorgaanbieders en overheid, de mate van competitie en onderwerpen zoals transparantie en administratieve lasten. Omdat er altijd discussie mogelijk is over de indeling van afzonderlijke maatregelen werd de classificatie van de maatregelen onafhankelijk van elkaar uitgevoerd door twee onderzoekers. De meeste beleidsopties waren marktgericht, waarbij de VS oververtegenwoordigd was. In andere landen werden relatief vaak volumemaatregelen genoemd als kansrijk. Deze verdeling bleek relatief constant over tijd. Opvallend genoeg werd budgettering en regulering vooral gesuggereerd voor marktgerichte zorgstelsels, en marktgerichte maatregelen voor overheidsgereguleerde zorgstelsels. Hoewel dit literatuuronderzoek een uitgebreid overzicht biedt van de mogelijkheden tot kostenbeheersing, bevat het geen informatie over de effectiviteit ervan. De effectiviteit blijft dus een open vraag.    Ter beantwoording van deze vraag biedt hoofdstuk 3 een systematische literatuurstudie van beleidsopties die aantoonbaar effectief zijn. Daarbij excludeerden we studies die het effect van beleidsmaatregelen op ziekenhuis- of patiëntgroepniveau meten. Deze studies zeggen namelijk weinig over kostenbesparingen op een hoger aggregatieniveau, bijvoorbeeld omdat een ziekenhuis lagere uitgaven voor een patiëntgroep kan compenseren door hogere uitgaven voor andere patiëntgroepen of eventuele kostenbesparingen niet doorvertaalt naar de zorginkoper of premiebetaler. Om met meer zekerheid iets te kunnen zeggen over het 
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effect van beleidsopties op de totale kosten zijn alleen studies meegenomen die de uitgaven meten op het niveau van de maatschappij, zorginkoper of overheid. In totaal voldeden 43 onderzoeksartikelen en 18 literatuurstudies, voornamelijk afkomstig uit de VS, aan de inclusiecriteria. De 18 literatuurstudies bundelden de bevindingen van 341 onderzoeksartikelen. Maatregelen op het gebied van bekostigingssystematiek (10 studies), actieve zorginkopers (8 studies) en eigen betalingen (6 studies) waren het meest vertegenwoordigd. Ondanks de brede zoekstrategie werden voor 21 van de 41 groepen van beleidsopties helemaal geen evaluaties gevonden. De effecten van veel maatregelen op de zorgkosten zijn mogelijk niet of beperkt onderzocht omdat het lastig of onmogelijk is om op dit niveau gecontroleerde gerandomiseerde studies uit te voeren. Hierdoor is het risico op statistische afwijkingen (bias) groot. Uit evaluatie met een speciaal ontwikkeld analysekader blijkt dat 67% van de onderzoeksstudies een hoog risico op bias in minstens één van vijf domeinen van studiekwaliteit scoorde.     
 Figuur a: literatuuroverzicht evaluaties van bezuinigingsbeleid in OECD-landen  In totaal vond 61% van de studies een uitgavenbeperkend effect. De studies met de hoogste kwaliteit wijzen op uitgavenbeperkende effecten van eigen betalingen, actieve zorginkoop en concurrentie, referentieprijzen voor geneesmiddelen en generieke substitutie van geneesmiddelen (figuur a). Specifiek voor de VS is er bewijs dat hervorming van de aansprakelijkheid van medisch specialisten binnen het juridische systeem in lagere zorguitgaven resulteert. Een nadeel van dit onderzoek is dat alleen het effect op de zorguitgaven wordt gemeten en dat het effect van beleidsmaatregelen op doelmatigheid, toegankelijkheid of gelijkheid buiten beschouwing blijft. De resultaten tonen aan dat 
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specifieke beleidsmaatregelen lang niet altijd effectief zijn. Een mogelijke verklaring hiervoor is het optreden van weglekeffecten. Een combinatie van maatregelen gericht op het beperken van weglekeffecten zou daarom wel eens effectiever kunnen zijn dan het treffen van afzonderlijke beleidsmaatregelen.   Hoofdstuk 4 is gewijd aan de tweede deelvraag en betreft het marginale gezondheidseffect van veranderingen in ziekenhuisuitgaven. Een beperking van de ziekenhuisuitgaven kan ten koste gaan van de kwaliteit van zorg (een marginaal gezondheidseffect). Omgekeerd kan een toename van de ziekenhuisuitgaven extra gezondheid opleveren mits wordt geïnvesteerd in doelmatige zorg. Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt de relatie tussen een verandering aan de marge in ziekenhuisuitgaven en gezondheidsuitkomsten. Deze relatie is ook van belang bij de toelating van nieuwe geneesmiddelen en behandelingen in het ziekenhuisbudget. Door nieuwe dure geneesmiddelen is bijvoorbeeld minder geld beschikbaar voor andere ziekenhuiszorg. Zeker als de toegevoegde waarde van een nieuw geneesmiddel beperkt is, kan het beschikbare geld wellicht beter worden besteed aan andere ziekenhuisdiensten. Om de marginale waarde van reguliere ziekenhuisuitgaven te berekenen werden de declaratiedata van 2012 tot 2014 gekoppeld aan sterftedata en data over de kwaliteit van leven. Alle ziekenhuisuitgaven werden aan de hand van de declaraties onderverdeeld in 17.000 groepen op basis van leeftijd, geslacht en diagnose. Vervolgens werd van elke groep de sterfte en gemiddelde kwaliteit van leven verzameld, en tevens hoeveel gezonde levensjaren door sterfte en ziekte verloren zijn gegaan, uitgedrukt in Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs), het aantal levensjaren dat in goede gezondheid wordt doorgebracht. Met behulp van een fixed-effects translog-model werd het gemiddelde effect van een verandering in uitgaven in elke groep op de verandering in het aantal verloren gezonde levensjaren geschat. Door veranderingen van het aantal patiënten en gezondheidstrends mee te nemen werd gecorrigeerd voor de mogelijkheid dat zowel kosten als sterfte afnemen omdat de patiëntgroep gezonder wordt. Tevens werd gecorrigeerd voor de toename in uitgaven als gevolg van een hogere sterfte (correctie voor hoge kosten in het laatste levensjaar).   Het model resulteerde in een geschatte marginale waarde voor ziekenhuisuitgaven van €73,600 per QALY. Dit impliceert dat toelating van nieuwe geneesmiddelen of behandelingen die meer kosten om een QALY op te leveren niet de maximale gezondheidswinst opleveren. Deze uitkomsten hangen niet zozeer af van leeftijd: een extra euro levert ongeveer evenveel gezondheidswinst op bij ouderen als jonge patiënten. Per ziektecategorie werden wel verschillen gevonden. Zo werd de marginale waarde van extra uitgaven aan bloedziekten en zwangerschap- en perinatale zorg lager geschat dan de 
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marginale waarde voor uitgaven aan zenuwziekten en infectieziekten (figuur b). Dit toont aan dat ook binnen een ziekenhuis mogelijkheden zijn om de doelmatigheid van de zorguitgaven te verbeteren. De schattingen zijn echter met grote onzekerheid omgeven. Dit komt bijvoorbeeld omdat de kosten in het laatste levensjaar per ziektebeeld sterk kunnen verschillen. Data van meerdere jaren en nauwkeurige schattingen van kosten in de laatste levensfase per ziektebeeld kunnen een nauwkeurigere schatting opleveren die betere aanknopingspunten oplevert voor het verbeteren van de doelmatigheid van bestedingen in het ziekenhuis.  
 Figuur b: geschatte marginale waarde van uitgaven aan verschillende ziektecategorieën   Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt de zorginkoop (derde deelvraag). Zorginkopers kunnen doelmatigheid stimuleren door de beschikbare middelen te sturen naar de meest doelmatige aanbieders. Aldus zal het marktaandeel van deze aanbieders worden uitgebreid. Actieve zorginkoop is hiermee een hoeksteen van het zorgstelsel. Wij onderzochten de mate van verschuivingen in marktaandeel tussen aanbieders. Deze verschuivingen werden tussen 2007 en 2014 gemeten in vier zorgsectoren: de medisch-specialistische zorg in het kader van de Zvw, de langdurige ouderen- en gehandicaptenzorg in het kader van de (inmiddels voormalige) Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten (AWBZ), de huishoudelijke hulp en maatschappelijke ondersteuning in het kader van de Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning (Wmo) en de persoonsgebonden budgetten (pgb) in het kader van de AWBZ en Wmo.  Ziekenhuiszorg wordt ingekocht door concurrerende zorgverzekeraars binnen een systeem dat actieve zorginkoop stimuleert. Langdurige zorg wordt door regionale zorgkantoren ingekocht, die bij gebrek aan onderlinge competitie weinig prikkels ervaren om actief in te kopen. Bovendien moeten zorgkantoren eventuele besparingen afdragen aan de overheid. Gemeenten, verantwoordelijk voor de Wmo-zorg, hebben wel een sterke 
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prikkel om actief in te kopen, omdat eventuele besparingen vrij besteed mogen worden. Ook cliënten met een pgb zijn naar verwachting kritisch in hun keuze voor een zorgaanbieder.  De marktaandelen van de aanbieders worden bepaald door de omzet uit de vier sectoren, afkomstig uit de jaarverslagen van de instellingen van 2007 tot 2014, te delen door de totale uitgaven aan deze sectoren. De hypothese is dat in sectoren met veel actieve inkoop meer verschuivingen van zorgmiddelen plaatsvinden dan in markten met passieve zorginkoop. Een analyse van de verschuivingen in de afzonderlijke sectoren (figuur c) laat zien dat budgetverschuivingen tussen langdurige zorgaanbieders relatief beperkt zijn (tussen 2% en 3% van het totale budget) en budgetverschuivingen in de Wmo-zorg en Pgb-zorg relatief hoog zijn (9% en 10%). Dit is in overeenstemming met de hypothese. Anders dan verwacht blijken de budgetverschuivingen tussen ziekenhuizen (tussen 2% en 3%) relatief laag en vergelijkbaar met de verschuivingen in de langdurige zorg. Dit suggereert dat actieve inkoop door herverdeling van budgetten in deze sector beperkt is. Deze bevinding wordt ondersteund door enkele aanvullende analyses. Toetreding en uittreding van de markt hebben maar een zeer beperkt effect op de budgetverschuivingen. Ook werd geen relatie gevonden tussen de intensiteit van selectieve contractering en budgetverschuivingen. Dit is opnieuw een mogelijke indicatie dat selectieve contractering niet leidt tot herverdeling van middelen naar doelmatige aanbieders.  
 Figuur c: Percentage van de totale uitgaven dat verschuift tussen aanbieders in vijf sectoren, 2007-2014   Budgetverschuivingen zijn echter een onvolledige indicator voor actieve inkoop; andere factoren, zoals verbouwingen, demografische ontwikkelingen en strategische keuzes van het ziekenhuis kunnen ook leiden tot marktverschuivingen. De mate van budgetverschuiving is daarom een overschatting van actieve zorginkoop. Bovendien kan de mate van zorginkoop 
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tussen sectoren verschillen. Zo tonen analyses aan dat een hoge mate van gebouwgebonden kosten (kapitaalintensiteit) samenhangt met beperkte budgetverschuivingen. De kapitaalintensiteit in de ziekenhuissector is echter lager dan in de langdurige zorg, waardoor in deze sector een hoger niveau van budgetverschuivingen te verwachten valt. Dit is nog een indicatie dat de mate van budgetverschuivingen bij ziekenhuizen relatief laag is. Gereguleerde concurrentie lijkt dus minder marktdynamiek in de ziekenhuissector teweeg te brengen dan verwacht. Het blijft echter een lastige vraag hoe groot budgetverschuivingen zouden moeten zijn om de doelmatigheid te verbeteren en prikkels te geven voor kwaliteitsverbetering. Mogelijk dat kleine budgetverschuivingen al het gewenste effect opleveren. Het is onbekend in hoeverre de gemeten beperkte budgetverschuivingen aan de doelmatigheid van de zorginstellingen zijn gerelateerd.  Of een actieve zorginkoop de doelmatigheid van de zorg bevordert is tevens onderzocht aan de hand van de relatie tussen kwaliteit en patiëntenstromen bij reageerbuisbevruchting (hoofdstuk 6). Bij reageerbuisbevruchting wordt verwacht dat patiënten actief kiezen voor de kliniek die de beste kwaliteit levert. Een hoge kwaliteit gaat bovendien gepaard met lage kosten: een hoger succespercentage leidt immers tot minder IVF pogingen per patiënt. Kwaliteitsverbetering leidt zo ook tot lagere zorgdeclaraties bij de verzekeraar. Voor de klinieken is dus een toename van patiënten noodzakelijk om de daling van de vergoedingen door een hogere succeskans te compenseren. Dit kan een barrière vormen voor kwaliteitsverbetering.   Om te onderzoeken of een hoger succespercentage meer nieuwe patiënten aantrekt werden aantallen behandelingen en succespercentages van de 15 vruchtbaarheidsklinieken in Nederland van 1997-2016 verzameld. Een fixed-effects regressie toonde aan dat een stijging van het succespercentage geen significant effect had op het aantal behandelingen in het volgende jaar. Nadere analyse toonde aan dat klinieken in de Randstad meer nieuwe patiënten aantrekken als gevolg van een hoger succespercentage, maar dat dit niet voldoende is om de daling in het aantal secundaire behandelingen per patiënt te compenseren. De invoering van de zorgverzekeringswet in 2006 heeft geen significante invloed gehad op deze relatie. De conclusie is daarom dat klinieken netto geen financiële prikkel hebben om de kwaliteit te verbeteren. Toch is de kwaliteit over de gehele linie sterk verbeterd in 20 jaar. Dit onderschrijft het belang van niet-financiële prikkels voor de verbetering van de kwaliteit.   Hoofdstuk 7 betreft de vierde deelvraag en onderzoekt eventuele verschillen tussen publieke en private ziekenhuizen in kwaliteit, doelmatigheid en toegankelijkheid. Het 
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overgrote deel van de Nederlandse ziekenhuizen zijn stichtingen: private partijen die geen winst uitkeren aan aandeelhouders. Nederland kent momenteel ook een verbod op winstuitkering in de ziekenhuiszorg. Veel andere landen kennen meer variatie en hebben ziekenhuizen die in bezit zijn van de overheid of die winst uitkeren aan private eigenaren. In de Verenigde Staten is al veel onderzoek gedaan naar het effect van winstuitkering op de kwaliteit, doelmatigheid (kosten) en toegang tot zorg. Hierbij worden veelal wisselende effecten gevonden. Voor Europa is vooral het onderscheid tussen publiek en privaat eigenaarschap relevant, doordat veel zorgstelsels een relatief groot aandeel publieke ziekenhuizen kennen. Dit gaf aanleiding om een literatuurstudie te ondernemen naar verschillen tussen publieke en private ziekenhuizen binnen Europa op het gebied van kwaliteit, toegankelijkheid en doelmatigheid.   In totaal werden 45 studies uit Italië, Duitsland, Engeland, Frankrijk, Griekenland, Oostenrijk, Spanje en Portugal geïncludeerd. Deze studies laten wisselende resultaten zien. Zes studies vinden geen verschil in doelmatigheid en efficiëntie tussen ziekenhuizen in publiek en privaat eigenaarschap, acht studies vinden dat de doelmatigheid in publieke ziekenhuizen hoger ligt, en twee studies vinden juist dat private ziekenhuizen hun middelen doelmatiger besteden. Ook op het gebied van kwaliteitsuitkomsten was geen duidelijke trend zichtbaar. In 18 studies bleken publieke ziekenhuizen toegankelijker voor patiënten met lage inkomens of patiënten met een hoge zorgzwaarte. Hier stond echter tegenover dat vijf van deze studies aantonen dat private ziekenhuizen op sommige aspecten van toegankelijkheid beter scoren, bijvoorbeeld door kortere wachtlijsten.   De grote verschillen in zorgstelsels binnen Europa, en de verschillende rollen van publieke en private ziekenhuizen in het zorgstelsel, kunnen een verklaring zijn voor de wisselende uitkomsten. De context kan mogelijk een grotere invloed hebben op de uitkomsten dan het eigenaarschap van het ziekenhuis. Enkele studies vinden wel aanwijzingen dat private ziekenhuizen sterker reageren op financiële prikkels. Mogelijk is een goedwerkende bekostigingssystematiek daarom belangrijker in stelsels met veel private ziekenhuizen. In zoverre de resultaten te extrapoleren zijn naar Nederland, zou de conclusie kunnen zijn dat andere factoren zoals bekostiging wellicht zwaarder wegen dan privaat eigenaarschap van ziekenhuizen in hun invloed op betaalbaarheid en doelmatigheid.   
Conclusie en beleidsaanbevelingen Dit proefschrift biedt verschillende aanknopingspunten om de zorguitgaven te beperken en de doelmatigheid mogelijk te verbeteren. Ten eerste wordt aanbevolen beleidsmaatregelen uit verschillende categorieën te combineren om weglekeffecten te beperken. De complexiteit van het zorgstelsel vraagt een veelzijdige en multidisciplinaire aanpak om de 
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zorguitgaven te beheersen. Hoewel enkele kansrijke maatregelen zijn geïdentificeerd, zoals eigen betalingen, actieve zorginkoop, generieke substitutie en referentieprijzen, biedt een combinatie van verschillende maatregelen het beste perspectief om weglekeffecten tegen te gaan en zorguitgaven te beheersen. Een model in appendix 2 van hoofdstuk 8 beschrijft weglekeffecten in detail en kan houvast bieden bij het ontwikkelen van effectieve combinaties van kostenbeheersingbeleid. Ten tweede wordt aanbevolen om de marginale waarde van ziekenhuiszorg routinematig te meten ter ondersteuning van hoofdlijnenakkoorden voor de ziekenhuissector. Een te ruime (beperkte) groeiruimte voor ziekenhuisuitgaven zal immers de marginale waarde doen dalen (stijgen). Deze informatie dient te worden gecombineerd met schattingen van de marginale waarde van andere sectoren om de verdeling van middelen over sectoren te verbeteren, en met schattingen van de maatschappelijke bereidheid te betalen voor een QALY, om het maatschappelijk gewenste niveau van zorguitgaven te bepalen. Al met al is nog veel verdiepend onderzoek nodig om de verdeling van middelen te baseren op de marginale waarde van alternatieve bestedingen. De derde aanbeveling is om actieve zorginkoop door middel van herverdeling van budgetten en patiëntenstromen in de ziekenhuiszorg te verbeteren. Dit proefschrift toont aan dat de beleidstheorie van scherp inkopende zorgverzekeraars in de ziekenhuissector nog beperkt is waargemaakt. Hier zijn veel verschillende verklaringen voor, zoals hoge marktconcentratie en marktmacht van ziekenhuizen, gebrek aan patiëntvertrouwen in de verzekeraar, gebrek aan transparantie van uitkomsten en beperkingen op het gebied van selectief contracteren. Het aanpakken van deze tekortkomingen kan de actieve inkoop van zorgverzekeraars verhogen en de werking van het stelsel verbeteren. Mogelijk hebben verzekeraars behalve budgetverschuivingen nog andere middelen om de doelmatigheid en betaalbaarheid in de ziekenhuissector te verhogen; dit vereist meer onderzoek. Tot slot wordt aanbevolen om op alle niveaus de transparantie te verhogen. Bijvoorbeeld door bezuinigingsbeleid te monitoren en evalueren, de effecten van zorginkoop van verzekeraars beter in kaart te brengen, de marginale waarde van zorg te meten en de kwaliteitsuitkomsten van zorgaanbieders openbaar te maken. Verantwoording door alle partijen voor de geleverde prestaties kan de overheid, zorginkopers en zorgaanbieders motiveren de prestaties te verbeteren en de doelmatigheid en betaalbaarheid te garanderen.    
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Dankwoord Wellicht wekt een promotietraject de indruk een eenzame prestatie te zijn van dagen achtereen alleen achter de computer zwoegen. Dit proefschrift is vooral ontstaan in samenspel en door bijdragen van vele personen. Ik ben grote dank verschuldigd aan alle personen die me geholpen, ondersteund, beïnvloed en geïnspireerd hebben tijdens het onderzoek en schrijven van het proefschrift. In het bijzonder is er één persoon zonder wie dit proefschrift nooit tot stand was gekomen. Patrick, je hebt me de kans gegeven om deze uitdaging aan te gaan, en me gedurende het traject ontzettend veel vertrouwen en ondersteuning gegeven. Ik ben je erg dankbaar voor alle tijd en geduld die je voor me op hebt weten te brengen, en alle ruimte die je me gaf om mijn onderzoeksinteresses na te streven en uit te bouwen. Ik heb veel bewondering voor de manier waarop je onze groep leidt, vormt en verder brengt, en ik ben erg blij dat we deze prettige samenwerking kunnen voortzetten. Veel dank voor alle ondersteuning in de afgelopen jaren.  Ook mijn andere begeleiders ben ik veel dank verschuldigd. Xander, ik kon erg genieten van onze overleggen: het kantoortje op de VU in Amsterdam was gevuld met kennis, discussie en wetenschap, en liet me geïnspireerd en gemotiveerd achter. Als ik vast zat, kon een enkele aanwijzing me weer uit de brand helpen, en jouw aandacht voor mijn persoonlijke en wetenschappelijke ontwikkeling waardeer ik zeer. Marit, dank dat je de begeleiding op je hebt genomen. Het was erg fijn dat je orde en structuur hebt aangebracht in de dagelijkse gang van zaken, en dat je altijd en overal bereikbaar was. Het was ontzettend fijn om met je samen te werken, en ik heb veel van je geleerd. Hans, jouw bestuurskundige inbreng en visie was van grote waarde voor dit proefschrift. Ik ben me ervan bewust dat het niet altijd meeviel om het belang van politieke en maatschappelijke context over te brengen aan een simpele econoom als ik. Je was altijd bereid om me weer op het goede pad te sturen en mijn schrijfstijl te verbeteren. Ik hoop dat dit in het proefschrift terug te zien is, dank voor al het geduld! Eddy, als mentor heb je mijn ontwikkelingen op de voet gevolgd, en dat heeft geleid tot een succesvolle samenwerking op een onderzoeksproject en twee artikelen. Ik vind het zeer prettig samenwerken, en hoop dat dit in de toekomst voortgezet kan worden.   Floris en Florien, dank dat jullie jezelf wilden opofferen als paranimfen, jullie zijn hele fijne collega’s en vrienden, en ik hoop dat de gezellige sfeer die jullie in de groep hebben gecreëerd nog lang in stand blijft. Wieteke, Joost en Inger, ik mocht samen met jullie als eerste lichting promovendi optrekken. Ik heb veel steun aan jullie gehad, en veel van jullie geleerd. Ik ging met plezier naar werk, en wist dat ik met problemen bij jullie terecht kon. Dank voor de hele prettige samenwerking de afgelopen vijf jaar. Karel Peter, ik kan 
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genieten van onze gesprekken over geschiedenis, politiek, tuinieren en chihuahua’s. Jolanda, veel dank voor het helpen bij het opstellen van dit boekje, en dank voor je grote behulpzaamheid bij het draaiend houden van de leerstoelgroep.   Ook ben ik veel dank verschuldigd aan alle andere personen die onderdeel maakten van het Celsus programma. De wekelijkse bijeenkomsten gaven vaak de noodzakelijke momenten ter bezinning en reflectie. Stef, Philip, Yvonne, Angelique, Hilly, Henny, Gert, Mariëlle, allen dank voor de kritische vragen en opbouwende kritiek tijdens de Celsus-bijeenkomsten. Hierbij wil ik de buitenpromovendi, met name Luc en Christiaan, zeker niet vergeten te noemen. Voorts een dankbetuiging aan de collega’s van IQ healthcare, en niet in de laatste plaats aan Irah, Daniëlle, Myriam en Yvonne voor de onmisbare ondersteuning. Jan Kremer, dank voor de inspirerende gesprekken! Alle vriendelijke en kundige collega’s van IQ healthcare maken dit werk zo leuk. Daarom kijk ik ernaar uit om de komende jaren nog met jullie samen te werken, in het bijzonder met Simone, Stefan, Erik, Daniëlle, Toine als kern van de nieuwe leerstoel betaalbare zorg.   Veel dank aan alle stagiaires die ik heb mogen te begeleiden, te weten Aniek, Inci, Max, Berend, Thom, Anthony, Berend, Monique, Dominiek, Richard, Bas. Dank voor jullie bovenmatige inzet voor het onderzoek naar betaalbaarheid. Ik hoop dat ik jullie een fractie heb kunnen bijbrengen van wat jullie mij hebben geleerd. Bijzonder was ook de samenwerking met het ministerie van VWS en de directie MEVA. Ik heb erg genoten van de maandelijkse bijeenkomsten, en heb altijd veel gastvrijheid en ondersteuning mogen ervaren van mijn oud-collega’s. In het bijzonder dank aan Marianne, Corine, Anoushka, Victor, Valentin, Katja, Richard, Jan Derk, Evert Jan, Joens, Rafael, Gert-Anne, Paul, Roy, Arne, Stef, Joost, Caroline, Remco en Nikki en alle andere oud collega’s. Ook heb ik het genoegen gehad te mogen samenwerken met het Zorginstituut Nederland; Joost, Christel, Jaqueline en Saskia, dank voor de fijne samenwerking. Ook dank aan Geert, Wija, en de consortiumpartners van de Universiteit Utrecht, Ecorys Rotterdam en de Universiteit van Maastricht. Special thanks to James, Jessica, Karl and colleagues of the Centre of Health Economics and the University of York for your wisdom and guidance. Dank aan Colene Zomer en Mediquest voor de prettige samenwerking in het onderzoek naar selectieve contractering. Tijdens symposia en congressen heb ik vele intelligente en inspirerende mede-promovendi mogen ontmoeten. Graag wil ik Kati, Benjamin, Sander, Arthur, Raf en vele andere promovendi van andere universiteiten danken voor de inspiratie en kennisdeling.  Hiernaast wil ik van de gelegenheid gebruik maken om de belangrijke personen in mijn leven te danken voor hun steun en verdraagzaamheid. Uiteraard ben ik veel dank verschuldigd aan mijn ouders, Hans en Ellen, voor het doorgeven van hun genen en een 
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bijbehorende voortreffelijke opvoeding. Ik weet niet of het Nature of nurture is, maar ik ben blij en trots dat ik steeds meer op jullie ben gaan lijken. Dank voor alle ongelimiteerde steun en vertrouwen. Bart en Lian, broer en zusje, ik ben erg blij dat we het onderling zo goed kunnen vinden. Jullie zijn fantastische mensen, dank voor jullie voorbeeld en vriendschap!   Ik ben erg blij dat onze familieband zo sterk is, en dat omvat uiteraard ook jullie: Peggy, Jaro, Roel, Rian, Henri, Henk. Jullie maken de familie Stadhouders compleet. Ook dank aan alle ooms en tantes, neven en nichten van de familie Loonen, ik ben trots om onderdeel van deze grote familie uit te maken. En al 11 jaar lang wordt ik met ontzettende warmte opgenomen in mijn ‘tweede’ familie. Karel, Nettie, Eveline, Abbe, Rosa, Jonas, Christine en Berend, dank voor alle warmte en gezelligheid tijdens alle feesten, verjaardagen, de Weerter Kermis, carnaval, vakanties en Sinterklaasavonden. Ik kan me geen betere schoonfamilie voorstellen. Dit geldt ook zeker voor alle ooms en tantes, neven en nichten van de familie Pacilly en Huisman. Ik geniet altijd erg van de familiedagen en kerstborrels.   Mijn dankbetuiging is niet compleet zonder het noemen van de ‘Mojo Tilburg’ mannen: Bart, Jaap, Robert, Mark, Rob, Bas, Bob, Rick en Jordi. Zonder jullie zou dit proefschrift wellicht een stukje voller zijn geworden, maar mijn leven minder goed gevuld. Hopelijk mogen de jaarlijkse mannenweekenden nog lang legendarisch blijven. Ik ben ook ontzettend dankbaar dat ik mijn vrienden van de middelbare school niet uit het oog verloren ben. Remco, Erik, Mick, Martin, Rogier: onze groep is als een barbecue: verschillende soorten vlees die in dezelfde marinade sudderen. Ik hoop dat het vuur nog lang blijft branden.   Erika, het carpoolen was altijd een gezellig moment om de dag door te nemen, fijn dat we dit voort kunnen zetten tijdens gezellige avondjes met jou en Rens. Mark, Anne en Carline, jullie zijn een inspirerend gezinnetje, hopelijk kunnen we nog vaak van jullie 
gemütlichkeit genieten. Anne, veel dank voor het ontwerpen van de kaft, hij is erg mooi geworden! Ik vind het leuk dat we nog met zoveel oud-studiegenoten van biologie regelmatig afspreken. Dank jullie allemaal voor alle leuke spelletjesavonden, feestjes, boekenclubs en uitstapjes.  Dank aan de cavia’s Witje en Bruintje voor alle knuffels; een wijs persoon zei ooit dat alle promovendi eigenlijk een huisdier zouden moeten hebben, en ik ben het helemaal met haar eens. Dit brengt me bij de persoon die het meest voor mij betekent: mijn vrouw, mijn beste vriendin, mijn steun en toeverlaat. Francine, bedankt voor alle steun, bemoedigende woorden en leuke momenten in de afgelopen jaren. We hebben samen al veel mooie dingen meegemaakt, ervaringen opgedaan en mooie reizen gemaakt, en ik hoop dat ik alle gebeurtenissen die het leven in petto heeft met jou mag blijven delen. Het is een feest om samen met jou te zijn, bedankt dat je zo ontzettend leuk bent!   
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